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"WE ARE FAMILY"*: VALUING
ASSOCIATIONALISM IN DISPUTES OVER
CHILDREN'S SURNAMES
MERLE H. WEINER**
An increasing volume of litigation has arisen between divorced
or separated parents concerning the surnames of their minor
children. For example, a newly divorced mother will sometimes
petition the court to change her child's surname from the surname
of the absent father to the mother's birth surname or her
remarried surname. Courts adjudicating such petitions usually
apply one of three standards: a presumption favoring the status
quo, a "best interest of the child" test, or a custodial parent
presumption. In this Article, Professor Merle Weiner argues that
all three of these standards are flawed-either in their express
requirements or in their application by the courts-because they
reflect men's conception of surnames and undervalue
associationalist principles.
After setting forth her feminist methodology, Professor Weiner
explores the differences between men's and women's experiences
with their own surnames. Professor Weiner argues that because
men typically retain their surnames from birth to death, many
men come to believe that a constant surname is essential for a
stable sense of identity. Women, by contrast, are more
accustomed to surnominal alterity because they often change their
names upon marriage. Women generally conceive of surnames as
markers of association-i.e., a surname indicates "I am presently
associated with family members in this household." Professor
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Weiner also discusses other differences between men's and
women's views of surnames, including the belief of many men,
but not women, that a non-custodial parent and his child need to
share the same surname in order to preserve a strong filial bond.
Professor Weiner argues that the male conception of surnames
pervades all of the standards presently used by the courts to
adjudicate name change disputes, and the courts ignore or
undervalue the female conception of surnames. This gender bias
is unfortunate, Professor Weiner contends, because the female
associationalist perspective is more consistent with children's
interests, and better comports with the values that courts should
be promoting in the context of marital dissolution.
Professor Weiner suggests various alternatives for reform. She
argues that equal protection litigation and the education of judges
are not sufficient to ensure that associationalism receives the
attention it deserves in name change disputes. Professor Weiner
concludes by proposing a "family association rule." This rule
would require courts to grant the custodial parent's name change
petition provided that an associational justification exists. The
rule carves out an exception if the non-custodial parent
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that serious harm
to the child would result from the name change. While
recognizing the limitations of this solution, Professor Weiner
contends that it offers the best promise of ensuring that
associationalist principles guide the adjudication of name change
disputes involving children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alan Gubernat killed his three-year-old son and himself three
days after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that the boy
would bear his mother's surname, Deremer, rather than the surname
Gubernat.' No one had foreseen that this naming dispute would lead
to such disastrous consequences. The court described Mr. Guber-
nat's relationship with his son as "loving and supportive."2  Mr.
Gubernat's own lawyer said," 'The quality of the relationship he had
with this child is so contrary to this, so antipodal.' , Even Mr. Gu-
bernat's psychologist had seen no forewarning of the tragedy.!
Though Mr. Gubernat was by all accounts a "doting" father5 he
would sooner murder his own son than endure the ignominy of per-
mitting the boy to bear the maternal surname.
1. See Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. 1995) (adjudicating name dis-
pute of non-marital child); Doting Father Kills Son, Self After Losing Battle Over Name,
L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at A20 [hereinafter Doting Father Kills Son].
2. See Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 870.
3. Paula Span, Killing Ends Fight Over Child's Name: Officials Say Father Shot Son,
Self After Court Ruled for Mother, WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at Al.
4. See id.
5. See Doting Father Kills Son, supra note 1, at A20.
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Mr. Gubernat's fatal obsession with his son's surname provides
a disturbing backdrop against which to analyze the law governing the
changing of children's surnames. To be sure, most disputes over
children's surnames never result in litigation, let alone murder or
suicide. In cases that do not reach the legal system, the selection of a
child's cognomen may be influenced by statute,' testamentary in-
strument,7 third-party contract,' pre-existing agreement between the
parents,9 relatives' pleas,10 family custom,11 parental negotiation, 2 ma-
6. See, e.g., Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1209-10 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding con-
stitutionality of statute setting parameters for choice of child's surname); Robertson v.
Pfister, 523 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 382.16 (West 1985) (repealed 1987), requiring mother to give child con-
ceived during marriage father's surname); see also infra note 591 (citing statutes setting
parameters for choice of child's surname).
7. See L. I. Reiser, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Provision in Will or Trust In-
strument, Conditioning Gift on Beneficiary's Assumption or Retention of Family Name, 38
A.L.R.2d 1343, 1344 (1954).
8. See Lewis C. Warden, Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Contract in Con-
sideration of Naming Child, 21 A.L.R.2d 1061, 1063 (1952).
9. Couples sometimes try to avoid disputes over their children's surnames with pre-
marital agreements, see, e.g., Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 52 (Wyo. 1993)(presenting a pre-marital agreement under dispute that provided, "Any progeny resulting
from the union of this couple shall bear the surname of the father .... "), or separation
agreements, see, e.g., Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 356, 356 (App. Div.)(presenting separation agreement that provided," 'wife agrees not to change the surname
of the child, formally or informally, without the husband's express written assent
thereto' "), appeal dismissed, 489 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1985).
10. Cf RICHARD D. ALFORD, NAMING AND IDENTITY: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY
OF PERSONAL NAMING PRACTICES 128-29 (1988) (noting that mothers receive pressure
from friends or relatives in seven percent of initial naming decisions); Frank F. Fursten-
berg, Jr. & Kathy Gordon Talvitie, Children's Names and Paternal Claims, 1 J. FAM.
ISSUES 31, 40 (1980) (commenting that adolescent mothers sometimes defer to a relative,
usually the adolescent's mother, in the selection of a first name for a non-marital child);
Robert R. Holt, Studies in the Psychology of Names 153 (1939) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Princeton University) (copies available from the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library,
Princeton University Archives, Princeton, NJ, 08544) (discussing example of woman who
named daughter-in-law's first child).
11. As one scholar warned, albeit in another context, "'Domestic law' should not be
understood as trivial." Carol Weisbrod, Family Governance: A Reading of Kafka's Letter
to His Father, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 689, 706 n.92 (1993) (describing family eating rules ex-
perienced by Franz Kafka as a boy).
12. Cf. Internet survey (response of Karen Clark) (results on file with author)(explaining that child will use father's surname even though mother usually uses her birth
name because "I have chosen not [to] pursue that battle in favor of other concessions").
As I was expecting a baby in August 1997, I joined an Internet list for people who were
expecting a baby then. In mid-May, I sent the following questions to the 220 individuals
who were on the list: "Is your last name the same as your partner's last name? If not,
what will be the baby's last name? Why did you decide upon that last name? How did you
arrive at the decision? Who was involved in the decision?" I received fifteen replies. See
id.; cf Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
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ternal or paternal monopolization of the decision, 3 brute strength,"
or even a coin toss. 5  Yet countless naming disputes still enter the
legal system.6 Although judicial involvement is not new,17 since the
1960s an increasing number of these disputes have resulted in litiga-
tion."8 This trend has been accelerated by the influence of the
feminist movement, 9 women's increased participation in the labor
REV. 615, 668 (1992) (noting, in a discussion of custody rules, that "family members['] ...
interactions involve an intricate pattern of exchanges, decisions, assignments of tasks, and
spheres of authority that [are] shaped by preferences, values, and external pressures").
13. Cf ALFORD, supra note 10, at 167, 126, 128 (demonstrating that mothers mo-
nopolize approximately 25% of decisions regarding newborns' first names in the United
States compared to 9% of fathers; however, fathers make a greater proportion of the first
name decisions as economic class increases, with upper-middle class fathers making 23.5%
of the decisions and upper-middle class mothers making only 11.8%). African-American
and American-Indian mothers are much more likely to monopolize first name decisions
than Caucasian mothers. See id. at 128 (reporting that African-American mothers made
61.1% of the naming decisions and that American Indian mothers made 75% of the deci-
sions).
14. Domestic violence occurs in some relationships where a naming dispute also ex-
ists. See, e.g., Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
15. While I have not discovered a case where the parties used this method to settle a
naming dispute, coin tossing is utilized as a method of resolving other disputes within the
family, see, e.g., Tognazzini v. Tognazzini, 271 P.2d 77, 79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)
(reporting that brother and sister tossed coin to facilitate partition of estate among benefi-
ciaries), and the technique probably has been used to resolve name disputes as well. One
author has suggested that disagreement over a child's name at birth be resolved by coin
flip. See Frederica K. Lombard, The Law on Naming Children: Past, Present and Occa-
sionally Future, 32 NAMES 129, 131 (1984).
16. See In re Rossell by Yacono, 481 A.2d 602, 603 & n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) ("[M]any name change applications are filed in our court."); id. (reporting that Bur-
lington County averaged 11 name change applications per Motion Day over a five-month
period in 1984); Shannon J. Kennedy-Sjodin, Note, Keegan v. Gudahl: The Child's Sur-
name as a New Bargaining Chip in the Game of Divorce, 41 S.D. L. REv. 166, 166 (1995-
96) ("The consideration of a child's surname arises in hundreds of divorce cases each
year."); Karen Springen, Fight for a Name of His Own, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1990, at 71, 72
("No one knows how many couples take their name battles to court. Eight to 10 cases
nationwide reach the appellate level each year, though hundreds are settled in lower
courts .... ") (citing Jeff Atkinson, Chair of the American Bar Association's Child Cus-
tody Committee).
17. See, e.g., In re Epstein, 200 N.Y.S. 897 (County Ct. 1923); Arthur Scherr, Change-
Of-Name Petitions of the New York Courts: An Untapped Source in Historical Onomastics,
34 NAMES 284, 289-91 (1986) (citing Application of Abbie M. Richards, Mother and
Guardian of Winthrop, filed April 8, 1878, Court of Common Pleas, and other late Eight-
eenth and Nineteenth Century name cases).
18. A rough gauge of litigation in this area over time is the number of children's name
change disputes that reach the appellate level. There was one such case in 1969, four in
1979, ten in 1989, and eighteen in 1995.
19. With the exception of the Lucy Stone League, see infra note 168, the organized
women's movement had not agitated for a woman's right to keep her own surname upon
marriage (or a woman's right to give her children that surname) until approximately 1970.
See UNA STANNARD, MRS. MAN 4, 154-56, 268-72 (1977); see also ALFORD, supra note
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force," the rise in marital dissolutions," and an increase in paternity
and child support actions.2 Divorce attorneys and judges predict
that the number of legal disputes over children's surnames will con-
tinue to grow in the future. 3
In the recent past, commentators have begun to argue that the
legal standards governing name change disputes are biased in favor
of the paternal surname. Only a little more than a decade ago, Pris-
cila Ruth MacDougall wrote that "[o]lder [marital] children's names
... remain almost completely subject to paternal control."24 The
author continued, "The right of women to determine their children's
names is at a crossroads," '' and presents "a major feminist struggle
for the next decade., 26 Another author, Cynthia Blevins Doll, has
argued that cases from the latter half of the 1980s through 1991 show
a "persistent bias toward the interest of the father.,
27
Courts have responded to such criticism. Today there are three
primary rules that govern disputes over the changing of children's
10, at 143 (arguing that the 1970s women's liberation movement was responsible for the
trend of women keeping their own surnames or hyphenating their surnames with their
husbands' surnames upon marriage).
20. In 1960, approximately 23 million women participated in the civilian labor force;
by 1990, the number had grown to approximately 56.5 million. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 388 tbl. 638 (111th
ed. 1991). Women in the labor force are more likely to continue using their birth names
upon marriage. See Laura Pedersen-Pietersen, Minding Your Business; To Have and to
Hyphenate: The Marriage Name Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at Cl1.
21. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1992, at 64 tbl. 80 (112th ed.) (showing the divorce rate per 1,000 population at
2.6 in 1950,35 in 1970,5.2 in 1980, and 4.7 in 1990).
22. See Ann Nichols-Casebolt & Irwin Garfinkel, Trends in Paternity Adjudications
and Child Support Awards, 72 Soc. Scd. Q. 83, 95 (1991) ("[D]uring the 1979-86 period,
the ratio of paternity adjudications to non-marital births increased by almost 50 percent
and the average family of a never-married mother increased its probability of a child sup-
port award by almost 75 percent .... ).
23. See Springen, supra note 16, at 72 ("Divorce attorneys predict that disputes be-
tween biological parents will grow more common as women try to extend gender equality
to their children's names."); see also In re Iverson, 786 P.2d 1, 3 (Mont. 1990) (Barz, J.,
dissenting) ("These type [sic] of cases [mother's petition to change non-marital child's
surname to mother's surname] ... are likely to arise with more frequency as... women ...
question this society's customs and traditions regarding surnames." ).
24. Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAw
& INEQ. J. 91, 131 (1985). MacDougall defines "older marital children" as children over
three years of age. See id.; see also Beverly S. Seng, Note, Like Father, Like Child: The
Rights of Parents in Their Children's Surnames, 70 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1984) (noting
that there is "a nearly absolute presumption in favor of the paternal surname").
25. MacDougall, supra note 24, at 159.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Cynthia Blevins Doll, Harmonizing Filial and Parental Rights in Names: Progress,
Pitfalls, and Constitutional Problems, 35 How. LJ. 227, 227 (1992).
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surnames:2 a presumption in favor of the status quo, a "best interest
of the child" test, and a custodial parent presumption (the newest
addition to the law).29 The appellate courts have generally taken the
position that pro-paternal bias does not necessarily inhere in these
standards, and that courts can apply these standards in a gender-
neutral manner when adjudicating name change disputes." Accord-
ingly, the courts have rejected equal protection challenges in such
cases, except where the challenged statute or legal standard explicitly
favors the paternal surname. 1
I shall argue that gender bias continues to influence the law
governing disputes over children's name changes. Despite the ad-
vent of the custodial parent presumption, and the proclamations by
courts that still adhere to the other standards-primarily the best in-
terest standard-that the law no longer privileges the male interest,
none of the standards for resolving name change disputes have to-
tally eliminated the law's patronymic bias. 2 While more women now
prevail in cases involving marital children's surnames, there remain
significant impediments to full gender equality. The courts have
perhaps abandoned their automatic preference for the patronym, but
they continue to view the significance of surnames and name change
disputes from a traditionally male perspective. Evidence from the
field of onomastics,33 and from a variety of other fields, suggests that
most women tend to conceptualize surnames and naming disputes
differently from most men. I contend that the existing legal stan-
28. Theoretically these three standards could be used to resolve name change disputes
involving children's first names as well. Very few cases of this type are reported. See, e.g.,
Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519, 522-23 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (debating whether the hus-
band/father should be able to demand that both his first and last names be given to his
child); Bugg v. Rojas, No. C8-94-2590, 1995 WL 365457, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20,
1995) (finding that trial court should have considered the first-name dispute); Cary v.
Cary, No. 02A01-9401-CV-00003, 1995 WL 30603, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995)
(resolving dispute over child's first name).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 284-87.
30. See infra notes 386-89,535-37 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Section V.A.
32. The terms "patronymy" and "patronymics" are used in this Article to represent
"the code by which last names are based on fathers' last names." SHARON LEBELL,
NAMING OURSELVES, NAMING OUR CHILDREN: RESOLVING THE LAST NAME DILEMMA
9 (1988). Authors have sometimes used the terms to describe the practice whereby a fa-
ther's first name is made part of another's surname. See, e.g., id. at 45; Holt, supra note 10,
at 35.
33. Onomastics is an interdisciplinary venture to study the origin and form of words,
and also includes the study of the system underlying the formation and use of words, in-
cluding proper names. See WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 821
(1988).
1631
1632 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
dards (as well as the existing criticisms) are applied and interpreted
in a way that tends to reflect men's views of surnames, rather than
women's.m This result is unfortunate: In the context of family
breakup, when the two paradigms are in conflict, the female perspec-
tive appears to be more consistent with children's interests and offers
several other distinct advantages.35
The first step of my analysis involves a review of contemporary
American naming practices grounded in Anglo-American custom. I
shall argue that women and men, in general, have different experi-
ences with their own names, and as a result they tend to attach
different significance to their children's surnames.36 Women, and not
men, customarily forego using their birth names upon marriage.37 It
appears that the lability of women's own surnames leads many
women to believe that surnames are fungible. For significant num-
bers of women, a surname functions as a marker of one's present
propinquity with other family members in the same household. A
surname is a way of saying, "I am currently associated with this fam-
34. See infra Section IV.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 344-45,479-87, 614-25.
36. See infra Section III.
37. See infra notes 97, 169-70 and accompanying text. Various terminology has been
used to designate a woman's surname at birth. It has been called the "birth name," the
"maiden name," and the "father's name." See SUSAN C. ROSS, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A WOMAN'S RIGHTS 254 n.1 (1973). I choose to use the
term "birth name." "Maiden name" perpetuates the image of women as virgins until mar-
riage, a factual inaccuracy for many women. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into
Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,
60 & nn. 256, 259, 262 (1994) (citing ALAN GLTrTMACHER INSTITUTE, SEX AND
AMERICA'S TEENAGERS (1994) for the statistic that 82% of all teenagers are sexually
experienced, and Kristin Luker, Dubious Conceptions: The Controversy Over Teen Preg-
nancy, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1991, at 73, 78, for the fact that "teenage girls are almost as
likely as teenage boys to be sexually active before marriage"); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OUT-
OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING 1, 6 (1995) (citing statistic that unmarried teenagers gave
birth to approximately 372,000 children in 1993). The term "maiden name" also has a
normative tone, thereby contributing to women's sexual oppression by perpetuating dou-
ble standards. See Oberman, supra, at 61-68 (arguing that the double standard causes girls
to view sexuality with ambivalence and shame resulting in resistance to contraceptive use
and the absence of any affirmative "discourse of desire"). The term "father's name" has
appeal because it emphasizes that "most people in our society still give their children the
surname of the father," Ross, supra, 254 n.1. However, the term is factually inaccurate
for those few women who bear their mothers' surnames, hyphenated or blended surnames,
or other alternatives. For first names, I abandon the term "Christian name" and "given
name" and use the more accurate "first name." "Christian name" seems inappropriate in
our religiously diverse society and "given name" obscures the fact that a surname is also a
given name.
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ily member (or members). 38  I term this concept
"associationalism."39 Also, for these women, a stable sense of iden-
tity is not dependent upon their fixed surnames. These women
expect and generally welcome alterity, equating a change of surname
with a change in marital status. Most men, in contrast, retain the
same surname from birth until death. As a consequence, it appears
that many men believe that their identities are inextricably inter-
twined with their birth names. This fact, along with the practice that
married women and marital children typically take the man's sur-
name, leads many men to reject, ignore, or diminish the importance
of a child's surname as a marker of present association after marital
dissolution. These men often believe that a child's surname should
be immutable-a permanent expression of the child's individual
identity and his patrilineal ancestry.
The analysis to be set forth is complicated by several facts. First,
it is sometimes difficult to draw gender-based distinctions between
men's and women's conceptions of surnames. It appears that the
views of men and women fall along a continuum, with the views of
most men (but not all) located on one side of the midpoint, and the
views of most women (but not all) on the opposite side. Second,
while it may appear logical that a causal connection exists between
men's and women's varied experiences with surnames upon marriage
and their varied perceptions about surnames, this connection has not
been tested empirically.40 Consequently, my assumptions, analysis,
and conclusions represent a starting point for further social science
research.
While several authors have written about the law of name
change disputes, and particularly about naming as a women's rights
issue, no scholar has taken the position I advocate in this Article,
that men and women tend to see naming disputes in different terms
38. To these women, a surname represents the woman's proximate physical associa-
tion with those in her most immediate nuclear family (spouse and children). While non-
nuclear family members can live in the household and play an important role in a woman's
or child's life, the non-nuclear family members' surnames have not traditionally been
shared by the woman and child.
39. Men also have an "associative" claim related to surnames. Many men believe that
a shared surname is critical for a strong filial bond. I discuss in a later section the sup-
posed connection between a shared surname and the father-child bond. See infra text
accompanying notes 302-62, 392-414. For clarity, and because men's associative claim
already has a label (the father-child bond argument), I only use the term
"associationalism" in relation to the predominantly female view.
40. In fact, I find some support for my argument from suggestive-but not necessarily
highly persuasive-sources. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 79-87 (fictional ac-
count of man's and girl's views of surnames).
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and that the law (and criticisms of it) fail to address the predomi-
nantly female perspective.4 ' By failing to acknowledge that most
men's and women's views on surnames differ, some writers have in-
advertently perpetuated and validated the male view while trying to
further women's interests.42  Authors have also failed to integrate
41. For example, Priscilla Ruth MacDougall claims that her article discusses "the
assumptions, acknowledged and unacknowledged, behind courts' protection of fathers'
primary naming right." MacDougall, supra note 24, at 133. While she identifies those
assumptions (i.e., the father's liberty interest, the father-child bond, and the notion that
men "own" their children by paying support for them), she does not explore women's be-
liefs, whether women's beliefs differ from men's beliefs and why, or whether the existing
standards can accommodate women's beliefs. Consequently, MacDougall's cursory state-
ments about women's beliefs seem, at times, inaccurate. For example, MacDougall argues
that "[w]omen's growing demand to share the basic right to name children follows logically
from women's successful assertion of their right to name themselves." Id. at 93. Yet, even
prior to the establishment of a widely recognized right of women to keep using their birth
names upon marriage, remarried women tried to give their children the stepfathers'
names. Moreover, only one sixth of her sixty-six page article deals with the assumptions
behind judicial decisions in favor of paternal naming rights. See id. at 136-46.
Beverly S. Seng, in Like Father, Like Child- The Rights of Parents in Their Children's
Surnames, recognizes that "naming a child ... invokes ideas particular to each parent." See
Seng, supra note 24, at 1343. To the father, it expresses his parenthood, and to the mother,
it declares that "she is part of the child's family heritage, that she is the equal of the child's
father, that she is not the mere caretaker of a chattel that 'belongs' to someone else." Id.
at 1343-44. However, no empirical data supports her interpretation of each gender's ideas,
nor does she explain how these gendered differences may impact the implementation of
existing law.
42. Numerous authors assume that most men's and women's views of their surnames
are the same, and these authors use men's views as the norm. For example, Cynthia
Blevins Doll states that courts have been wrong to assume that a woman's nominal identity
is less than a man's because she has traditionally given up her name upon marriage. See
Doll, supra note 27, at 260. Rather Doll assumes, without social science support, that a
woman's name change has profound implications for her sense of self, and that "the trend
of women retaining birth names, hyphenating, and even fusing names, underscores
women's desire for control over their surnames." Id at 231. Doll fails to differentiate the
vast majority of women who still take their husbands' names upon marriage from the mi-
nority of women she references. See id. Sharon Lebell argues that "[t]he name and the
person are one and the same," LEBELL, supra note 32, at 7, and that patronymy allows
men's identity development to be "ever-deepening, expanding, and solidifying," id. at 17,
whereas women have "identity ruptures," and that it is problematic that "[w]omen con-
stantly shift the locus of their identity to transitory reference points: roles and
relationships," id. at 24-25; see also Yvonne M. Cherena Pacheco, Latino Surnames: For-
mal and Informal Forces in the United States Affecting the Retention and Use of the
Maternal Surname, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1992) (arguing that an individual's
name is a "priceless possession" and that one's name is tied to one's identity).
Student authors have made a similar mistake. One student advocates a presumption
for the status quo because it gives children "a stable identity referent." Ellen Jean Dan-
nin, Note, Proposal for a Model Name Act, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 153, 167, 178-79
(1976) (proposing that both parents agree to a name change for a minor under 14 years
old, unless exceptional circumstances indicate that the change is in the minor's best inter-
est). Another student advocates a gender-neutral "best interest test," but he proposes
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existing social science literature into their legal analysis-a critical
component if one is to understand the limitations of existing judicial
approaches to name change disputes. Many commentators have ar-
gued that parents should be treated equally in the adjudication of
these disputes,43 but these commentators have given little thought as
to whether the existing or proposed standards can achieve equality,"4
or even whether this goal is desirable. Given the limitations of ex-
isting scholarship, there is a strong need for a thorough,
interdisciplinary analysis of sex bias in the adjudication of name
change disputes.
I conclude this Article by proposing a solution that tries to
privilege the predominantly female perspective-that surnames
should outwardly designate present propinquity. This proposal pos-
its a "family association rule" for disputes over the changing of a
child's surname. Under this rule, the surname selected by the parent
who is the physical custodian should prevail, so long as an associa-
tional justification for the surname exists, unless the non-custodial
parent can prove by clear and convincing evidence that serious harm
to the child would result.4 1 In determining whether clear and con-
vincing evidence of harm exists, associationalism must be explicitly
considered. I elaborate on the details of the proposal in the last part
of the Article.4' This proposed solution, while not integral to my ar-
gument, offers a potential alternative to the status quo's emphasis on
surnominal stasis and patrilineal succession. My proposal provides a
adding factors that are relevant from a male perspective. For example, he suggests that
courts consider the effect of the name change on the mother-child relationship, as well as
the length of time that a child has borne a particular surname. See Richard H. Thornton,
Note, The Controversy Over Children's Surnames: Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection
and the Child's Best Interests, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 303, 330. He also discussed the advan-
tage of giving" 'children a stable identity referent.'" Id. at 327 (quoting Dannin, supra, at
167). Similarly, another law student calls for giving equal weight to the mother-child rela-
tionship when considering how a name change affects the child's best interest. See M.
Hannah Leavitt, Note, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV. 101, 115
(1977).
43. See, e.g., MacDougall, supra note 24, at 100.
44. Authors often suggest solutions to the perceived problem, but their solutions' effi-
cacy is questionable as associationalism is never made a weighty consideration. See, e.g.,
Doll, supra note 27, at 260-61 (recommending changes to the best interest of the child
standard); Seng, supra note 24, at 1347-51 (advocating a rebuttable presumption in favor
of a compound surname for children under 14 years of age); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Note,
No Judicial Dyslexia: The Custodial Parent Presumption Distinguishes The Paternal From
the Parental Right to Name a Child, 58 N.D. L. REv. 793, 794-96 (1982) (suggesting that
courts adopt a custodial parent presumption); see also Thornton, supra note 42, at 328-30
(suggesting changes to the best interest standard).
45. See infra Section V.C.
46. See infra Section V.C.
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starting point for a scholarly debate over the merits of reform in this
area. By privileging the notion of associationalism in my proposal, I
hope to encourage open discussion of the relative merit of the vari-
ous values implicated in name change disputes.
I set forth this Article's methodology in Part II. Part III then
explores the degree to which men and women tend to view surnames
differently. Part IV chronicles the development of the existing legal
standards that govern disputes over children's surnames, and demon-
strates that these standards generally reflect a conception that is held
by more men than women. Finally, Part V suggests an alternative
approach to resolving disputes over children's surnames.
II. A FEMINIST PERSPECRIVE ON THE NAME GAME
I employ a feminist methodology, 47 and the Article accordingly
starts with the "woman question: 48 How, if at all, are women ad-
47. To counteract what Patricia Cain has called the "Gendered Misunderstanding of
Feminist Scholarship," which contributes to its devaluation, I purposefully detail my as-
sumptions. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 35-39
(1991). By explaining "the [feminist] project" in the context of name change disputes, I
hope to make this Article meaningful to an audience larger than feminist scholars. In ad-
dition, overtly discussing methodology acknowledges that methodology, just like
substantive analysis, is inextricably linked to the enterprise of combating patriarchy. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 887-88 (1990)
[hereinafter Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods]. Explaining one's methodology also helps
expose-at the outset-some of the limitations of the substantive argument. My feminist
methodology represents the "positionality" that Professor Bartlett has defined as combin-
ing "the postmodern critique of objectivity and neutrality in the law with the possibility of
political commitments toward particular legal agendas." KATHARINE, T. BARTLET'T,
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 921 (1993) [hereinafter
BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW]; see also Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra, at 880-
85 (outlining her stance on positionality). As Professor Bartlett states, feminist methods
do not displace conventional legal analysis. Rather,
[t]he methods accept the necessity for rules, reason, legal abstraction, and efforts
to eliminate bias and arbitrariness, but at the same time attempt to take greater
account of how legal rules often invisibly represent the partial perspectives of
those who are dominant in society and ignore the perspectives of others.
BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW, supra, at 634.
48. See Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 47, at 837. Specifically Bartlett
states:
In law, asking the woman question means examining how the law fails to take
into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of
men, for whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might
disadvantage women. The question assumes that some features of the law may
be not only non-neutral in a general sense, but also 'male' in a specific sense. The
purpose of the woman question is to expose those features and how they operate,
and to suggest how they might be corrected.
lIa While I adopt the three other feminist methodological tools described by Katharine
Bartlett in her comprehensive article, Feminist Legal Methods (feminist practical reason-
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versely affected by the law governing disputes over children's sur-
names? While a thorough answer to this question must await later
sections of the Article, it is possible at the outset to discern two
broad categories of adverse effects on women: one practical and one
symbolic.
The practical effects are easy to recognize. Children of divorced
parents are predominantly in their mothers' custody,4 9 but the over-
whelming number of these children bear their fathers' surnames at
the time of divorce.0 Thus, it is not surprising that women institute
most name change petitions-usually for the purpose of giving chil-
dren the mother's birth name or the surname of a new stepfather.5
In addition, women often must defend against actions by fathers who
are trying to halt the use of a surname other than the child's original
paternal surname. Whether the law helps or hinders women in these
disputes is a matter of great salience to many women, and as one
ing, consciousness-raising, and positionality), the woman question is discussed in detail
because it frames this Article's thesis and because the technique illuminates very well the
Article's underlying assumptions. Positionality has been discussed above. See supra note
47. Consciousness-raising will be discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 76.
Feminist practical reasoning pervades this Article. Bartlett describes this last methodo-
logical tool as "combin[ing] some aspects of a classic Aristotelian model of practical
deliberation with a feminist focus on identifying and taking into account the perspectives
of the excluded." Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 47, at 850.
49. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112 (1992) (citing their California study
which showed that "[m]others plainly remain[ed] the primary custodians of children fol-
lowing divorce: they receive sole physical custody of the children in two out of three cases,
while fathers have sole physical custody less than 10 percent of the time"); see also Scott,
supra note 12, at 635 ("Children of divorce in single-parent homes are overwhelmingly in
the custody of their mothers .... ") (citing Frank F. Furstenberg et al., The Life Course of
Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 656, 667
(1983)); Nathalie Martin, Note, Fathers and Families: Expanding the Familial Rights of
Men, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1265, 1274 (1986) (estimating that "ninety percent of all chil-
dren of divorce are still in the custody of their mothers").
50. See M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543, 544 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) ("In modem
society, it has been customary for a child to assume the surname of the father ... ."); Rio
v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960-61 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("Most American children born in wed-
lock are given their father's surname," this is a "practically universal custom." (citation
omitted)); Kay v. Bell, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) ("It has been the custom
in our country since the time 'when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' to
give to a child the surname of its father." (citations omitted)). In fact, "[t]oday, few
American mothers are aware that they are not legally required to give their children their
father's surnames." Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
51. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter
Se with Respect to the Names of Their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d 1091, 1095 (1979) (noting that
the biological father "is ordinarily the objecting party" in a naming dispute); W. E. Ship-
ley, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se with Respect to the Names of
Their Children, 53 A.L.R.2d 914, 915 (1957) (stating that father is ordinarily objecting
party).
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state supreme court observed, constitutes an "important public is-
sue."
52
The law of name change disputes also has profound symbolic
implications. Patronymy represents an overt vestige of coverture.
Until it is eradicated, women will symbolically, and actually, remain
unequal to men. As Sharon Lebell states:
Patronymy is not the cause of patriarchy, but it does keep
patriarchy alive and well. Like random male violence, it is
one of the vital links in the patriarchal chain that holds
women back from the full freedom to be their authentic
selves. In many ways, patronymy is more insidious than
some of the other grosser examples of patriarchy, which can
be easily identified and decried. Since patronymy, if it is
recognized at all, is typically seen as a trivial custom, some-
thing akin to our culture's preference for certain kinds of
foods over others, no one does anything to change it. 3
I do not propose a legal regime to eliminate patronymy at birth, as
others have done.54 Rather I address a more common legal problem
and one of the most pernicious aspects of patronymy: the legal sys-
tem's preference for the patronym in disputes between divorced
52. See Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303,305 (Md. 1985).
53. LEBELL, supra note 32, at 28.
54. There are a variety of non-sexist options, suggested both historically and recently,
that a state could adopt to guide parents in choosing their children's initial surnames. For
example, Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Moving the Mountain describes a utopian community
where wives do not take husbands' names: Boys are given their fathers' names, and girls
are given their mothers' names. See Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Moving The Mountain:
Chapter Three, The Forerunner, Mar. 1911, at 79, 83; see also MARY LASSITER, OUR
NAMES, OUR SELVES 98-99 (1983) (recommending the adoption of a system in which sons
receive their fathers' surnames and daughters receive their mothers' surnames); Dannin,
supra note 42, at 173 (proposing Model Name Act). In 1914, Fola La Follette proposed,
among other options, that "'the children could have.., the combined names of their fa-
ther and mother ....'" STANNARD, supra note 19, at 177; see also SUSAN J. KUPPER,
SURNAMES FOR WOMEN: A DECISION-MAKING GUIDE 91 (1990) (advocating the hy-
phenation of "the parents' surnames in alphabetical order, if there is a dispute"). Sharon
Lebell created the Bilineal Solution. Everyone keeps his or her "source name" for life, a
last name one wishes to adopt. Girls take their mothers' surnames as their surnames, and
their fathers' surnames as their middle names. Boys take their fathers' surnames as their
surnames, and their mothers' surnames as their middle names. See LEBELL, supra note 32,
at 64-66. One commentator has stated that Lebell's system means "that some family
names are less likely to die out. Genealogists might also find it easier to trace families."
Edwin D. Lawson, Naming Ourselves, Naming Our Children: Resolving the Last Name
Dilemma, 37 NAMES 391, 392 (1989) (book review). Linda Bird Francke recommends
adopting a matrilineal system of naming so that when a woman receives child custody upon
divorce, as most women do, the child and mother would share the mother's birth name.
See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROWING UP DIVORCED 200 (1983). For a possible constitu-
tional objection to such suggestions, see infra notes 627-31 and accompanying text.
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parents over their child's surname. When the preference results in
the child bearing the surname of his or her departed biological fa-
ther, the law conveys a disturbing message that even in absentia the
father outranks the custodial mother.
In asking the "woman question," I am cognizant of the hazard of
overgeneralization that attends any such inquiry. Feminist scholars
caution that one's categorization of "women" can easily exclude
some women, and that "a partial description may mislead ... [and]
may actively disadvantage those whose experience was not consid-
ered.""5 The same can be said of the category of "men" when one
tries to contrast the male and female perspectives. Realistically,
overgeneralization is almost inevitable when formulating an answer
to the woman question, especially in the naming context. 6 There are
many levels of diversity among men or women: vertical diversity
(that is, diversity among men or women based on characteristics such
as nationality, religion, race, and class),57 horizontal diversity (that is,
diversity among men or women within the vertical groups), 8 and epi-
sodic diversity (that is, diversity experienced by a man or a woman at
different times over the course of his or her life). 9 This manifold di-
versity hinders attempts to "essentialize" the experience of men or
women,60 and it renders impossible the formulation of rigid gender-
55. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1029 (1991).
56. The problem of "exclusion" is often subsumed under "gender essentialism," see,
e.g., BARTLETt, GENDER AND LAW, supra note 47, at 871, but the former is not always a
subset of the latter. Exclusion often attends overgeneralization, i.e., the tendency to see a
homogeneity among women, despite their race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.
Gender essentialism is discussed in note 60, infra.
57. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that practices for naming children
"vary dramatically from society to society"); Edward H. Tebbenhoff, Tacit Rules and Hid-
den Family Structures: Naming Practices and Godparentage in Schenectady, New York
1680-1800, 18 J. Soc. HIST. 567, 583 (1985) (finding that first names reflect culturally de-
rived patterns which "differ as widely as the range of cultures examined"). The Iroquois,
for example, give a child only one name, selected by the mother or maternal grandmother
from a set of names owned by the mother's clan. Between ages 14 and 16, an Iroquois
child receives a new name which is selected by the women of the clan. These personal
names, however, are not used; rather, kin terms are used with relatives, and terms indi-
cating one's generational status are used with non-relatives. See ALFORD, supra note 10,
at 3-4.
5& See Deborah A. Duggan et al., Taking Thy Husband's Name: What Might it
Mean?, 41 NAMES 87, 98 (1993) ("Researchers have not fully explored the possibility ...
that women who make different choices regarding their marital last name may show dif-
ferent personality profiles.").
59. See Holt, supra note 10, at 49-80 (discussing various case studies that reflect the
variety of feelings any one individual can have about the importance of names).
60. Gender essentialism assumes that there is something essential about women that
explains the answer to the "woman question." See Cain, supra note 47, at 28. The fact
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that women bear and nurture children may be an "essential" reason why most women and
men view the importance of surnames differently. The gendered division for bearing and
breast-feeding children arguably has psychological repercussions for women and men,
including men's desire to distance themselves from their mothers (and, arguably, a conse-
quent need to reject the matronymic and diminish the importance of associationalism, as
defined in this Article). This observation finds its clearest formulation in NANCY
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
,SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978), where she discusses the effect of female mothering on
the sexes and the development of the "individual" versus "relational" dichotomy:
A boy, in order to feel himself adequately masculine, must distinguish and dif-
ferentiate himself from others in a way that a girl need not-must categorize
himself as someone apart. Moreover, he defines masculinity negatively as that
which is not feminine and/or connected to women, rather than positively. This is
another way boys come to deny and repress relation and connection in the proc-
ess of growing up ....
Girls' identification processes, then are more continuously embedded in and
mediated by their ongoing relationship with their mother. They develop through
and stress particularistic and affective relationships to others. A boy's identifica-
tion processes are not likely to be so embedded in or mediated by a real affective
relation to his father. At the same time, he tends to deny identification with and
relationship to his mother and reject what he takes to be the feminine world;
masculinity is defined as much negatively as positively. Masculine identification
processes stress differentiation from others, the denial of affective relation, and
categorical universalistic components of the masculine role. Feminine identifica-
tion processes are relational, whereas masculine identification processes tend to
deny relationship.
ld. at 174, 176; see also MARY BECKER Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE, TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 562 (1994) ("It is a fact that women nur-
ture most children, and this fact has a profound impact upon those children as adults and,
through them, upon gender relations in society."); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN:
MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 11 (1986) ("There is much to suggest
that the male mind has always been haunted by the force of the idea of dependence on a
woman for life itself, the son's constant effort to assimilate, compensate for, or deny the
fact that he is 'of woman born.' Women are also born of women. But we know little about
the effect on culture of that fact, because women have not been makers and sayers of pa-
triarchal culture."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 2-3 (1988)
("[Tlhe claim that we are individuals 'first,' and the claim that what separates us is episte-
mologically and morally prior to what connects us-while 'trivially true' of men, [is]
patently untrue of women.... Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the
last decade has been that women are 'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,'
from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-
feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life."). But see Tracy E. Hig-
gins, "By Reason of Their Sex". Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 1536, 1565-66 (1995) (criticizing use of "the mothering story").
The "non-essential" reasons why most women's and men's views of their children's
surnames differ include the difference in social experience of giving up one's name upon
marriage and gender role socialization. These reasons are not mutually exclusive explana-
tions, and they are explored below. See infra notes 97, 121, 169-70, 244 and accompanying
text.
I believe that women's and men's views of surnames are at least partially socially con-
structed because of the diversity that exists among and between men's and women's views.
This belief raises the possibility that women's views are not "authentic." See infra notes
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based classifications. Undeniably, some men hold all or a part of the
views ascribed to women, and visa-versa,6 even though the majority
of men and women in this country have vastly different experiences
with their own names. Consequently, when I describe the "male"
and "female" views of surnames, these terms are best understood to
be end points of a continuum. The terms reflect a hypothetical con-
struct derived from the sources cited herein-sources that mainly
reflect the influence of Anglo-American naming practices. At best,
the sources suggest a loose dichotomy of viewpoints that merits fur-
ther scrutiny by empirical research.
While space does not permit a comprehensive analysis account-
ing for all levels of diversity among men or women, the unique
experience of one subgroup requires special attention. Latino nam-
ing practices differ dramatically from Anglo-American practices.62
The dominant custom throughout Latin America and Spain is for a
mother and father to combine their surnames into a hybrid cogno-
men that is given to their children.63 Yet it is unclear whether the
73, 77. Women's views may have grown out of patriarchy's insistence that women and
children be surnominally associated to men. Even if women's voices are not "authentic,"
society should still include and value women's expressed views in order to validate
women's voices generally, as women try to respond and cope with patriarchy's manifesta-
tions. This strategy of inclusion should occur in tandem with larger efforts to dismantle
patriarchy.
61. As I was writing this Article, several colleagues asked what prompted my interest
in the topic. I was pregnant at the time, and people correctly assumed that I had a per-
sonal interest in the subject. My husband and I were in the process of trying to determine
what surname we would give our baby. Imagining ourselves to be "progressive," we con-
sidered our options. Our deliberations revealed the problem of episodic diversity that
complicates categorizing "men's" or "women's" views. For example, my husband's views
at times reflected the traditional male perspective and at other times were more liberal.
At first, my husband reminded me that most other men get to have "their" children bear
the paternal surname. It seemed to be his "right," and he presumed that it was the default
position. He was the one who felt burdened to inform his parents and his grandmother
that there may not be another "Lininger" (his surname) in the world. Yet my husband also
displayed the desire to have the child's surname reflect both our identities, and he felt
some discomfort with the patriarchal custom. On the other hand, while I felt very strongly
that my son's surname should represent his association with both of his parents, I also felt
that my "identity" was implicated as much as my husband's. The lesson of our experience
is that individuals can, and often do, simultaneously embrace competing notions of
"association" and "identity." Which notion wins out-as the legal system's preference-is
the real inquiry. Incidentally, we ultimately decided to give our son the surname Weiner-
Lininger.
62. As one commentator has stated, "the Latino name does not conform to any nam-
ing issues which have been addressed, disseminated and defended by the 'naming
experts.'" Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 31.
63. A child whose surname is "Garcia-Rodriguez" has probably derived the name
"Garcia" from her father's side of the family, and the name "Rodriguez" from her
mother's side. The two components of a Latino surname may either be hyphenated, free-
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analysis set forth herein changes when applied to the Latino naming
system. Among other things, the Latino system of naming children is
still patrilineal. When Latino parents combine their surnames for
their children, the children receive only one-half of each parent's
name-usually the portion inherited from each parent's father.64 The
first name in the hyphenated sequence is from the father's side, and
this name carries more social weight.65 Thus it appears that the pri-
macy of the patronym is common to both the Latino and the Anglo
naming systems. Nonetheless, further study is needed to determine
whether Latinos hold the same conception of surnames as others de-
scribed in this Article," and whether Latinos' disputes over their
children's surnames take the same form. The paucity of empirical
research on the implications of naming practices in general67 -and
standing, or separated by the word "y" (which means "and"). See Cherena Pacheco, supra
note 42, at 9-11 & 11 n.43.
64. See LEBELL, supra note 32, at 48; Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 10 n.42.
65. See supra note 63; see also LEBELL, supra note 33, at 48 (stating that first surname
carries more social weight).
66. For example, "[i]t is not known to what extent these [naming] practices are con-
tinued by Latinos in the United States." Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 3-4. It
appears that most Latinos are forced into involuntary name changes in the United States,
resulting in the abandonment of the maternal name. See id Cherena Pacheco's own sur-
vey found that "the majority" of respondents do not use both surnames in the United
States. See id at 14 n.59. The author attributes this to the United States' tradition and
custom, cultural supremacy, bureaucratic laziness (e.g., governmental forms only having
space for shorter surnames), racism, and simple ignorance. See id. at 14-19. In addition,
some Latina and Hispanic women may take their husbands' names upon marriage, al-
though it is difficult to calculate precisely the number of women who do so and the exact
form of the practice. The extant literature has shown that the marital naming practices of
these women have taken several different approaches. One author explained that women
who take their husbands' names after marriage often just append "de" and their husbands'
names after their surnames. See Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 11. Another author
explained that upon marriage, Hispanic women drop the mother's name and take on the
husband's name, hyphenating the two names or separating them by the word "de." See
Melanie S. Landis, Hispanic Blend, LANCASTER NEW ERA, INTELLIGENCER J., May 4,
1993, at C2. Another author explained that for some legal purposes, and in aristocratic
circles, women will be referred to as her first name "'de her husband's name.'" See
LEBELL, supra note 31, at 49. And yet a fourth pair of authors explained: "In some Latin
American countries, husbands and wives keep both their father's and mother's last names
as their last name," "or opt to use their birth name on a day-to-day basis." David R. John-
son & Laurie K. Scheuble, Women's Marital Naming in Two Generations: A National
Study, 57 J. MARR. & FAM. 724, 725 (1995) (citing S. LOBO, A HOUSE OF MY OWN:
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SQUATTER SETrLEMENTS OF LIMA, PERU 87 (1982)).
Some believe the practice of using the word "de," which means "of," signals male owner-
ship of the female. See Karen A. Foss & Belle A. Edson, What's in a Name? Accounts of
Married Women's Name Choices, 53 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 356, 366 (1989).
67. See Foss & Edson, supra note 66, at 357 ("The interest in the implications of mar-
ried women's name changes is a much more recent. and still largely untapped area for
investigation."); see also ALFORD, supra note 10, at 6, 18 (commenting on the virtual non-
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the dearth of research on inter-ethnic variations in particular 6 --
provides little basis on which to examine the Latino naming system
in the present Article.
While the omnipresent diversity complicates any attempt to
compare the genders' views of surnames, it should not stymie schol-
arship. Gender-based distinctions are a revealing analytical tool, and
the use of these distinctions presupposes some ability to differentiate
differences between the sexes." Instead of abandoning such analysis
altogether because of the complexity, it makes more sense to ac-
knowledge the impossibility of crafting a solution that speaks to all
men's and women's experiences7' and to evaluate honestly the disad-
vantages of drawing the line where one does.72 Although constrained
existence of information on name changing in scientific literature on naming generally);
Penelope Wasson Dralle & Kathelynne Mackiewicz, Psychological Impact of Women's
Name Change at Marriage: Literature Review and Implications for Further Study, 9 AM. J.
FAM. THERAPY 50, 51 (1981) ("[T]he psychological literature includes little published
research on the impact on women of changing surnames at marriage."); Johnson &
Scheuble, supra note 66, at 724, 732 (1995) (calling for more research because "[s]ocial
explanations for patterns and trends in marital naming have received only sporadic atten-
tion from both social scientists and the mass media" and such information "would tell us
more about the consequences of naming choice[s] for... relationships with ... children");
Laurie Scheuble & David R. Johnson, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes of Col-
lege Students, 55 J. MARR. & FAM. 747, 747 (1993) ("Given the changes that are currently
taking place in marriage and family role expectations, marital name change issues clearly
warrant examination, yet this topic has been virtually unexplored by social scientists.").
68. See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 6, 18 (commenting on scant ethnographic material
on naming); Duggan et al., supra note 58, at 98 (commenting that "more information is
needed on the topic of marital names in which the ethnicity of the respondents is taken
into consideration"); see also infra note 172 (discussing the reluctance of some African-
American women to take their husbands' names).
69. This Article does, however, rely on one major study that included Hispanic re-
spondents. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Higgins, supra note 60, at 1537 (" 'Woman' is a troublesome term, in
feminism and in law. The category is neither consistently nor coherently constituted in
linguistic, historical or legal contexts. Yet the framework through which women have
sought (and gained) improvements in their legal, economic, and social status depends upon
the ascription of meaning to the term." (citations omitted)); see also Christine A. Littleton,
Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 37-51
(1991) (arguing that it is useful to ask "the woman question" and showing, through a
"move-away" case, that gender neutrality assumes both a commonality of interest and
equality of situation not yet achieved between men and women).
71. Cf Abrams, supra note 55, at 1030 ("It is difficult to formulate a remedy that is
responsive to the entire range of women's perspectives.").
72. See id; see also Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586 (1990) ("My suggestion is only that we make our categories
explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable, and that to do so is all the more important in a
discipline like law, where abstraction and 'frozen' categories are the norm."); Higgins,
supra note 60, at 1581 (arguing that accepting "objectivist accounts of gender.., entails a
recognition that to choose among such partial accounts is an exercise of power. Such a
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by space limitations, I will attempt in Part V to propose a solution
that benefits most women, and I will discuss the varying effects of the
proposal on women and men with diverse perspectives and experi-
ences. If future empirical research fails to validate the apparent
dichotomy between men's and women's views on surnames, at least
the feminist approach will have illuminated the variety of values that
can influence the selection and maintenance of a child's surname,
and will have facilitated consideration of which interests should be
privileged.
Feminist scholars also caution about the problem of "authentic
voice," which poses a very real challenge for this project.73 Examin-
ing legal opinions to derive men's and women's feelings about names
is an imperfect way to gather information. Within the legal system,
women may forego their "authentic voices" and adopt a more for-
malistic discourse in accordance with the prevailing legal standards.
If I am correct that the law governing name change disputes gener-
ally reflects male values concerning surnames, then women's legal
arguments under the current system may mask their true feelings be-
cause these arguments may be couched in language designed to
appeal to judges who are applying the male-oriented legal stan-
dards. I shall attempt to discover the authentic voices of women by
relying on non-legal sources such as personal testimonials, the
popular press, fiction, literary criticism, and anthropological, socio-
recognition does not imply that principled choices cannot be made but rather that they
cannot be made innocently. Both the judge and the critic must investigate, acknowledge,
and accept responsibility for the exclusionary implications of their choices rather than
treating their assumptions as preexisting and fixed." (citations omitted)). But see Ca-
tharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway? 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 16 (1991) ("To speak of social treatment 'as a woman' is thus
not to invoke any abstract essence or homogeneous generic or ideal type, not to posit any-
thing, far less a universal anything, but to refer to this diverse and pervasive concrete
material reality of social meanings and practices .... "). As Professor Mar Matsuda ar-
gues, to consider perspectives of women that have been excluded can only help achieve a
more complete analysis of legal issues, regardless of whether the truth is partial. See Man
J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1763, 1764-68 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323,324 (1987).
73. The problem of authentic voice is identified by the questions, "[W]hom do we
believe? Who speaks the truth?" Is a woman's voice her own, or is it instead affected by
her subordinated position in the gender hierarchy? See Cain, supra note 47, at 25.
74. See Scherr, supra note 17, at 285 (commenting that change-of-name petitions in
New York between 1848 and 1924 "cast fresh light on American social norms and val-
ues .... Since attorneys usually represented the petitioners, the literary style of their
requests was invariably legalistic, although the petitioners' feelings emerge from time to
time").
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logical, and psychological research.' Using the feminist methodol-
ogy of "consciousness-raising, 76  I employ these sources in an
attempt to present women's true voices so that their experiences can
affect the interpretation of the law and the formulation of proposals
for legal reform.7 Their personal narratives inspire, frame, and illus-
trate my argument,7 although the voices reflected in this Article do
not provide definitive proof of "men's" and "women's" views.
By listening to the words of women as they talk about their own
surnames, one sees that the current legal regime for resolving chil-
dren's naming disputes does not value, nor sometimes even address,
what most women find significant about a surname. Rather, the law
predominantly reflects the voices of men. I now turn to a detailed
analysis of the extent to which men and women hold different views
on the subject of surnames.
III. MEN'S AND WOMEN'S CONCEPTIONS OF SURNAMES
A. An Illustrative Colloquy
Ellen Foster, a novel by Kaye Gibbons,79 offers an example of
how men and women tend to view surnames differently. The
eponymous protagonist is an eleven-year-old girl who has lived in a
violent family: her father has molested her and killed her mother.s
After Ellen's parents die, she moves to a series of temporary resi-
dences. Ellen is eventually placed in a foster home where she is
75. In searching for clues about how people view surnames, I sometimes find a source,
particularly fiction, relevant in a way that may not have been intended by its author. Most
of my sources are anecdotal rather than empirical. They were not compiled systematically
or in accordance with statistical methodology.
76. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 47, at 866 (calling consciousness-
raising the "meta-method" under which "the woman question and feminist practical rea-
soning" can occur); see also Cain, supra note 47, at 25 ("As a legal method, consciousness-
raising has come to stand for any form of research or legal argument that begins with
women's experience."); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Per-
spectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 601-02 (1986) ("Feminist
theory emphasizes the value of direct and personal experience as the place that theory
should begin .... The notion of consciousness-raising as feminist method flows from this
insight." (footnotes omitted)).
77. The search for an authentic voice may be ontologically and epistemologically
problematic. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 115-16 (1989); Higgins, supra note 60, at 1594.
78. Patricia Cain calls this" 'connected scholarship.'" Cain, supra note 47, at 38. The
advantages, and potential problems, of feminist narrative scholarship are set forth very
completely by Kathryn Abrams, supra note 55 passim.
79. KAYE GIBBONS, ELLEN FOSTER (1987).
80. See id. at 10-11, 45.
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relatively happy. Once she moves in with this foster family, she
meets with the school psychologist to discuss a teacher's complaint
that Ellen has been signing her papers with a new surname.81 The
following excerpt is narrated by Ellen:
Ellen? he says to get my attention.
I always think on my own when I sit with him.
Yes?
I understand from your teacher that you've taken to signing
your papers differently.
I wondered when somebody would catch it.
Well Ellen he says like he might be a little confused his own
self we could understand if you were misspelling your name
but you've been signing Foster as your last name this entire
term. Did you realize that?
Of course I know my last name I tell him.
OK then tell me your name.
Ellen Foster.
But that is not your last name. Would you like to talk
about it?
About what?
About why you are using that name. You see Ellen some-
times children such as yourself who have experienced such
a high degree of trauma tend to have identity problems.
Do you follow me?
OK go on.
And these children express these identity problems in sev-
eral ways. What I am thinking of in particular is the child
who has experienced what he or she feels to be an unbear-
able amount of pain, and this child might not want to be
81. See id. at 101-02.
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himself anymore. Are you with me so far?
I understand.
It is not uncommon for such a child to pretend he is some-
body else. He doesn't necessarily have to know that other
person. Just so he does not feel the pain anymore is all that
matters.
OK go on.
I don't know who this Foster is but it really doesn't matter.
What does matter is that you open up and talk to me. Get
that pain out of Ellen and she won't have to be somebody
else.
Lord I say to him. I hate to tell him he's wrong because you
can tell it took him a long time to make up his ideas. And
the worst part is I can see he believes them.
Go ahead Ellen. Tell me what you're thinking. It's OK.
That may not be the name God or my mama gave me but
that is my name now. Ellen Foster. My old family wore the
other name out and I figured I would take the name of my
new family. That one is fresh. Foster. I told him all that.
I'm starting to see your point. Go ahead he told me.
Before I even met Stella or Jo Jo or the rest of them I heard
they were the Foster family. Then I moved in the house
and met everybody and figured it was OK to make my
name like theirs. Something told me I might have to
change it legal or at a church but I was hoping I could slide
by the law and folks would think I came by the name natu-
ral after a while.
He laughed like I had said a joke.
At this point, the psychologist realizes that Ellen has assumed
the name "Foster" because she believes it is the surname of her new
82. L at 101-03.
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family, whom she knows only as "the Foster family." In fact, the
family has a different surname, which is never revealed to the reader.
After he explained it all to me I felt like a fool for a minute.
Then I asked him if I could keep using that name anyway or
if I needed to pick out another one.
I just don't care for my old name I said to him. I sure could
use another one. If I have to give up Foster then give me a
while to think up a flashy one.
When he stopped laughing he said we were back to where
we started.
But I thought we had everything figured out I said. Foster
is not the right pick so I'll think up something else.
No Ellen. The problem is not in the name. The problem is
WHY you feel you need another identity.
Not identity. Just a new name I wanted to write that big
across the sky so he would understand and the picking into
my head would stop.
You are the one who is mixed up about me I told him.83
Ellen's voice contrasts sharply with the male psychologist's
voice, and the contrast suggests how the sexes may view surnames
differently. First, Ellen seems to believe that a surname is an indi-
cium of association. Ellen refers to the foster family as her "new
family," and Ellen's desire to express her connection with her new
family leads her to adopt what she believes to be the family's sur-
name, "Foster." Second, Ellen thinks that changing her name is
natural and unexceptional. After she moves in with her new family,
she expects that "folks would think I came by the name [Foster]
natural[ly]."' Third, Ellen rejects the suggestion that changing her
last name affects who she is-her own identity. She is hardly dis-
traught by the abandonment of her birth name: "[Foster] may not be
the name God or my mama gave me but that is my name
now.... My old family wore the other name out and I figured I
would take the name of my new family.""5 In short, Ellen appears to
83. it at 103-04.
84. Id. at 103.
85. Id.
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believe that her surname is labile and fungible, and that her surname
should be a marker of present association rather than of her father's
lineage.
The school psychologist has a different view of surnames. He
believes it is unnatural for Ellen to change her surname. He feels
that in doing so she must be renouncing her true identity. The psy-
chologist does not believe that Ellen could preserve her identity
without retaining her birth surname. He fails to recognize that El-
len's newly adopted surname may represent an important statement
about association. Ellen's attempt to affiliate herself with her new
family by assuming their apparent surname strikes the psychologist
as a "joke." 6 And as he always does, the psychologist "pull[s] and
stretch[es]" what Ellen says until it falls within his paradigm."
The foregoing passage from Ellen Foster can be read as illus-
trating some of the points that will be raised in the balance of this
section: (1) Women tend to see surnames primarily as indicia of as-
sociation, while men generally see surnames as implicating identity;
(2) women tend to think that changing a surname is natural, whereas
men tend to see it as aberrational; and, (3) each sex has difficulty ac-
knowledging the other's viewpoint, but the male perspective usually
is privileged (at least in the law relating to children's name changes).
B. Men's Conceptions of Surnames
For a number of reasons, men commonly attach great impor-
tance to the stability of a child's surname. Men often regard their
own surnames as fixed symbols of their identities. Because most
men never change their surnames over the course of their lives, 8 they
come to associate a surname with a stable identity." Many men also
believe that a surname has value in the public sphere, where a man's
surname (and his children's use of it) functions much like a trade
name, accumulating goodwill and prestige over time." In addition,
some men believe the preservation and dissemination of their sur-
names gives them "immortality," 91 and demarcates their dominion
over others who bear their surnames. Finally, many men believe
that the sharing of a surname with their children is necessary to
86. See id at 103.
87. Id at 101.
88. See infra Section IILB.1.
89. See infra Section II.B.1.
90. See infra Section HLI.B.1.
91. See infra Section III.B.2.
92. See infra Section 1I.B.3.
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maintain a strong filial bond, especially when their children are no
longer in their custody.93 For these reasons and others, men often
have an instinctive aversion to name change petitions-an aversion
that will be explored in greater detail in the following subsections.
1. Surnames and Identity
I argue here that many men believe their surnames are inextri-
cably bound up with their identities. I define the term "identity" as
it is defined in humanistic psychology: a person's self-structure.
One's self-structure is comprised of "the self-concept (the person's
beliefs about himself), the self-ideal (his view of how he ought to be),
and his public selves (the way in which he wishes to be experienced
by others)."' As Professor Sidney Jourard writes, "A person's self-
structure functions as a regulator of his experience and action, so
that from day to day, and year to year, he will sense continuity in his
existence, and will recognize himself with a sense of familiarity....
Loss of a sense of identity is tantamount to dying... ."" One's self-
structure is influenced by social definitions of behavior appropriate
to one's sex.96
To assess the link between surnames and identity, one must be-
gin by noting the statistical rarity of name changes by adult men.
Men in our society are far less likely than women to abandon use of
their birth names at marriage or otherwise.97 While some men do
93. See infra Section III.B.4.
94. SIDNEY M. JOURARD, HEALTHY PERSONALITY: AN APPROACH FROM THE
VIEWPOINT OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 170 (1974). Other definitions of identity exist.
For example, Anselm L. Strauss argues that, while "[i]dentity as a concept is fully as elu-
sive as is everyone's sense of his own personal identity," generally "identity is connected
with the fateful appraisals made of oneself-by oneself and by others." ANSELM L.
STRAUSS, MIRRORS AND MASKS: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 9 (1969); see also Erik H.
Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, 1 PSYCHOL. ISSUES 1, 23 (1959) ("The conscious
feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: the imme-
diate perception of one's selfsameness and continuity in time; and the simultaneous
perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity."). For some
insight into the term's complexity, see, e.g., CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES IN MENTAL
HEALTH: IDENTITY, MENTAL HEALTH AND VALUE SYSTEMS 3 (Kenneth Soddy ed.,
1961) (commenting that the Scientific Committee of World Federations for Mental Health
could not find "a unified convention of use" for the term "identity").
95. JOURARD, supra note 94, at 152.
96. See id at 218.
97. See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 157-58 (noting that three million women assume
their husbands' surnames at marriage each year, but there are only approximately one
hundred thousand court-approved name changes annually in the United States); Holt,
supra note 10, at 108 ("Marriage is, and has always been, the most productive source of
substitution of one name for another."). See also infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
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change their names-for example, immigrants seeking assimilation,
religious converts, or people reasserting their ethnic identity" -the
vast majority retain the same surname from birth to death. A jour-
nalist aptly described the male perspective:
Married women have four or more choices. 1) Keep the
last name they were given at birth. 2) Take the husband's
last name. 3) Use three names, as in Hillary Rodham Clin-
ton; or ... join the wife's birth name and the husband's
birth name with a hyphen .... 4) Use the unmarried name
in most matters professional, and use the husband's name in
at least some matters personal and domestic. Most men, if
they were to wake up one morning and find themselves
transformed into married women, would (rather huffily)
choose Option No. 1.9'
Because most men bear the same surname throughout their
lives, they often believe that a single lifelong surname is vital to their
sense of identity. One literary critic has written that "[t]o men in our
culture, the name of the father is an irrevocable identity."'' 0 For ex-
ample, Professor Jourard, a psychologist, has explained how his own
text. Of course, some women do have a continuous surname for life: most notably, women
who do not marry.
98. See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 158-60 (noting also "radical political conversions"
and sex-changes as other motivations); see also STRAUSS, supra note 94, at 17 (mentioning
religious conversion); Darrel W. Drury & John D. McCarthy, The Social Psychology of
Name Change: Reflections on a Serendipitous Discovery, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 310, 311
(1980) ("Upon entering a foreign culture where a language other than one's own is pre-
dominant, a person may experience pressure to alter his or her mode of self referral.")
(quoting H. L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 347-48 (1931) and citing THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE: SUPPLEMENT 11 (1948)). In addition, actors are one group of
men that sometimes do change their name, by assuming a "stage name." For example,
Roy Harold Scherer Jr. became Rock Hudson, Leonard Slye became Roy Rogers, and
Ferdinand La Methe became Jelly Roll Morton. See generally Don Asher, Confessions of
a Name-dropper, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1994, at 71, 73 (discussing a number of actors'
name changes).
99. Lance Morrow, The Strange Burden of a Name, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 76; see also
Carey Quan Gelernter, Taking Names: Most Brides Now Are Using Their Husbands' Sur-
names, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1986, at C1 ("[S]ome husbands who are uncomfortable
about a wife keeping her own name will accept her hyphenating her name. Most won't
hyphenate theirs, though.").
100. Marie Maclean, The Performance of Illegitimacy: Signing the Matronym, 25 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 95, 99 (1994); see also Esco v. State, 179 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1965)
("The general rule is well settled that identity of name imports, prima facie, identity of
person. It would seem to follow that a difference of name imports, prima facie, a differ-
ence of person. A change of name, then, it can be argued, always imports, at least prima
facie, a difference in identity. To some extent, a change of name always conceals the
nominee's identity." (citations omitted)); Avner Falk, Identity and Name Changes, 62
PSYCHOANALYTIC REv. 647, 655 (1976) ("Names have strong affective value and sym-
bolize an important part of a person's identity.").
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identity is tightly intertwined with his name:
I am a Jourard, and of all the Jourards, I am that one
named Sidney. People from my home town had little diffi-
culty recognizing me as a Jourard when I was growing up;
there was a physical resemblance among us and we all took
pride in being hard-working, friendly, and independent.
But I am that Jourard named Sidney, and I do not behave
in ways identical with my brothers and sisters, nor do I ex-
perience the world in the ways they do. My identity is my
own. My first name and my surname come to stand for
some limits on the ways in which I will act-there are many
things I will not do because I am a Jourard, named Sidney,
and there are many things which I demand of myself, and
which others expect of me, because I am that very person.10
Professor Jourard argued that it would be "out of character" for a
man to change his surname; to do so would compromise his iden-
tity.1
02
Other men concur with Professor Jourard's sentiment. John
Russell, a nursing manager of a nonprofit home-health agency,
opined that" '[n]ames are very important and I would never give up
mine; I couldn't understand why anybody would give up hers.' ,,103
Another man, who held "conventional" views,"4 explained that his
name was a real part of him (like an arm or finger), and believed that
" 'everyone feels their name is a part of them-it is a part of
them.' ,105 The author Arthur Kurzweil has echoed this view:
[I would never change my surname!] ... "Surnames are
equally important [as first names]. I could never under-
stand how a person could change his last name .... [For me]
changing one's name is like cutting off an arm. It is part of
you. How can you bear to lose it?"1"6
The link between a constant name and a consistent identity
emerges in some male litigants' arguments in disputes over their
children's surnames. For example, one father testified "that he felt
101. JOURARD, supra note 94, at 150 (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 155.
103. Gelernter, supra note 99, at C1.
104. See Holt, supra note 10, at 227 (interview with George Woodward Trcziyulny).
105. Id. at 231 (interview with George Woodward Trcziyulny).
106. LEBELL, supra note 32, at 24 (quoting ARTHUR KURZWEIL, FROM GENERATION
TO GENERATION: How TO TRACE YOUR JEWISH GENEALOGY AND PERSONAL
HISTORY 27 (1982) (first and third alteration in original) (second omission in original));
Jim Croce, I Got a Name, on I GOT A NAME (ABC Records 1973) ("Like pine trees lining
the winding road I've got a name/I got a name Like the singing bird and the croaking toad/
I've got a name And I carry it with me like my daddy did .... ).
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that it would be in the child's interest to retain his name as it would
provide him 'a stable identity in an uncertain future.' "'0' Even when
this argument is not made so explicitly, it is likely that such senti-
ments motivate other non-custodial fathers who oppose petitions to
change their children's surnames.
Many men believe that a constant surname is important not only
to one's personal sense of identity, but also to one's projection of
that identity in the public sphere. In the fourteenth century, when
surnames came into general use in England,"8 a surname actually
communicated something about the person who bore the surname.
At that time, due to the limited number of first names, it became cus-
tomary for men to add surnames to their baptismal names.' 9
Surnames usually reflected an aspect of a man's life circumstances:
"Practically all of the European family names were ... derived in
one or another of the following four ways: I. From the man's place
of residence, either present or past; II. From the man's occupation;
107. Hardy v. Hardy, 306 A.2d 244,246 (Md. 1973).
108. Surname use probably began at the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066, influ-
enced by the Domesday book. Initially, knights, nobility and gentry adopted surnames and
not the peasantry. See generally Holt, supra note 10, at 36-37; Cherena Pacheco, supra
note 42, at 5-9. Surnames became generally necessary and hereditary (by custom, not law)
when Edward I established primogeniture, and when Richard II implemented the poll tax,
which required assessors to record names. See C.M. MATrHEWS, ENGLISH SURNAMES 43-
44 (1966); Seng, supra note 24, at 1307-08, 1324-27. Surname proliferation was also aided
by the Parish Registers required by Henry VIII. See In re Shipley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581, 586
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (citing CHARLES WAREING BARDSLEY, ENGLISH SURNAMES 3 (1875));
MATrHEWS, supra note 31, at 47; G.S. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227, 227
(1906). It seems that "English surnames became fixed and hereditary in the period be-
tween the battles of Hastings and Agincourt." MATrHEWS, supra note 31, at 17. By 1300,
99% of all recorded men, rich as well as poor, had surnames, and many were hereditary.
See id. at 48, 51. Various historians, legal scholars, and courts have already chronicled the
history of surname adoption in England and its related history in the United States. Apart
from those sources cited above, see In re Marriage of Schiffinan, 620 P.2d 579, 581 (Cal.
1980) (en banc); Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 859-67 (N.J. 1995); M.D. v. A.S.L.,
646 A.2d 543, 544-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994); In re Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 568-71
(N.Y.C.P. 1859); J. N. HOOK, FAMILY NAMES: How OUR SURNAMES CAME TO
AMERICA 10-18 (1982); KUPPER, supra note 54, at 9-21; Doll, supra note 27, at 228-30;
Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Married Women's Sur-
names, 5 CONN. L. Rev. 598, 599-602 (1973); Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note 16, at 173-75;
MacDougall, supra note 24, at 108 n.37; Thornton, supra note 42, at 304-06.
109. See Arnold, supra note 108, at 227; Ralph Slovenko, Overview: Names and the
Law, 32 NAMES 107, 107 (1984) ("The Normans adopted the Catholic system of a couple
of hundred saints' names as constituting the entire acceptable repertoire of names. One
could not complain that another used the same name. As a consequence, after the Catho-
lic system took hold, there were not enough names in the village to distinguish everyone,
and so, in the 14th century, surnames.., were adopted.").
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III. From the father's name; IV. From a descriptive nickname.." A
few surnames were even derived from mothers' first names."'
The importance of men's names to their public identities was
reinforced in later centuries when the courts began protecting trade
names, which sometimes derived from the surnames of businessmen.
Courts initially regarded the right to use one's surname in business
as "sacred,"" 2 "absolute,"". and "natural and inalienable."1 4 As one
court stated in 1875:
every man has the absolute right to use his own name in his
own business, even though he may thereby interfere with or
injure the business of another person bearing the same
name, provided he does not resort to any artifice or con-
trivance for the purpose of producing the impression that
the establishments are identical, or do any thing [sic] calcu-
lated to mislead."'
Absent a subjective intent to defraud, courts seldom limited a
businessman's use of his surname as the name of his business." 6 It
110. ELSDON C. SMITH, NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN FAMILY NAMES xiv (1988);
see also Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 (N.Y. 1910) (mentioning that
names of estates, inter alia, also became surnames); MATTHEWS, supra note 32, at 32 ("In
fact in Domesday Book we see the four types into which surnames can always be classified,
those of locality, relationship, occupation and description .... ); Arnold, supra note 108,
at 227 (noting that "even [a man's] real or fancied resemblance to an animal" could form
the basis of a surname). African Americans, on the other hand, have surnames which may
have been derived from different sources, depending upon whether their ancestors were
slaves:
Some slaves assumed and kept the names of their owners or past owners after the
Civil War ended in 1865. Once emancipated, others adopted the names of nota-
ble citizens in their area or significant historical figures, such as Washington and
Jefferson. Still others invented names to describe their status or occupation, such
as "Freeman" or "Blacksmith." The result is that many biological families have a
multiplicity of surnames which may or may not be based on legal relationships,
such as marriage.
Shelly Reese, Shrouded by Slavery, 17 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 51, 51 (1995); see also Ar-
nold, supra note 108, at 232 (stating that after the civil war many "freedmen appropriated
at wholesale the names of families in which they had formerly served" (citation omitted)).
111. See Leonard RLN. Ashley, Nicknames and Surnames: Neglected Origins of Family
Names, Especially Surnames Derived from Inn Signs, 39 NAMES 167, 169 (1991)
(explaining, among other examples, that the first name Barbara produced the surnames
"Babb, Babe, Babcock, Babson, Baby, [and] maybe Babbitt").
112. Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 467-68 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining the demise
of this view).
113. Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427,431 (1875).
114. Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 183-84 (1918).
115. Meneely, 62 N.Y. at 431-32.
116. See David Goldberg, The Right To Use One's Own Name in Business, 32 NAMES
156, 157 (1984); see also, e.g., Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1891)
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was only at the turn of the century that courts started awarding lim-
ited injunctions if public confusion could result, despite the
defendant's honest subjective intent.117 The law's protection of sur-
names as trade names not only encouraged the equation of a man's
surname with his public identity, but even implied that a man's sur-
name had proprietary significance, and that encroachment upon the
patronym infringed upon a man's property rights. Women, by con-
trast, were less influenced than men by judicial protection of trade
names. Women were not involved in commerce to the same extent
as men, and those women who were employed often adopted their
husbands' surnames.118
(affirming lower court's ruling against plaintiff, maker of "Brown's Iron Bitters," in suit
arising from defendant's labeling of product "Brown's Iron Tonic" because "the usual
indicia of fraud are lacking"); Paul Westphal v. Westphal's World's Best Corp., 215 N.Y.S.
4, 6-7 (App. Div. 1926) (granting injunction because defendant was dishonestly trying to
pass off tonic as invented by his grandfather when plaintiff owned the rights), affd, 154
N.E. 638 (N.Y. 1926) (per curiam).
117. See, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 93-95, 98 (1914)
(upholding limited injunction). Public confusion continues to be relevant in determining
whether an injunction will be granted. See, e.g., Visser v. Macres, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367, 372
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (upholding injunction against flower shop operator although defen-
dant did not intend to deceive); David B. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay, 218 N.E.2d 531, 533
(N.Y. 1966) (upholding injunction which prevented Wally Findlay from opening "Wally
Findlay Galleries" on the same block as his brother's art store which was called "Findlay's
on 57th St."). However, injunctions based upon public confusion are usually narrowly
tailored. See, e.g., Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554, 559
(1908) ("An absolute prohibition against using the name would carry trade-marks too far.
Therefore the rights of the two parties have been reconciled by allowing the use, provided
that an explanation [that the companies are not associated] is attached."); Taylor Wine Co.
v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1978) (ruling that the defendant
"may use his signature on a Bully Hill label or advertisement if he chooses, but only with
appropriate disclaimer that he is not connected with, or a successor to, the Taylor Wine
Company"); Purofied Down Prods. Corp. v. Puro Down Int'l, 530 F. Supp. 134, 136
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing defendant Arthur Puro to use his name in business, but enjoin-
ing the use in conjunction with the word "Down"); Findlay, 218 N.E.2d at 535 (enjoining
Wally Findlay from using the family name only for his gallery on 57th Street). Yet a broad
injunction may be issued if the defendant has sold the right to his name. See, e.g., Levitt,
593 F.2d at 468. Over time, the law in this area has moved closer to general trademark
law. See Goldberg, supra note 116, at 161.
118. See MATrHEWS, supra note 32, at 51-52 ("[F]rom the early fourteenth century...
we see the majority of women of the working class called by their husband's surnames.");
Slovenko, supra note 109, at 109 ("In the history of naming, as surnames were basically
descriptive or occupational (like John the carpenter becoming John Carpenter), and as
women did not pursue an occupation outside the home and inheritance typically passed
through sons or other male heirs, women took upon marriage their husbands' surnames as
their own."). But see GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF THE
THIRTEENTH CENTURY 187 (1941) (explaining how husbands changed their surnames to
their wives' surnames to "keep 'the name on the land'" if wife was an heiress); but c.f
Doe v. Hancock County Bd. of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. 1982) (" 'Historically, it
was not uncommon for children to take the mother's surname where she owned the most
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Today a man's surname usually does not reflect his personal
characteristics, nor is it as strongly protected as a trade name as it
once was; his surname is probably not even unique to him.' Yet a
man's surname continues to be intertwined with his public identity.
Men generally hold the positions of power and prestige in our soci-
ety.' Men still are socialized to have a public persona, to provide
financial support to the family, to succeed in the world, and to make
a name for themselves.' A young man, striving to meet his male-
defined role, uses his ,name to link his life's accomplishments to-
gether, in order to gain further power and prestige. His name is a
very important part of his actual or potential public identity. This
stark reality was captured in a Harvard Business Review article
about business names. The author cautioned against using one's
surname to name a business: "Remember, most entrepreneurial yen-
property or had the largest estate.'" (quoting Doe v. Danning, 549 P.2d 1, 4 (Wash. 1976)
(en banc)) (Hunter, J., dissenting to grant of petition to transfer and dismissal).
119. While the United States' current population is approximately 260,000,000, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at 1
(115th ed.), there are only 1,286,556 different surnames in the United States (as deter-
mined from Social Security Administration records). See Edward Callary, Review of The
Book of Names, 34 NAMES 318, 319-20 (1986). In fact, the 100 most common surnames
account for approximately one sixth of the population, and the most common 3,160 sur-
names account for more than half of the population. There are only 500,000 one-of-a-kind
names. When one considers the global population, a name's uniqueness seems even more
illusive. For example, some 75 million people answer to the name of Chang. Id.
120. The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, chaired by then Labor Secretary Robert
Reich, reported in March 1995 that 95% of the senior-level managers in the largest 2000
American industrial and service companies are men. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING
COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN
CAPITAL iii-iv (1993); see also An Unbreakable Glass Ceiling?, BUS. WK., Mar. 20, 1995, at
42 (discussing the report); The Glass Ceiling, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 1995, at 59 (same).
121. See Jacquelynne S. Eccles & Lois W. Hoffman, Sex Roles, Socialization, and Oc-
cupational Behavior, in 1 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH & SOCIAL POLICY, 367, 378
(Harold W. Stevenson & Alberta E. Siegel eds., 1984) ("Child-rearing practices in a soci-
ety reflect the adult roles that children are expected to occupy. Because little girls are
expected to grow up to be mothers with primary child-rearing responsibilities... nurtur-
ing, caring qualities are encouraged .... Boys, on the other hand, are given early training
in the qualities that are functional to occupational roles because these are assumed to be
their major adult commitments. Thus, socialization patterns reflect and reinforce sex dif-
ferences in adult roles." (citation omitted)); see also Jeanne H. Block, Another Look at Sex
Differentiation in the Socialization Behaviors of Mothers and Fathers, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF WOMEN: FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH 29, 74-75 (Julia A. Sherman
& Florence L. Denmark eds., 1978) (noting, for example, that data indicates parents em-
phasize "achievement" and "competition" more for sons than daughters, and that parents'
relations with their daughters are characterized by more "physical closeness" and trust);
Scott, supra note 12, at 663 ("Although the message is surely softened in the modern con-
text, female children continue to absorb from society that self-fulfillment is found first
through marriage and motherhood, while for male children self-fulfillment is more often
equated with success in the broader world beyond the family." (footnote omitted)).
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tures fail and when the business contains your surname, your name
fails too. And when your name fails, to the public you as a person
have failed."' 22
The significance of men's surnames in the public sphere proba-
bly contributes to the difficulty many men have envisioning the
relinquishment of a surname. When children forego the paternal
surname, the father may also perceive a public statement of rejection
and failure, as when a business that bears his name fails. According
to one jurist, "No amount of judicial legerdemain can conceal the
fact that, in changing the surname of these children, the mother and
the Courts are thereby encouraging the children to dishonor the
name of the man who gave them paternity, and who is supporting
them."'" It is not surprising that men who hold this view are strongly
opposed to name change petitions.
2. Patronymy as "Immortality"
Another reason why some men seek to preserve and dissemi-
nate their surnames is their belief that this practice allows them to
achieve a sort of "immortality." As one researcher noted, "Many a
Junior has been so named in the hope that he will be his father all
over again."'24 In one case study, a male subject explained that
"[s]ince he has no children, the family is going to die out, for he is
the last [Trcziyulny] anywhere in this country... and it is a source of
regret to him."'' Similarly, a non-custodial father opposed to adding
the maternal surname with a hyphen to his children's paternal sur-
name explained that the son was the "only male heir of the Dennis
surname, as I am an only child and my father is an only child."'12 In
another case, the father's sole explanation for why it was in his non-
marital child's best interest to have the father's surname, and not the
mother's surname, was that the child was his only son and the fa-
ther's surname "was an honorable name which he would 'truly like'
to have 'carried on.' ,,27 The mother made no comparable claim, al-
122. Joseph R. Mancuso, How to Name-And Not Name-A Business, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 20, 21. The author cited the example of Ford's unsuccessful Ed-
sel model, the failure of which .redounds to the infamy of Henry Ford's great-grandson,
Edsel Ford. See id. at 22.
123. Clinton v. Morrow, 247 S.W.2d 1015, 1019 (Ark. 1952) (McFaddin, J., dissenting in
part).
124. Holt, supra note 10, at 21.
125. Id. at 231.
126. Appellant's Brief at 36a, In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (No. 50811),
cited in Urbonya, supra note 44, at 798 n.35.
127. In re Paternity of M.O.B., 627 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); see also In
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though arguably the boy would carry on her surname if she were vic-
torious in court."' In fact, women rarely, if ever, make such a claim.
The notion of "name immortality" through the practice of pat-
ronymics values abstract, historical, rarefied, and incomplete family
relationships. Patrilineal succession obliterates the genealogical his-
tory of the maternal line, with potentially harmful consequences for
children."9 Patronymy connects a person to less than one half of one
percent of all direct ancestors:
Suppose the last name you were given at birth happened to
be around ten generations ago, that your great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-grandfather had this name ....
If you went back to the tenth generation preceding your
birth, you would have 1,024 great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-grandparents. Only one great-great, etc.-
grandfather among that gang of 1,024 would bear the
patronym that was passed on to you. If you were to add up
all your direct ancestors (... parents, grandparents, great-
grandparents, and so forth, as distinguished from collateral
ancestors: cousins, aunts, and uncles) back to that tenth
generation, you would come up with 2,046 people. Of those
2,046 people, only ten of them bore (and passed on) this
patronym.... [M]ore than 200 times as many of your direct
ancestors bore another name than the one you happened to
get .... What's more ... remember that of those ten men
who represent the line of your patronymical last name, each
of them came from, not one line, but two. So, each of those
men who bore their given patronym for life did so at the
expense of obliterating the hundreds of other names found
along their maternal lines.13
The "immortality" achieved through patronymy is illusory indeed:
re Marriage of Presson, 451 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that father argued
that "his son is his only male child and the only male grandchild of his parents"), rev'd, 465
N.E.2d 85 (IIl. 1984); Aitkin County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 908
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that father explained "that he was the only son in his family
that named a son after his father, that his father had expressed a dying wish that the Gi-
rard name be carried forward, and that he wanted to fulfill his father's wish").
128. See M.O.B., 627 N.E.2d at 1317.
129. See CASEY MILLER & KATE SWIFr, WORDS AND WOMEN 10 (1976) ("To most of
us the identity of our mother's mother's mother's mother, and that of her mother, and on
back, are lost forever. How is one affected by this fading out of female ancestors whose
names have disappeared from memory and the genealogical records? Research on the
subject is not readily available, if it exists at all, but it seems likely that daughters are af-
fected somewhat differently from sons. If it is emotionally healthy, as psychologists
believe, for a child to identify with the parent of the same sex, would it not also be healthy
for a child to identify with ancestors of the same sex?").
130. LEBELL, supra note 32, at 19-20.
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Not only are future generations deracinated from their female ances-
try, but they also lose their connection to all but a few male
ancestors. Yet, flawed as it may be, the "immortality" theory re-
mains widely held. As long as some men perceive a connection
between their place in history and the dissemination of their sur-
names, patronymy will have its staunch advocates.
3. Surnames as Markers of Dominion
From time immemorial, the ability to name has corresponded
with power. As Friedrich Nietzsche stated:
The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one
should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language it-
self as an expression of power on the part of the rulers:
they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and
event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it."'
Historically, a man's power often extended over the objects and
people that bore his surname or that he named, as exemplified by
businesses named after their owners,132 slaves named by their mas-
ters,133 and women and children named after their husbands and
fathers.3 Today, as discussed below, some men still perceive the
dissemination of their surnames to their wives and children as de-
131. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 26 (Walter Kaufmann
& R. J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1967) (describing the origin of the concept of
"good").
132. For example, Honda was named for Japanese engineer Soichiro Honda. See
ADRIAN RooM, DICTIONARY OF TRADE NAME ORIGINS 92 (1982). The Hoover vacuum
cleaner was named for William Henry Hoover, who bought the rights to the cleaner from
J. Murray Spangler. See id. at 92-93. Max Factor established his cosmetics firm in 1909.
See id. at 118. Tupperware was named after U.S. molding engineer Earl Tupper. See id. at
176.
133. See Cheryll Ann Cody, There Was No "Absalom" on the Ball Plantations: Slave-
Naming Practices in the South Carolina Low Country, 1720-1865, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 563,
572 & n.15, 590 tbl. (1987) (stating that slave owners selected the names of purchased
slaves and first generation slave children in order to uniquely identify the slave, although
the number of plantations, size of the slave population, and regular owner absenteeism
made it unlikely that owners continued to select the names of slave children after the first
generation).
134. See In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 581 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) Oinking
to coverture the customs that a woman assumed her husband's surname upon marriage and
the offspring assumed the father's surname); MacDougall, supra note 24, at 138
(attributing the tradition of patronymics to the practice of men naming everything they
paid for); Leavitt, supra note 42, at 101 ("When the doctrine of coverture made it impossi-
ble ... for the married woman to handle property, no reason existed for the family to bear
any name but the paternal surname."); Margaret Buc Spencer, Comment, A Woman's
Right to Her Name, 21 UCLA L. REV. 665, 666 (1973) (arguing that the common law's
marital surname rule derives from the doctrine of coverture).
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marcating the extent of their dominion, either symbolically or actu-
ally.13
5
Margaret Atwood's novel The Handmaid's Tale provides a
chilling illustration of the Nietzschean notion that naming is an ex-
pression of dominion.136 The novel is set in a future dystopian society
in which only a small proportion of women are capable of reproduc-
tion. The "Handmaids" are fertile women who are kept as chattel by
male masters. The novel's narrator, a Handmaid, has been given a
new name, like all Handmaids. While one never learns any Hand-
maid's surname in the novel, the Handmaid narrator is called Offred,
a name different from her first name at birth. As her master's name
is Fred, her name represents his possession of her: she is Of-fred. If
a Handmaid changes masters, her name changes as well.
The significance of their namelessness-their interchange-
ability in the eyes of their masters-is made especially clear
in one incident involving the Handmaid with whom Offred
is paired for daily shopping excursions. This woman, Of-
glen, who has been active in the underground, suddenly
disappears (We learn that her underground activities have
been discovered, and, fearing that under torture she may
incriminate others, she kills herself). Offred goes to meet
her at the prearranged street comer and is met by her re-
placement. When the frightened Offred asks, "'["h]as
Ofglen been transferred so soon?,'" the replacement re-
plies," 'I am Ofglen.' ""'
In some respects, the nightmarish world of The Handmaid's Tale
parallels modem America. 38 In our society, women tend to assume
their husbands' names upon marriage, and children are given the
husbands' surnames as well. Just as every Handmaid who belonged
to Glen was "Ofglen," every woman married to Mr. Smith is the new
Mrs. Smith, and every child fathered by Mr. Smith is named Smith
also. The symbolism attending the practice is pronouced.
The use of "rights" language by courts in reference to fathers'
ability to prevent their non-custodial children from abandoning the
135. See infra text accompanying note 151.
136. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986); see generally Char-
lotte Templin, Names and Naming Tell an Archetypal Story in Margaret Atwood's The
Handmaid's Tale, 41 NAMES 143, 146 (1993) ("Men occupy positions of authority; women
serve and obey, and have names appropriate to their subordinate status.").
137. Templin, supra note 136, at 148-49 (quoting ATWOOD, supra note 136, at 283).
138. See Templin, supra note 136, at 145 ("[Atwood's novel] is a fable of our time,
showing us the fundamental flaws in our society .... This fable can be read in part through
the names of Atwood's characters.").
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patronym reinforces the image that men alone have the power to
name. In the past, courts had often characterized the man's interest
in passing his surname on to his children as a "protectible interest"'39
or a "right."'40 While many courts had used this language in the con-
text of affording the father procedural due process to challenge a
purposed name change,' the language also had substantive weight.
139. Laks v. Laks, 540 P.2d. 1277, 1279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that although
father's right to have children bear his surname has "never amounted to a common law
legal right," courts "have generally recognized that the father has a protectible interest in
having his child bear the parental surname in accordance with the usual custom"); Carroll
v. Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Ark. 1978) (" 'The courts have generally recognized that
the father has a protectible interest in having his child bear the parental surname in accor-
dance with the usual custom .... '") (quoting W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and
Remedies of Parents with Respect to the Names of their Children, 53 A.L.R.2d 914, 915
(1957)); In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968) (father has a "protectible
interest in having the child bear the paternal surname"), overruled by In re Marriage of
Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980) (adopting best interests test); Burke v. Ham-
monds, 586 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that "a natural father has a
protectable right to have his child bear his name"); Ex parte Stull, 280 S.E.2d 209, 210
(S.C. 1981) ("[B]ecause the father has a protectible interest in having his child bear the
parental surname ... he should be notified of any proceedings for a change in his minor
child's surname .... "); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. App. 1984, no writ)
("protectible interest").
140. See, e.g., Worms v. Worms, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1967) ("natural right"),
overruled by Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 583 (adopting best interests test); West v. Wright, 283
A.2d 401, 402 (Md. 1971) ("'[T]he father has a natural right to have his son bear his
name .... .' ") (quoting In re Yessner, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (Cir. Ct. 1969)); Sobel v. So-
bel, 134 A.2d 598, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) (holding that a father has "the right
to expect his kin to bear his name"); Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960-61 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(noting that courts base the father's right on natural law); In re Wachsberger, N.Y.LJ.,
June 28, 1982, at 16,16 (Sup. Ct.) (noting the "inherent, natural fundamental [sic], primary
or time-honored right of a father in his child's continued use of the paternal surname");
Young v. Board of Educ., 114 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ("fundamental right"); De
Vorkin v. Foster, 66 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ("natural right"); Good v. Stevenson,
448 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983 (Fain. Ct. 1982) (stating that "a common law right of a father to
have his child use his surname seems to have developed"); Yessner, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 903
(recognizing a father's "natural right to have his son bear his name"); In re Harris, 236
S.E.2d 426, 430 (W. Va. 1977) (comparing a father's right to have his child bear his sur-
name to his rights under the state's adoption statute). Some courts raise the interest to the
level of a "fundamental right" by equating loss of the paternal name with destruction of
the parental bond. See In re J.S.S. & B.A.B., 895 P.2d 748,749 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995). But
see Concha v. Concha, 808 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991, no writ) (stating that fa-
ther has no constitutionally protected interest in child bearing his surname; rather the
standard is best interest of minor).
141. See, e.g., Carroll, 565 S.W.2d at 17 (holding that non-custodial parent was entitled
to notice of children's name change petition under procedural due process); In re Larson,
183 P.2d 688,690-91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (dismissing decree changing minor's name
for failure to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard to child's father), over-
ruled by Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 583 (adopting best interest test); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.
2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that six days' notice to father of name change
hearing was insufficient); In re DeJesus, 254 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24-25 (Civ. Ct. 1964) (refusing to
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A family law treatise summarized the law's "traditional view" of a
petition by a divorcing or a divorced woman seeking to change her
children's surname to either her resumed birth name or the chil-
dren's stepfather's name: "[T]here was a sort of presumption or
vaguely qualified right in the child's father that the child should con-
tinue to have the father's surname., 142 Although women may now
have the equal legal right to pass their surnames on to their chil-
dren,"' numerous decisions within the last decade continue to
characterize the father's interest as a "protectible interest" or a
"right." " Such language persists because most children receive the
patronym at birth and therefore it is their fathers' "protectible inter-
est" that is implicated by name change petitions.14 Consequently,
the notion of dominion that attaches to the dissemination of a man's
surname continues to receive the state's imprimatur by the courts'
strong descriptive language.
It appears that the ramifications of patronymy are not merely
symbolic. This practice disseminates a message (subconsciously or
overtly) that reinforces patriarchy. "In Western society the patro-
nym embodies the forces of tradition and authority; it enables the
grant name change unless natural father is given due notice); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384,
388 (Okla. 1980) (holding name change decree void for failure to give due notice to fa-
ther); Ex parte Stull, 280 S.E.2d at 210 (stating that father should be notified of name
change proceedings and allowed to participate); Scucchi v. Woodruff, 503 S.W.2d 356, 359-
60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, no writ) (dismissing a default judgment changing child's name for
failure to serve father with proper notice); Eschrich v. Williamson, 475 S.W.2d 380, 383
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that natural father was entitled to notice
of hearing regarding changing of child's name); In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d at 430 (stating that
child should be able to change surname if father has abandoned child, but "upon proper
notice to the father").
142. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 547-48 (1988); see also supra notes 144 & 145.
143. See supra section V.A.
144. E.g., In re Paternity of Tibbitts, 668 N.E.2d 1266,1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (father
has a "'protectible interest'" in his non-marital child bearing his surname) (quoting
D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)); Likins v. Logsdon, 793
S.W.2d 118, 122 (Ky. 1990) ("a right and a protectible interest"); Keegan v. Gudahl, 525
N.W.2d 695,701 (S.D. 1994) (Henderson, Retired J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("protectible interest"); Replogle v. Replogle, No. 01-01-9312-cv-00516, 1994 WL 228227,
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 1994) ("protectible interest"); Halloran v. Kostka, 778
S.W.2d 454,456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (" 'protectible interest' ") (quoting 57 AM. JUR. 2D
Name § 15 (1988)); Beyah v. Shelton, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Va. 1986) ("the importance of
'a father's interest' ") (quoting Flowers v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 1977)).
145. The courts seem to use the term in a way that does necessarily reflect a preference
for the patronym. See, e.g., Cohan v. Cunningham, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1984) ("[A]
father has a recognized interest in having his child bear his surname ... [but] neither par-
ent has a superior right to determine the surname of the child.").
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dominant ideology and culture., 14 6 In addition, the continued prac-
tice of families bearing the male surname both strengthens and is
strengthened by the actual power that many men wield within their
families. This power is manifested through, among other things, do-
mestic violence,'47 child discipline,148 and women's and children's
economic dependence. 9 The courts' preference for the patronym in
146. Maclean, supra note 100, at 96.
147. Domestic violence victims are predominantly women. "Women were about 6
times more likely than men to experience violence committed by an intimate." BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE RE-
DESIGNED SURVEY 1 (1995). Approximately one million women a year suffer violence at
the hands of an intimate. See id. at 3. Nearly one third of all female murder victims are
killed by their husbands or boyfriends. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1990).
148. See WAYNE R. LAFAE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6 (1986)
("The parent of a minor child is justified in using a reasonable amount of force upon the
child for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare. Thus the parent
may punish the child for wrongdoing and not be guilty of a battery or of a violation of a
statute punishing cruelty to children if the punishment is inflicted for this beneficent pur-
pose, and if the punishment thus inflicted is not excessive in view of all the
circumstances .... ); see also, e.g., Moakley v. State, 547 So. 2d 1246, 1246-47 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (overruling father's conviction for aggravated child abuse because spanking
an eight-year-old child with a belt and causing bruising on buttocks and hips did not rise to
the level of malicious punishment).
149. See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
383,383 (1994) ("Female-headed households are five times more likely to be poor and up
to ten times more likely to stay poor than are households with a male present." (citation
omitted)) [hereinafter Williams, Married Women and Property]. Even when a male is
present, the common law doctrine of family privacy helps ensure that any benefits the
woman has in the marriage bargain may not be enforceable until divorce. See, e.g.,
McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (holding that so long as a couple is
still living together, "[t]he living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the
household, and not for the courts to determine"). Additionally, "[i]n intact families, so-
ciological studies have found that husbands' market power translates into power within the
household. Other studies show that husbands' ability to exit the marriage while retaining
the key family asset greatly enhances their bargaining power within the marriage." Joan
Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2281
(1994) (citing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 158 (1989)
and ELLEN ISRAEL ROSEN, BITTER CHOICES: BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN IN AND OUT OF
WORK 100-01 (1987)).
Various authors have described women's subordinated family status in stark terms.
See, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 218-19 (1982) ("Although men no
longer legally own women, many act as if they do. In her marriage vows today, the woman
still promises to love, honor and obey.... Men's status is upheld by a general division of
labor outside as well as inside the home that makes women economically dependent on
men .... Battering is one tool that enforces husbands' authority over wives or simply re-
minds women that this authority exists."); Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence
and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S LUJ. 1, 24 (1995) ("The structure of today's society explains the prevalence of
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the interpretation and application of the law gives men additional
power that women do not have.5 °
While no conclusive evidence supports a causal link between a
family's use of a man's surname and the man's power within the
family, enough men articulate such a connection to raise here that
possibility. A study by researchers at Indiana University showed
that thirty-six percent of undergraduate male respondents, but only
seven percent of undergraduate female respondents, agreed with the
proposition that a man becomes the head of the household when his
wife takes his name.' In addition, sixty-four percent of undergradu-
ate male respondents, but only twenty-nine percent of undergraduate
female respondents, agreed with the proposition that society would
expect that a couple followed traditional marital roles if the couple
observed traditional surname custom.' 2 The same study also demon-
strated that both men and women, but more men than women,
attribute new responsibilities to a man when his family takes his sur-
name.
53
Some circumstantial evidence also supports the causal link be-
tween a family's use of the patronym and the man's power within his
family. The fact that many more men than women believe a woman
males as abusers and females as victims. Battering is supported by the belief that the fa-
ther is the head of the family. The disproportionate degree to which women are
objectified in society is another factor. The increasing use of pornography and the use of
women's bodies to sell products... reinforce the abuser's perception of women as prop-
erty or subhuman. The ability of men to control women's education and employment
further facilitates the use of violence against women. Women are financially unable to
provide for themselves and the children without the abuser."); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule
of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996)
("The status of married women has improved, but wives still have not attained equality
with their husband-if we measure equality as the dignitary and material 'goods' associ-
ated with the wealth wives control, or the kinds of work they perform, or the degree of
physical security they enjoy."); Williams, Married Women and Property, supra, at 407-08
("Today, laws supposedly aimed at 'equality' give women the formal right to own prop-
erty. But the legal definition of property excludes human capital, leaving women with
disproportionately little property to own, and revealing modern property law as little more
than an updated version of coverture.").
150. See infra Section IV.
151. See Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson & Jill Crawford, The Meanings of Marital Sur-
names, 12 SEX ROLES 1163, 1168 (1985). As the researchers concluded, "In general, our
female respondents were more likely than the males to dissociate traditional marital-
surname styles from marital roles." Id.
152- See id. at 1168.
153. Undergraduate and graduate students believe that the wife's assumption of her
husband's surname imposed responsibility upon the husband akin to that existing under
coverture. See id. at 1169 ("When asked if a man becomes legally responsible for a women
[sic] when she assumed his last name, 36% of the female and 43% of the male under-
graduates and 19% of the graduate women and 31% of the graduate men agreed.").
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should always change her name to that of her husband, 54 and the fact
that even men married to women with different last names often seek
to perpetuate the patronym through their children,'55 may suggest
that men perceive an enhancement of their power through the prac-
tice. In addition, statements by women who have kept their birth
names upon marriage provide further material for conjecture. Some
of these women described their choice as motivated by a desire "to
avoid feeling like an appendage, like someone's property.',5 6 They
also often reported that their husbands supported their decision be-
cause the husbands wanted an equal partner.
157
On the other hand, the fact that most women agree to adopt
their spouses' surnames and to give those surnames to their children
may undermine the alleged relationship (causal or other) between
patronymy and men's power. If a connection exists, and if women
perceive it at the* time they choose to follow the custom of
patronymy, then difficult questions are raised about why women
follow custom or whether they have the ability to resist. A possible
explanation is provided in a later section of this Article.5
4. Patronymy and the Father-Child Bond
Men whose marriages end in dissolution often lose physical cus-
tody of their children. 9 When later faced with the prospect that their
children's surnames may change, many men who contest the name
changes argue, and many courts agree, that the loss of a shared sur-
name will harm the father's relationship with his child. 60  The
154. See Scheuble & Johnson, supra note 67, at 750 (noting that 32% of males and 5%
of females interviewed agreed with the statement that "a woman should always change her
name to that of her husband").
155. In Susan J. Kupper's study, almost 50% of the men said that the children should
receive the father's surname even if the parents use different surnames. See KUPPER,
supra note 53, at 84. "Most used as their rationale either tradition (one man wrote, 'this is
a patrilineal society') or simplicity for the sake of the child." ld. Another 25% of the men
said that the children should be given a combined surname, while the final 25% of the men
said that they did not know or had not decided. See id. Only one respondent wanted the
children to bear the mother's surname. See icL Yet fewer men in Kupper's study will
probably select a nontraditional surname for their children than the men's responses indi-
cate. Many of the men advocating combined surnames for their children were not yet
fathers, and in fact, 84.5% of those who already had children gave them the fathers' sur-
name alone. See id. at 84. Many of the women explaining the traditional surname choice
for their children stated that their husbands wanted to pass on the patronym. See id. at 85.
156. I. at 24 (response of 10% of women who maintained their own surname).
157. See Foss & Edson, supra note 66, at 364. But see infra note 243.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44.
159. See supra note 49.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 303 and 395-414.
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father-child bond may already be strained by the physical separation
of parent and child and the acrimony surrounding the dissolution,
and a father may fear further deterioration of the relationship.
The connection between a surname and the strength of the par-
ent-child relationship is discussed at length below in Section IV,
when the Article explores how the law reflects men's conceptions of
surnames. The connection between a shared surname and the qual-
ity of the parent-child relationship is the most common way courts
justify a ruling that requires a child to continue using the surname of
a non-custodial father.'61 In Section IV, I suggest that this benevo-
lent rationale has serious limitations.'62
In sum, I have maintained that the majority of men have a par-
ticular understanding of surnames. They believe, in whole or in part,
that a surname is: (1) a fixed symbol of a man's identity, both on a
personal level and in the public sphere; (2) a vessel for the man's
"immortality"; (3) a marker of dominion indicating a man's authority
over his wife and children; and (4) an essential component of a man's
relationship with his children following marital dissolution. These
perceptions have led many men to conclude that children's surnames
should remain constant, even after the father who shares the child's
surname has departed the household.
C. Women's Conceptions of Surnames
In general, most women's conceptions of the importance of sur-
names differ dramatically from the traditional male view analyzed
above. Juliet's famous soliloquy in Romeo and Juliet provides a
mise-en-scene for this section's discussion of the female perspective.
O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo?
Deny thy father and refuse thy name;
Or if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love
And I'll no longer be a Capulet
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy,
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.
What's Montague? It is nor hand nor foot
Nor arm nor face, 0 be some other name
Belonging to a man.
161. See iL
162. See infra text accompanying notes 305-62.
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What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other word would smell as sweet.
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And for thy name, which is no part of thee,
Take all myself.163
Like Juliet, many women view a surname as fungible and dis-
tinct from one's core identity. The reason Juliet holds this view may
vary from why other women hold this view: Juliet is enmeshed in a
family feud that keeps her apart from Romeo, and that feud is identi-
fied in terms of the families' surnames. Most contemporary women's
views on surnames, rather, are probably influenced by the fact that
women generally forego their surnames upon marriage. 114  Most
women do not expect surnominal constancy, so, as social science data
confirms, their sense of a stable identity is not dependent on it.6' In
addition, Juliet's willingness to relinquish her own surname when she
leaves her family's household to be with Romeo, while related to her
unique circumstances, is consistent with many women's understand-
ing of a surname as an associational label. Today most women view
a surname's significance in its ability to label the woman, her hus-
band, and her children as a "family."
1. Lability of Surnames
Under our society's system of patronymy, the imperative of
patrilineal succession yields only to the tradition that a woman will
relinquish her father's surname upon marriage and acquire her hus-
band's surname. In a decision affirmed without comment by the
United States Supreme Court, the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama explained the pervasiveness of this custom:
Certainly the custom of the husband's surname denomi-
nating the wedded couple is one of long standing. While its
origin is obscure, it suffices for our purposes to recognize
that it is a tradition extending back into the heritage of most
western civilizations. It is a custom common to all 50 states
in this union.'66
163. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET 37-38 (Richard
Hosley ed., Yale Univ. Press 1964).
164. See infra text accompanying footnotes 169-70.
165. See infra Section I1I.C.2.
166. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217,221 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (upholding the unwrit-
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Simply, "[a surname] is one of the things a little girl grows up know-
ing she will be expected to lose if she marries.""1 7
The custom persists today. Most American women are not like
Lucy Stone, the women's rights activist and abolitionist, who in 1855
refused to change her name upon marrying Henry Blackwell, saying:
"'My name is the symbol of my identity and must not be lost.' .168 A
1994 study found that 90% of American women still take their hus-
bands' surnames upon marriage or remarriage, and only two percent
use their birth names exclusively."9 A 1995 study found that it was
ten regulation of the Alabama Department of Public Safety that a married woman use her
husband's surname to seek and obtain a driver's license), affd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972); accord
M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543, 544 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) ("In modern society...
it has been customary for a woman to adopt her husband's surname upon marriage."); In
re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1976) ("[W]hen daughters marry, by custom, each
assumes the surname of her husband.").
167. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 129, at 5.
168. Id. at 13; see Holt, supra note 10, at 109 (same). Stone initially went by "Lucy
Stone Blackwell," adopting the same name structure as Elizabeth Cady Stanton. See
Denise Stamp Yannone, His Name or Yours?, MODERN BRIDE, Feb. 1984, at 210, 210
(quoting Dr. Natalie Naylor, specialist in women's history at Hofstra University). She
later reverted back to using just Stone. Stone's refusal to take her husband's name meant
that she was refused permission to vote in a 1879 school committee election. Ultimately,
her attempt to vote led the Massachusetts Board of Registrars to convert its decision in
her case into a general ruling that " '[a] married woman must vote bearing her husband's
surname.'" Una Stannard, Manners Make Laws: Married Women's Names in the United
States, 32 NAMES 114, 115 (1984). The controversy was widely reported in the Boston and
New York newspapers, and Lucy Stone's "attempt to defy custom," it. at 115, apparently
caused a legal backlash, including the codification of the rule that women must take their
husbands' surnames upon marriage, which was not the common law rule nor previously
codified in treatises, see id. at 114-15 (noting, for example, that while the first five editions
of Joel P. Bishop's Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce did not mention
names, the 1881 edition added a section that stated "[t]he rule of law and custom is famil-
iar, that marriage confers on the woman the husband's surname.").
Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell had a daughter and named her Alice Stone Black-
well; Stone was her middle name. While Henry felt that Lucy had the right to give Alice
the surname Stone, because Lucy had " 'suffered to bring the child into the world,'" Lucy
felt that this was unfair to Henry and Alice, as Alice would have been marked as illegiti-
mate. STANNARD, supra note 19, at 101; see also ALICE STONE BLACKWELL, LuCY
STONE: PIONEER OF WOMAN'S RIGHTS 195 (1930) (same); ELINOR RiCE HAYS,
MORNING STAR: A BIOGRAPHY OF LUCY STONE, 1818-1893,151 (1961) (same).
The Lucy Stone League opened in New York in 1921 and was organized to help
women keep their names after marriage. See MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 129, at 14. It
was activated when the keep-your-own name movement from 1910-1920 seemed to be
dying. See STANNARD, supra note 19, at 187. The League's position on children's sur-
names was very conservative; it adopted the position that children should continue to be
named after the father, as that was the children's "guarantee of legitimacy and of their
legal rights of inheritance." Idt at 200. In fact, almost all Lucy Stoners, like Lucy Stone
herself, gave their children the mother's surname as a middle name and the father's sur-
name as the child's surname. See id.
169. See Joan Brightman, Why Hillary Chooses Rodham Clinton, AM. DEMO-
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the norm in more than ninety-five out of one hundred marriages for
a woman to take her husband's surname upon marriage.17 1 The prac-
tice of a woman taking her husband's surname upon marriage, to the
extent it is in decline, is eroding very slowly. 7 ' Some evidence exists,
however, that it may be eroding faster for African-American
women,72 and that it may erode slightly faster in the future for Cau-
GRAPHICS, Mar. 1994, at 9, 9 ("Nine out of ten American wives use their husband's last
name."). In fact,
[H]yphenated names are used by 5 percent of couples, while just 2 percent of
married women use their maiden name exclusively. About 3 percent of women
use other alternatives. This category includes... [women who use a] maiden
name as a middle name .... [It also includes women who] switch names, using [a]
maiden name professionally and [a] husband's name for social or legal purposes.
Id.; see also Carmen Livingston, Many Take Vows But Not 'His' Name, MILWAUKEE J.,
June 20, 1993, at G1 (While "[a] survey of 2,000 engaged men and women in 1991 by
Bride's magazine found that 29% of the brides planned to keep their birth surnames," "an
informal telephone survey [done by the reporter] suggests that most women here still fol-
low the tradition of giving up their birth surnames and taking their husband's.").
170. See Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 731. Among those women who married
after 1980 and did not follow tradition, half either kept their birth names or hyphenated.
See id. at 727. For those who married before 1980, "other" was the most common uncon-
ventional choice, which the authors speculated may have been the woman's last name in a
previous marriage. See id. The authors, however, also found that among both groups,
approximately 25% retained their birth name as a middle name, as this practice was ex-
tremely common in the South and had a long history in Southern society. See id. at 731.
For the variables that correlated with unconventional name choice, see infra notes 234-38
and accompanying text.
171. See Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 731 (stating that there appears to be
only "some minor erosion of this practice" when one compares individuals who married
before 1980 and those who married after 1980). For those women married before 1980,
only 1.4% reported using an unconventional last name. For those women married after
1980,4.7% selected an unconventional last name. See id. at 727. See also Gelernter, supra
note 99, at C1 ("[A]fter a period in the 1970s when women in greater numbers were
keeping their own surnames or creating hyphenated names upon marriage, the custom of
taking the husband's name seems to be emerging stronger than ever.") (reporting that out
of 150 wedding announcements sent to The New York Times in the last two years, seven
women kept their names, five women used both names, all the other women took their
husbands' names, and no man hyphenated his name or used his wife's name).
172. There is some indication that African-American women are more reluctant to take
their husbands' names than the Johnson and Scheuble numbers, see supra note 170 and
accompanying text, reflect. See Syed Malik Khatib, Personal Names and Name Changes,
25 J. BLACK STUD. 349, 350-52 (1995) (reporting that a study of African-American college
students showed that approximately 50% of women and 10% of men anticipated changing
their names; half of the women who anticipated changing their names would do so for
marital reasons, and half said they would change their names "for reasons associated with
monetary gain or cultural (African) identification"); see also Livingston, supra note 169, at
G1 ("Black Milwaukeeans tend not to make an issue out of taking the husband's name,
two local ministers said. The Rev. James Leary... says that about 20% of his 800-
member congregation have chosen to hyphenate."). Yet one author claims that African-
American men put more importance on their spouses taking their surnames than non-
African-American men because the former want to ensure that the image of black man-
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casian women than in the recent past. 73
Because of the convention, many women change their surnames
repeatedly throughout the course of their lives.'74 For example,
Leona Helmsley has had five surnames during her life.75 The annals
of history are replete with similar examples. 6  Most Americans
never raise an eyebrow when a woman changes her name upon re-
marriage, but if a man were to adopt the surname of his spouse each
time he married, he would surely draw the attention (and perhaps
the censure) of his peers."
hood is not blemished or the black family divided. See id. (citing Harriette Cole, fashion
editor of Essence magazine and author of Jumping the Broom: The African-American
Wedding Planner). More empirical research on African Americans and their marital
naming practices is needed. See Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 725 ("Much less is
known about the expected pattern among African Americans [regarding women's marital
naming], so we cannot hypothesize the direction of the effect for this group."); Scheuble &
Johnson, supra note 67, at 748 ("The marital naming practices and attitudes towards nam-
ing in the predominately white American culture or in racial or ethnic minorities have not
been explored in the research literature and are thus unknown.").
173. In another study by David Johnson and Laurie Scheuble, 82% of female college
students indicated that they intended to take their spouse's name upon marriage, and an-
other 7% indicated that they would hyphenate their last name. See Scheuble & Johnson,
supra note 67, at 750 tbl.1. Scheuble and Johnson's study sample was 98% white. See id.
at 749.
174. Actresses historically have been one group of women, however, who do not
change their surnames upon marriage. Elizabeth Taylor serves as a recent example.
175. Leona Helmsley was born with the surname Rosenthal, she has had three hus-
bands (one of whom she married twice), and she adopted the surname Roberts in between
marriages. See Andrea Rothman, What if Leona Leaves The Palace for the Pokey?, Bus.
WK., July 24, 1989, at 79,79-81.
176. For example, Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, had a nominal
history of Mary Morse Baker Glover Patterson Eddy. She was Mary Morse Baker for
twenty-two years (although she published some poems under various pseudonyms during
that time), Mrs. Glover for ten years (after marrying George Glover, although he died six
months later), Mrs. Patterson for fifteen years (after marrying Dr. Daniel Patterson), Mrs.
Morse Glover and Mrs. Baker Glover for nine years (after her separation from Dr. Patter-
son), and Mrs. Eddy (when she married Asa Gilbert Eddy at age fifty-five). See
STANNARD, supra note 22, at 76-78. Betsy Ross had three husbands and her gravestone
reads: "'Elizabeth Griscom Ross Ashbourn Claypoole."' Id, at 73. This phenomenon was
fairly common throughout the Nineteenth Century because when husbands died, their
wives often remarried. See id.
177. Consider, for example, if F. Lee Bailey had changed his name each of the four
times he married. In his early twenties, when he studied law and was admitted to the bar,
he might have become F. Lee Gott. He would have become F. Lee Victoria after his sec-
ond marriage in the 1960s. In 1972, upon his third marriage, he might have become F. Lee
Hart, and that would have been the name under which he published numerous books on
criminal law and defended Patty Hearst. In 1985, upon his fourth marriage, he might have
become F. Lee Shiers, and under this name he would have defended O.J. Simpson. As he
had two sons by his first marriage, and another son with his second wife, he might have
retained some of his prior surnames for his children's benefit. For example, he might have
taken the name F. Lee Gott Victoria Hart upon his third marriage. Or he might have had
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The lability of most women's surnames allows women to see the
advantages of change in a way men do not. A name change usually
signals a marriage, a positive event in the woman's life. Even when
the name change accompanies a divorce, the name change may signal
a welcomed change of status or a woman may enjoy having multiple
personae. One woman who had been married three times and di-
vorced three times "uses all four available last names, changing them
as if she were chanaging outfits, according to mood or season."'
78
Even women who never marry benefit from society's acceptance of
the fungibility of women's names: for example, five women in the
fourth generation of the Rockefeller clan, known as "the cousins,"
dropped the Rockefeller name without the prompting of marriage.179
As a general matter, women enjoy a flexibility to alter their sur-
names that men do not share."'
The law undoubtedly has contributed to most women's attitudes
toward their own surnames. Although neither the common law of
England nor the early common law of the United States required a
woman to forego her surname upon marriage, 8' starting in the late
1800s, numerous United States courts and treatises stated that upon
marriage a woman's surname changed as a matter of law." 2 As late
attachment to each of his names, so that when he married a fourth time he might have
been F. Lee B.G.V.H. Shiers, using the initials B.G.V.H. to represent the first letter of
each of his previous surnames. See WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 145 (47th ed. 1992-93); Ira
Silverman & Fredric Dannen, A Complicated Life, 72 NEw YORKER, Mar. 11, 1996, at 44,
45-46; cf. STANNARD, supra note 19, at 78-79 (employing the same analysis for William O.
Douglas, who married four times).
178. Morrow, supra note 99, at 76.
179. See Carol J. Loomis, The Rockefellers End of a Dynasty?, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1986,
at 26,26-28. Some of these women use their middle names as their surnames (e.g., Hope
Aldrich and Margaret Dulany), and others adopted new surnames (e.g., Ann Clark Rob-
erts). See id. at 28.
180. See LEBELL, supra note 32, at 24; see also Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and In-
scrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-Centered Approach to Child Name Change
Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1996) (explaining her own name choice upon mar-
riage and that her husband's "identity was wrapped positively in the folds of [his
surname]" and that he did not "have the same sense of possibility about the transitory
nature of names or identity in relation to others").
181. See 9 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 813 (John Hous-
ton Merrill ed., 1st ed. 1889) ("[B]y custom, the wife is called by the husband's name. But
whether marriage shall work any change of name at all, is, after all, a mere question of
choice, and either may take the other's name, or they may join their names together."); see
also Stannard, supra note 168, at 114 ("[lIt gradually became the custom for women to
change their name to their husband's. They did so as a matter of choice....").
182. See Stannard, supra note 168, at 114-17; see also Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank,
85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881) ("For several centuries, by the common law among all English
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband's surname. That be-
comes her legal name, ind she ceases to be known by her maiden name."); JAMES
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as 1966, Corpus Juris Secundum's section on the "Name of Married
Woman" started with the proposition: "At marriage the wife takes
the husband's surname and [it] ... becomes her legal name. Her
maiden surname is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known
thereby." '83 In March 1972, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed Forbush v. Wallace,'1 4 in which the district court claimed that
Alabama had "adopted the common law rule that upon marriage the
wife by operation of law takes the husband's surname." '85 It was not
until October 1972 that the legal pendulum started swinging in the
opposite direction.86 In the case of Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections,8' a court upheld a woman's right to use her birth name
upon marriage and stated its understanding of the common law rule
as derived from England. ' In the years after Stuart, several other
state courts also concluded that the common law did not require that
a woman take her husband's surname upon marriage; these courts
determined that the proper understanding of the English common
law is that upon marriage a woman "'acquires a new name by re-
pute .... The change of name is in fact, rather than in law, a
consequence of the marriage.' ,,,89 Today "all states ... recognize
SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 40 (1882)
("Marriage at our law does not change the man's name, but it confers his surname upon
the woman."); Proper Designation of Married Women in Legal Proceedings, 4 (new series)
VA. L. REG. 721,721 (1919) ("The law confers upon a wife the surname of her husband.").
Stannard sees these initial legal misstatements as a backlash to both Lucy Stone's efforts
to keep her own name and the Lucy Stone League's subsequent efforts. See Stannard,
supra note 168, at 114-23.
183. 65 CJ.S. Names § 3 (1966).
184. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
185. 1d. at 221 (upholding Alabama policy requiring married woman to use her hus-
band's surname to seek and obtain a driver's license).
186. See Stannard, supra note 168, at 125; see also STANNARD, supra note 19, at 282
("Between 1972 and 1976 over thirty states, either by Attorney General Opinions, deci-
sions in higher courts or legislation, acknowledged that when a woman takes her husband's
name, she does so under the old common law right to use the name of one's choice, that
married women, therefore, cannot be compelled to use their husbands' names for any pur-
pose.").
187. 295 A.2d 223 (Md. 1972).
188. See id. at 227. "Under the common law of Maryland, as derived from the common
law of England, Mary Emily Stuart's surname ... has not been changed by operation of
law ... solely by reason of her marriage ...." Id. The court noted that "[t]he mere fact of
the marriage does not, as a matter of law, operate to establish the custom and tradition of
the majority as a rule of law binding upon all." ld.
189. Kruzel v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458,461 (Wis. 1975) (quoting 19 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND § 1350, at 829 (Viscount Simond ed., 3d ed. 1957)); see also State v. Taylor,
415 So. 2d 1043,1047 (Ala. 1982) ("Our research has convinced us that Forbush v. Wallace
does not accurately state, the common law on names .... "); Simmons v. O'Brien, 272
N.W.2d 273, 274 (Neb. 1978) ("A married woman, being free to adopt or not to adopt her
1672 [Vol. 75
1997] ASSOCIATIONALISM IN NAMING DISPUTES
that women have the right to not change their names when they
marry.""19 While women are no longer legally required to take their
husbands' surnames upon marriage, generations of women grew up
believing that the law required women to do so as a condition of
marriage.
The ritualized and almost universal abandonment of birth
names by half of the married population, mandated until recently by
the law, likely influences women's perceptions of a surname's muta-
bility. The impermanency of most women's surnames in turn affects
many women's openness to name changes generally. As feminist
literary critic Marie Maclean has explained:
Whether they became brides of Christ or merely brides,
ninety percent of women have traditionally experienced at
least two public names in their lifetime (not including the
changes in personal appellation which accompany us all in
private life). Women therefore had from the first a certain
protean quality. If one change is possible then all other
changes become thinkable.19'
2. Surnames and Identity
The fungibility of women's surnames led one researcher to study
women who kept using their birth names upon marriage and to ask,
"What does a name represent?"'92 Her rhetorical inquiry could be
characterized as positing the end points of a continuum: "[t]he core
of one's identity, or a fluid and changing entity . .. ?"" Social sci-
ence data and women's voices indicate that the answer for most
women falls much closer to the "fluid and changing entity" end of
the continuum.94 While some women's views fall on the opposite
end, these women are a distinct minority, and even these women
tend to have views similar to the vast majority of women with respect
to children's surnames. 95
Women, like men, have "identities," and a woman's name
change upon marriage affects her identity. A surname change upon
husband's surname at common law, remains free to do so.").
190. MacDougall, supra note 24, at 96 n.9 ("By statute, judicial opinion, state attorney
general opinion, formal and informal agency directives or memoranda, or legislation, all
states now recognize that women have the right to not change their names when they
marry." (citing authority from all fifty states)).
191. Maclean, supra note 100, at 99.
192. KUPPER, supra note 54, at 1.
193. ld.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 198,205-19.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 220-26,239-41.
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marriage signals a change of status (i.e., marriage), the passage into
adulthood,96 and/or the capacity for socially-permissible reproduc-
tion.9 7 Yet a woman's name change does not generally jar her core
sense of identity, as it might for a man. Rather, most women expect
alterity; a woman's socialization tells her that she will bear a succes-
sion of surnames during her life. As one woman stated:
I think in my case the name I am called doesn't matter very
much. I feel much more strongly that the person that I am
should continue and that it doesn't matter what that person
is called. I would not care for an ugly name with unpleasant
connotations (for aesthetic reasons as much as anything)
but otherwise I am content to be called anything because I
am I anyway .... 198
To the extent that a woman's identity depends upon a constant
name, it probably attaches to her praenomen."9 9 Women's first
names allow women to achieve recognition without being mistaken
for a more publicly-known father or husband. In her article Feminist
Legal Methods, Katharine Bartlett laments that the Harvard Law
Review editors will not let her cite authors by their first and last
names, in order "to humanize and particularize the authors."2 0 She
states, "First names have been one dignified way in which women
could distinguish themselves from their fathers and their hus-
bands."20' 1 Additionally, because of the impermanence of women's
surnames, women's first names, perhaps more than men's first
names, take on a special importance. 2°2 A possible outgrowth of the
importance of women's first name is that girls are more likely than
196. See Susan Ferraro, Name-Dropper, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at
18; Maclean, supra note 100, at 100.
197. See Maclean, supra note 100, at 100.
198. Holt, supra note 10, at 138; see also Jenny McPhee, A Mother's Name, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1996 (Magazine), at 68 ("Though names can mean a lot to women, girls learn very
early that they will probably lose their names when they marry. If you know you will lose
something, you do not get very attached to it. Thus, the connection for women between
name and identity becomes insignificant and unimportant.").
199. See Holt, supra note 10, at 152 (describing one woman's feeling that her first name
was "inviolable").
200. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 47, at 829 n.*.
201. ld.
202. See MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 129, at 7 (discussing how women's "first names
seem often to be considered the logical, appropriate, or even polite counterpart of men's
surnames") (citing as an example the many news stories that referred to Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Nancy Maginnis when they married as "Kissinger and Nancy"). But
see supra text accompanying note 101.
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boys to have unusual first names.203 Many mothers "want[ their
daughters to have a 'different,' even 'odd-sounding' name .... that
would make others take notice ....
The most relevant social science research reveals that women
who took their husbands' surnames upon marriage did not feel that
the name changes compromised their individual identities, but
rather, the name changes celebrated their new relationships. 25  A
1989 study of 180 married women by Karen Foss and Belle Edson
sought to explore "the kinds of accounts women offer about their
[marital-]name choices and to determine the larger theories behind
these accounts, 20 6 as "names, name choices, and explanations about
names provide clues about the world views of women."2 7  The
authors sent an equal number of questionnaires to three groups of
women: (1) women who upon marriage took their husbands' sur-
names; (2) women who kept their own surnames; and (3) women
203. See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 134 (1988) (finding boys' names to be more tradi-
tional and recurrent than girls' names, and hypothesizing that it reflects "one feature of a
general cultural value emphasizing attractiveness for females and accomplishment for
males"); see also Frank N. Willis et al., Given Names, Social Class, and Professional
Achievement, 51 PSYCHOL. REP. 543, 548 (1982) ("Parents seem less bound by tradition in
selecting a name for a girl. Perhaps they feel that it is more important for a girl to be tem-
porarily attractive (have a name that is currently fashionable or eye catching) than to be
conforming in the long run.").
204. Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10, at 55 n.2 (citation omitted). My own expe-
rience supports this observation. My first name is Merle, and my brothers' first names are
David and Gary.
205. Unfortunately, the social science research examining the implications of women's
surname choices is rather limited. See supra note 67. Deborah A. Duggan et al. identified
only nine empirical studies on women's marital names. See Duggan et al., supra note 58, at
89. Six of those studies are examined and discussed in this Article. The studies reviewed
are the following: ALFORD, supra note 10; Holt, supra note 10; IKUPPER, supra note 54;
Foss & Edson, supra note 66; Penelope Wasson Dralle, Women Physicians' Name Choices
at Marriage, 42 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 173 (1987); Intons-Peterson & Crawford,
supra note 152. Omitted as irrelevant to this Article's thesis are two studies which address
stereotypes associated with women who continue using their birth names after marriage.
See Sheila M. Embleton & Ruth King, Attitudes Towards Maiden Name Retention, 66
ONOMASTICA CANADIANA 11 (1984); Donna L. Atkinson, Names and Titles: Maiden
Name Retention and the Use of Ms., 9 J. ATLANTIC PROVINCES LINGUISTIC ASS'N 56
(1987). Also omitted is one study addressing cross-cultural patterns of marital naming
practices. See Rubie S. Watson, The Named and The Nameless: Gender and Person in
Chinese Society, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 619 (1986).
206. Foss & Edson, supra note 66, at 358.
207. d. at 370. They studied women who were pursuing a college degree or those with
a degree who were working outside the home. Their sample was two-thirds White and
one-third Black, Asian, or Hispanic. See id. at 359. The educational background of their
sample casts some doubt on the ability to generalize their results to women generally. See
infra note 237 (noting only 19.2% of women in the United States have college degrees).
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who adopted hyphenated or new surnames."8 The responses of the
women who assumed their husbands' surnames are particularly re-
vealing for purposes of this Article. These women's marital name
choices correspond to the choices made by the vast majority of mar-
ried women in this country. 9
The authors found that all of the women's explanations for their
name choices fell into one of three categories: "(1) concerns about
self; (2) concerns about relationships; and (3) concerns about cultural
or societal expectations.""21 However, while "all of the responses in-
corporated to a degree one of these concerns ... each group
prioritized these levels differently., 211 "In the accounts offered by
the women who took their husbands' names upon marriage, relation-
ships emerge as the primary focus.
212
These women consistently place their relationships with
their husbands and children in a central position in their
lives, and their identities stem from these relationships
more than from professional careers or other independent
activities. For many of the women in this sample, having
their husbands' names identifies them as "a team, a single
unit. ,21
3
Cultural expectations ranked second in importance for these women,
that is, seeing marriage as a prescribed role in life, with the name
change at marriage as part of custom and convention.214 The women
were least concerned about their own "selves" in explaining their
name choices. "These women repeatedly state that 'names don't
mean that much to me .... [They are] only a trivial social custom,'
'My name is not particularly important to my identity,' 'what's in a
name,' 'I didn't feel strongly about keeping it,' and 'names are just
208. See id. at 359.
209. Additionally, a greater percentage of the woman who assumed their husbands'
surnames had children, so these women may be more likely to face a dispute upon divorce
over a child's surname. See id. at 361 (stating that 86% of the women who took their hus-
band's surnames were mothers compared to 59% of those women with hyphenated names
and 53% who used solely their birth names). In addition, women who assumed their hus-
bands' surnames were apt to change their surnames upon divorce or remarriage, with
approximately one third of the women saying that they would resume using their birth
names upon divorce, and most claiming they would take their new husbands' names if they
remarried. See id. at 362. For a discussion of the views of the women in Foss and Edson's
second and third categories, see infra note 220 and accompanying text.




214. See id at 361.
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labels; labels are not extremely important.' ,215 Foss and Edson con-
clude, "These women's sense of self depends on others; it is an
acquired identity obtained through the marriage relationship.
2 16
Other commentators have reached similar conclusions. 217  As a re-
porter observed, "Many women who say it's easier to go with
tradition argue that names aren't that significant., 218 A respondent
to my informal Internet survey serves as an example: "I've never
had a particular attachment to my last name, so it never bothered me
to think of changing it.
219
Other research, as well as Foss and Edson's own study, indicates
that some women do link their identities to their birth names. Foss
and Edson found that identity factored prominently in the reasoning
of women who kept using their birth names upon marriage." Simi-
larly, Susan Kupper's study of women who continued using their
birth names upon marriage found that "many women have a visceral
need not to take 'someone else's' name: They fear that if the label
changes, the contents will change, too. ' 22' Dr. Marion Panzer, a psy-
215. IeL at 362.
216. Id. at 367.
217. For example, early Twentieth Century Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger
stated that the custom of a woman changing her surname upon marriage reveals that
"[w]omen are not bound to their names with any strong bond." OTTO WEININGER, SEX
AND CHARACTER 206 (1906). Rather, a woman can assume the name of her husband
"without any sense of loss." Id. Yet Weininger's interpretation of this fact was pejorative:
"The fundamental namelessness of the woman is simply a sign of her undifferentiated per-
sonality." See ic This book "had a brief but powerful influence on popular psychology,"
MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 129, at 5, but has been severely criticized for its sexist and
anti-Semitic content. See, e.g., JEWS AND GENDER: RESPONSES TO OTTO WEININGER 3
(Nancy A. Harrowitz & Barbara Hyams eds., 1995) (describing Weininger's work as "an
apotheosis of misogyny"); Misha Kavka, The "Alluring Abyss of Nothingness": Misogyny
and (Male) Hysteria in Otto Weininger, 66 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 123, 123-24 (1995)
("Sex and Character now stands as one of the most blatant examples of misogynist and
anti-Semitic writing to come out of turn-of-the-century Austria and Germany.").
218. See Gelernter, supra note 99, at C1.
219. Internet survey, supra note 12 (response of Roberta Becker).
220. See Foss & Edson, supra note 66, at 363 ("For women who kept their birth names
the most important context is the self.... They consistently state that they want to
'maintain' or 'not lose' their personal identities .... "). For women who adopted a hy-
phenated or new surname, the two most important explanations that emerged were
"relationship" and "self," and these were given equal weight. See id. at 365.
221. KUPPER, supra note 54, at 5; see id. at 131 ("I was startled at the intensity of their
feelings. Many of the women who wrote to me felt that their names are at the core of their
being."). In addition, Bugental and Zelen conducted a study asking groups of individuals,
"Who are you?" See James F.T. Bugental & Seymour L. Zelen, Investigations into the
'Self-Concept' L The W-A-Y, 18 J. PERSONALITY 483, 483 (1950). Although the authors
did not differentiate between first names and surnames, the authors concluded that for all
individuals studied-university students, male construction workers, and female church
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chologist, concurs: "'[T]he primary motivation for many women
who retain their birth name stems from a desire to define themselves
and maintain a stable sense of identity.' ,,2 The following two
statements by women who are reluctant to forego use of their birth
names upon marriage are illustrative. One twenty-six-year-old
teacher stated, "[A] man doesn't have to change his name and give
up hig identity when he marries. Why should IT' Another teacher
stated, "If I should ever marry, I plan to keep my name because it is
my name. It is part of my identity. I don't want to feel that by mar-




A 1985 study by Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson and Jill Craw-
ford captured the sentiments of the women that strongly identify
with their birth names. This study examined, among other areas, the
"extent to which a person identifies with her or his premarital sur-
name" and the "willingness to consider surname change," in order to
evaluate these "variables" of identity.2 5 As to the "extent to which a
person identifies with her or his premarital surname," the authors
found:
Tradition suggests that females identify less with their pre-
marital surnames than men because they are expected to
change to another surname if they marry. Our data contra-
dict this view: Half of both female and male
undergraduates indicated that they identified a great deal
with their premarital surnames. Even higher percentages of
the graduate groups held this opinion (60% of the women
and 58% of the men). The percentages did not differ sig-
nificantly by sex for either group, indicating that both older
and younger women identified as much as men with their
surnames.
What would happen to their sense of identity if they
changed their surnames? More than half of the under-
graduate men (61%) and women (53%) believed that their
identities would change. The older group concurred: 62%
members--"the name seems to be a central aspect or representative of the Self-Concept."
Id at 493 (evaluating significance of name as an answer to the question "Who are you?").
Yet, importantly, the listing of one's family status showed "its maximal frequency in the
data at hand in the mature females, suggesting its increasing emphasis and importance in
their concept of themselves." Id. at 494.
222. Yannone, supra note 168, at 210 (quoting interview with psychologist Marion Pan-
zer).
223. Id. at 210. But the teacher's husband wanted "some recognition," which led the
teacher to use her husband's surname as her middle name. See id.
224. Id. at 210.
225. Intons-Peterson & Crawford, supra note 152, at 1164.
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of the women and 73% of the men thought it would change
at least some.26
There are several ways to reconcile Foss and Edson's conclu-
sions about women who use their spouses' names exclusively upon
marriage (the vast majority of married women) with Intons-Peterson
and Crawford's findings, although further social science research
might dispute the studies' compatibility. First, only Foss and Edson
explicitly asked subjects about the importance of a surname as an
associational label. If the women in Intons-Peterson and Crawford's
study valued their premarital surnames because those surnames con-
nected them to their birth families, then Intons-Peterson and
Crawford's study would support the proposition that women gener-
ally see a surname as an associational label, and it is the associational
aspect of the name that helps define their identities. In fact, one ex-
planation for why the women in Intons-Peterson and Crawford's
study believed their identities would change if their surnames were
changed is that those women were contemplating the underlying
change of their life circumstances (i.e., marriage and the reorganiza-
tion of family relationships) and the consequent separation from
their birth families. Indeed, Intons-Peterson and Crawford's re-
spondents hinted that associationalism was a more significant
concept for some women than for the men generally.27
Second, it is plausible that a woman's attitude about her name
evolves as she bears her new marital name.28 Intons-Peterson and
Crawford's study inquired about respondents' hypothetical willing-
ness to change their surnames, whereas Foss and Edson inquired
about name choices actually made. Intons-Peterson and Crawford
never, for example, asked their married respondents how their actual
name choices affected their sense of identity. A woman may come to
226. IM at 1164-65. The Intons-Peterson and Crawford study also found that both men
and women underestimated the amount that women, but not men, claim to identify with
their surnames. See iU. at 1165-66. This finding may mean that courts, when deciding
which parental surname a child should bear, may erroneously minimize the woman's inter-
est.
227. First, the respondents "overwhelmingly thought social expectations or customs
were the reasons why wives typically adopt their husbands' surnames on marriage ....
[but] [t]he desire of women to merge their identities with those of their husbands was cho-
sen by 26% of the undergraduate women and by 11% of the undergraduate men." Id. at
1168. Second, "[s]ome graduates, especially women, claimed other reasons ... [including]
joining the man's family." Id. Third, 69% of graduate women are unwilling to share a
surname with a divorced spouse, whereas 45% of graduate men were unwilling to do so.
See id. at 1166.
228. The authors found that more unmarried women than married women believed that
"women identified some or a great deal with their surnames." Id. at 1166.
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see her marital surname over time more as an important marker of
her association with her family, and minimize her birth name's im-
portance as a symbol of her individual identity. Consistent with this
interpretation is the finding by Intons-Peterson and Crawford that
many more unmarried women than married women identified with
their surnames. 9
Third, Intons-Peterson and Crawford did not ask their subjects
whether they perceived the identity change as a positive or negative
experience. While women may identify with their premarital sur-
names and feel that their identities change when their surnames
change upon marriage, such change may not be antithetical to a
woman's self-structure. Most women expect to change their sur-
names upon marriage. Even if they reluctantly anticipate it, society
considers this change to be identity-affirming, rather than identity-
challenging. Therefore, the female respondents may have welcomed
their name changes. Consistent with this interpretation are Intons-
Peterson and Crawford's findings that women were more likely than
men to anticipate changing their surnames upon marriage,"0 that
women were much more likely than men to prefer a surname change
upon marriage,"' that men and women thought it was easier for fe-
males than for males to change a surname upon marriage, 2 and that
men were more likely than women to think their identities would
change a great deal as a result of a name change. 3
Another way to reconcile the findings is to focus generally on
the characteristics of women that believe their birth names are inte-
gral to their self-identities. This raises the possibility that Intons-
Peterson and Crawford's study overrepresents the views of women in
a particular (and narrow) demographic group. Women who keep
their birth names upon marriage and who speak in terms of individ-
229. See id. at 1165 ("Almost one-fourth of the married women reported little or no
identification with their marital surnames, whereas almost no single (non-married) gradu-
ate women indicated low surname identification .... ).
230. See kL at 1166 ("None of the younger males strongly agreed that they would
change their surnames on marriage, whereas 61% of the younger women strongly agreed.
Moreover, 92% of these males disagreed or strdngly disagreed that they would
change .... ).
231. See id at 1167 (stating that "92% of the undergraduate men, but 11% of the
women, preferred to keep their own surname.... Similarly, more graduate men (88%)
than graduate women (37%) preferred to retain their surname on marriage").
232. See id. ("Approximately two-thirds of both the younger and the older groups
thought it was psychologically easier for females than for males to change names.").
233. See id at 1165 ("[Mien (38%) were more likely than women to think their identi-
ties would change a great deal. With the older group, this difference between the sexes
was statistically significant....").
1680 [Vol. 75
1997] ASSOCIATIONALISM IN NAMING DISPUTES
ual identity tend to be professionally accomplished prior to mar-
riage. 4 Additionally, they tend to be better educated, better paid,
and more accustomed to progressive gender roles; they also tend to
have married later in life.25 In fact, Intons-Peterson and Crawford
conducted their research on highly educated undergraduate and
graduate students-women who are less inclined than other women
to adopt a new surname upon marriage,. 6 and who are more inclined
than other women to view their birth names as integral to their iden-
tities.
One who shares the views of women who see a birth surname as
important to a sense of identity, or belongs to the same demographic
stratum as these women, might be tempted to accord undue empha-
sis to their voices. Yet these women's conceptions of surnames are
not representative of most women's views, nor are their lives similar.
Most women are not obtaining or do not have a four-year college
degree, unlike the women in Intons-Peterson and Crawford's study
234. See KUPPER, supra note 54, at 28 ("About a quarter of those who answered the
questionnaire stated that they had maintained their own names after marriage because
they had established professional reputations under those names."); Foss & Edson, supra
note 66, at 363 ("[T]he maintenance of separate professional identities is another major
reason for women to keep their birth names. Many had established careers when they
married."); see also Brightman, supra note 169, at 9 (commenting that the number of new
brides who announced their weddings in The New York Times and who chose to keep their
birth names or to use hyphenated names rose from 22% to 26% between 1988 and 1993,
but that the newspaper "tends to publish announcements for brides and grooms with pro-
fessional accomplishments"); Gelernter, supra note 99, at Cl (stating that in the 1970s the
women who bucked tradition were "primarily professionals with established career track
records under maiden names"). But see Dralle, supra note 205, at 174 (noting that women
physicians in Louisiana who took their husbands' surnames upon marriage more often
married after they had obtained an M.D.).
235. See Brightman, supra note 169, at 9 (finding that married women who use some-
thing other than their husbands' last names after marriage tended to be younger, better
educated, and of higher income than other women). Johnson and Scheuble found that an
unconventional marital name choice for women who married before 1980 tended to corre-
spond to later-in-life marriages, higher educational achievement, greater career
orientation, and more liberal gender role values than for other women. See Johnson &
Scheuble, supra note 66, at 727. However, the strongest correlate found was for region.
See id. An unconventional marital name choice for women who married after 1980 tended
to correspond to region and rejection of gender role traditionalism. See id These women
also tended to be older, early daters, and to have a mother with an unconventional sur-
name. See id. at 727-28. Johnson and Scheuble found that an unconventional surname was
not related in either group to "number of times married, premarital cohabitation, family
income, and religiosity measured by church attendance." Iii at 728; see also KUPPER,
supra note 54, at 6-8 (finding married women who made nontraditional naming decisions in
the sample pool to be very well educated, successful professionals, late marriers, and pros-
perous).
236. See infra note 235. The male respondents' educational background may also have
affected their responses.
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or Kupper's study.z7 Only four percent of Kupper's sample worked
at home as housewives, homemakers and mothers."5 While their
message may sound familiar, these women constitute a small subset
of women generally. To privilege the minority's message is to silence
the vast majority of women and to ascribe to women generally a type
of social and economic reality that most women lack. A myopic fo-
cus on the viewpoints of the minority of women does a great
disservice to the majority of women.
Whether or not the minority's views are more "authentic"-
because these women have managed to escape some or all the effects
of patriarchy-the fact remains that even women who link their own
surnames to their identities usually do not insist upon the dissemina-
tion of their surnames to their children. While some women retain
their birth names upon marriage, they almost invariably give their
children the paternal surname." Dr. Harriet Lerner, a psychologist,
stated, "'Baby-naming is the bottom line .... That's when you find
out whose name is really important. And it's almost always the
man's.' ,240 Most of Intons-Peterson and Crawford's respondents
thought that a child should be given the father's surname.24'
237. Ninety percent of the women responding to Kupper's study, for example, had at
least a college degree; 32% also had a Master's degree, and 22% had either a professional
degree or a Ph.D. See KUPPER, supra note 54, at 7. In contrast, only 19.2% of women in
the country have college degrees. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 157 chart no. 233 (114th ed. 1994).
238. See KUPPER, supra note 54, at 8. This contrasts, for example, with the sample
studied in 1984-85 by Maccoby and Mnookin of 1,100 divorced families in California. See
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 60-61. "[Thirty] percent of the mothers were
full-time homemakers before the breakdown of the marriage," and those employed outside
the home tended to work "part time or for substantially fewer hours than the father." Id.
In a substantial majority of the families, the mother had primary managerial responsibility
for the child-rearing functions before divorce. See id. at 268.
239. See Slovenko, supra note 109, at 109 ("Statistics are not available, but it appears
that many professional women in the United States are keeping their maiden names.
When it comes to naming the children, however, feminist determination fades into indeci-
sion."); Gelernter, supra note 99, at C1 ("And even women who hyphenate their names or
have kept their own are usually giving their children the husband's surname."); see also
Intons-Peterson & Crawford, supra note 152, at 1169 (finding that 82% of undergraduate
women and 78% of undergraduate men surveyed, and 52% of graduate women and 66%
of graduate men surveyed, agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that a child
should be given the father's surname). Unfortunately, the studies cited in this note do not
provide enough detail or lack a diverse enough sample to suggest a more pluralistic pat-
tern, especially with regard to teenage mothers, non-marital children, children in different
birth order and/or children of different gender.
240. Gelernter, supra note 99, at Cl (quoting Dr. Harriet Lerner).
241. See Intons-Peterson & Crawford, supra note 152, at 1169-70 ("[W]hen several
options for a child's surname were offered in a multiple-choice question, 86% of the fe-
male and 82% of the male undergraduates preferred giving the father's surname to the
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The pervasiveness of patronymics among women who make un-
conventional surname choices upon marriage has four possible
explanations: (1) these women are not deeply offended by patro-
nymics (women who keep their birth names upon marriage, after all,
are usually using their fathers' surnames); 2 (2) these women lack
power in their relationships to influence their children's surnames;U
3
(3) these women are more accommodating than their spouses and
therefore acquiesce to their husbands' preferences; 4 or (4) these
women attach an importance to their own surnames that is inde-
pendent of the surnames' dissemination to their children. While any
of these reasons could be true for an individual woman, I believe the
third and fourth explanations most frequently apply to the subset of
women who make unconventional surname choices upon marriage.
These women often express disdain for patronymy, and they appear
to have power in their relationships as evidenced by their own un-
conventional marital surnames. Rather it seems likely that women
who speak of their names as a critical component of their own identi-
ties speak a language different from men: the importance of a
surname is not dependent upon the surname's dissemination to oth-
ers, either to enable one's "immortality" or as a marker of one's
dominion. Consequently, these women, like the majority of women,
tend to yield to the patronym because it identifies the child, albeit
incompletely, with the household family members. The patronym
satisfies their belief that a surname signals associationalism-and ac-
cepting the patronym also allows them to accommodate their
husbands' wishes.
child.... For the graduates, 64% of the women and 68% of the women [sic] would use the
father's surname for the child. More women (14%) than men (6%), however, chose a
hyphenated name.").
242. Patronymics may also seem less objectionable than the perceived confusion that
may result from an unconventional choice or the perceived harm that may befall the child
from an unconventional surname.
243. Cf Dralle, supra note 205, at 174 (finding that women who continued to use their
birth names upon marriage rated their marriages as more traditional than women who
changed their surnames).
244. See LEBELL, supra note 32, at 92 ("Women are so programmed into being rela-
tional, they are uncomfortable bearing a name different from their husband's and even
more uncomfortable giving their children names other than that of the children's fa-
ther's."). As one woman said, "Giving the baby Phil's surname was not really an issue to
me. I am not overly emotional about my last name and having to keep it. It seemed more
conventional and it made Phil happy which was good enough for me at the time." Internet
Survey, supra note 12 (response of Suzette Galka).
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3. Surnames as Markers of Association
For many women, a surname functions primarily as an indicium
of association-that is, it signifies one's present association with
other family members, especially those in the same household. Car-
son McCullers' play, The Member of the Wedding, can be interpreted
to illustrate this concept. Frankie Addams, a twelve-year-old girl,
speaks to Berenice Sadie Brown, the African-American cook, about
Frankie's relationship with her brother and his fianc6e:
Frankie: Janice and Jarvis. It gives me this pain just to
think about them.
Berenice: It is a known truth that gray-eyed people are
jealous.
Frankie: I told you I wasn't jealous. I couldn't be jealous
of one of them without being jealous of them both. I
'sociate the two of them together. Somehow they're just so
different from us .... J.A.-Janice and Jarvis. Isn't that
the strangest thing?
Berenice: What?
Frankie: J.A.-Both their names begin with "J.A."
Berenice: And? What about it?
Frankie: If only my name was Jane. Jane or Jasmine.
Berenice: I don't follow your frame of mind.
Frankie: Jarvis and Janice and Jasmine. See?
Berenice: No. I don't see.
Frankie: I wonder if it's against the law to change your
name. Or add to it.
Berenice: Naturally. It's against the law.
Frankie: Well, I don't care. F. Jasmine Addams. 45
Not only does Frankie see her name as fungible and a name
change as a positive step, but as a commentator states, "The child-
like quality of F. Jasmine's speech should not blind us to the fact that
a naming of self is always a genuine placement or categorization." 246
In the play, Frankie desperately wants to be part of Jarvis' and
Janice's group. Frankie states:
Shush, just now I realized something. The trouble with me
is that for a long time I have been just an "I" person. All
other people can say "we."... All people belong to a "we"
245. CARSON MCCULLERS, THE MEMBER OF THE WEDDING 25-27 (1951) (stage di-
rections omitted).
246. STRAUSS, supra note 94, at 18.
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except me .... Not to belong to a "we" makes you too
lonesome. Until this afternoon I didn't have a "we," but
now after seeing Janice and Jarvis I suddenly realize some-
thing .... I know that the bride and my brother are the
"we" of me. So I'm going with them, and joining with the
wedding .... I love the two of them so much and we belong
to be together. I love the two of them so much because
they are the we of me.247
Through Frankie's assumption of a first name that links her to Jarvis
and Janice, it appears that Frankie is attempting to become the "we"
she desires. Although she will share the same surname as her
brother and his wife, her desire for a common praenomen may indi-
cate her recognition that her surname will likely change one day.
Berenice's response demonstrates the error in formulating an
ironclad model of how men and women view surnames. Berenice
thinks Frankie is silly, but Berenice holds the male view of names
more than the female view. She has been married four times and
apparently has never changed her name. She sees names as un-
changeable markers of identity. In fact, Berenice explained that it
was against the law to change one's name because "it would be a
confusion. Suppose we all suddenly change to entirely different
names. Nobody would ever know who anybody was talking about.
The whole world would go crazy ... [b]ecause things accumulate
around your name. ' 24' Unfortunately, McCullers does not give the
reader enough information about Berenice to explain why her views
fall on the side of the spectrum usually inhabited by men.
Social science research confirms a surname's importance as an
associational label for most women. Foss and Edson's research, in-
troduced above, indicated that women who forego their birth names
upon marriage give their present associations with their husbands
and children precedence over their individual sense-of-self: Their
identities are primarily framed by their familial associations. These
women "describe[d] themselves as making deliberate and conscious
decisions about their names,"249 and many thought that taking their
husbands' names was a positive choice.20
247. MCCULLERS, supra note 245, at 51-52.
248. See id. at 84.
249. Foss & Edson, supra note 66, at 367.
250. Duggan et al. claim that Robert R. Holt's Studies in the Psychology of Names,
supra note 10, found that women did not believe that taking their husbands' surnames was
a positive choice. The authors were "unable to reconcile these discrepancies" with Foss
and Edson's findings. Duggan et al., supra note 58, at 93. Yet, a close reading of Holt
leads to no such conclusion. For example, many of Holt's female married subjects found
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Women's individual voices vividly express the importance of a
surname as an associational label. For example, a journalist de-
scribed why she took her husband's name upon marriage, although it
was contrary to the normal practice of people in her profession, at
her age, and with her ideology. She explained, "I'd done it, in part,
for the usual sappy, deliciously irrational and not politically correct
reason that makes Valentine's Day big business. I was in love. I
wanted to shout our association from the rooftops and everywhere
else-introductions, letterheads, legal documents, tax forms." ' An-
other woman stated, "'Having the same last name as your spouse
identifies you as being a couple ....' " This woman wants any
children of the marriage to bear the same surname in order to reflect
the family bond.z" Another woman explained, "'I'm all for chang-
ing to my husband's name .... A family's surname aids in continuity
and identification with a family.' "" And yet another woman stated
that "'it seemed marvelous'" to change her name upon marriage
"'because that meant complete identity with him, and that is what
she wanted.' "2" When she had two children, she felt "even more a
part of the name."' 6 This woman later divorced and believed "she
owes it to them [the children] to keep it."' 7 She further stated, " 'A
name becomes a symbol of family characteristics ... a symbol of
the name change easy. See Holt, supra note 10, at 123-56. As one subject stated, "'I
found the change in names a delightful and happy one.'" Id. at 124. To the extent a
woman was displeased with the change, it often related to the feeling of separation from
her birth family, see id. at 126, 128, 149, to her prior professional accomplishment, see id.
at 128-29, 141, or to her displeasure with the marriage, see id. at 133-34, 148. As Holt
recognized, there was a range of responses by women: "The chief factors that seem to be
involved are the attitude towards the name, the degree of identification with it, the values
associated with the name, the habit systems in which it is involved, and the degree to which
the owner has been made aware of it." Id. at 157. Yet "the chief factor of importance [in
determining ease connected with a name change] is the connection of personal values ...
and name." Id. at 126. Although Holt draws few gender distinctions, when he does, his
bias is evident: "On himself, the effect of a man's changing his name may be severe emo-
tional disturbances, a feeling of split personality, or other maladjustments. But women
who object to change because of possible violation of important values are usually malad-
justed anyway, and projecting their difficulties onto the norm." Id. at 312.
251. Ferraro, supra note 196, at 18 (emphasis added).
252. See Gelernter, supra note 99, at Cl (quoting Wendy Russell).
253. See id&
254. Your Name-Keep it or Change?, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 9, 1993, at
4C (quoting Carol from Solon, Ohio).
255. Holt, supra note 10, at 173 (interview with Katharine Gilman MacKenty Bryan).
256. Id. at 175.
257. Id. at 176; see also KUPPER, supra note 54, at 90 ("Some women who were di-
vorced or widowed and then remarried kept their first husbands' surnames for the sake of
their children. They felt that it would be comforting to the children to continue to share a
name with their mothers.").
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family you can identify with.' "2' The importance of a surname as a
marker of association also explains why many women relinquish
their husbands' surnames upon divorce. 9
Even women who keep their own names upon marriage strongly
evince the importance of association, although often it is an associa-
tion to the women's birth families. Kupper's study of women who
kept their birth names upon marriage indicated that, "[f]or many
women, the most important factor in choosing a surname is family
identification. For them, the question is not, 'What name will reveal
my identity as an individual?' but, 'what name will show my family
membership?' ,260 As to the importance of family ties, she writes:
The women in my study expressed this need for family
identification repeatedly in their questionnaires. Many said
that one of the most important reasons for using the names
they did was to express ties with their families. This was of-
ten the rationale for retaining or regaining their birth
surnames or for adopting other surnames that had family
associations.261
Whether or not a woman assumes her husband's surname upon
marriage, she tends to value the associationalist notion that children
should bear the same surname as other family members in the same
household. While no social science research specifically addresses
this point, anecdotal evidence-in particular, women's arguments to
258. Holt, supra note 10, at 181.
259. Forty-one women in Kupper's study specifically mentioned that they "changed
their names [to their birth names] to avoid keeping their former husbands' names, which
often evoked painful memories. Many also felt that since the marriages were over, they no
longer wanted the names that symbolized these relationships." KUPPER, supra note 54, at
35. However, a woman's self-identity can be intertwined with a name taken primarily for
associational reasons, although it no longer reflects that or any family association. For
example, Laura D'Andrea Tyson still bears the surname of her first husband "Tyson," a
marriage which ended in the mid-1970s, and which produced no children. See
NEWSMAKERS 1994 CUMULATION 506 (Louise Mooney Collins ed., 1994); Susan Dentzer
& Erik Tarloff, A Woman of Influence, WORKING WOMAN, Aug. 1993, at 30,30.
260. KUPPER, supra note 54, at 38. As one women stated, she took her husband's sur-
name when she married the first time, and kept it upon divorce. Yet when she remarried
she took her stepfather's name and stated, "I chose my Pop's name because I strongly
identify myself as his daughter, and receive a great deal of pleasure from this." Id. at 33.
Another women explained,
The most important factor is that I come from a family of five daughters. We are
very close-knit and we encourage each other to pursue all interests, no matter
how far-fetched. Except for my husband, I do not feel at all close to my hus-
band's family so I feel it makes more sense to keep my own name.
Id. at 32.
261. 1I at 31. Sometimes this included a desire to stay connected to an ethnic heritage.
See id. at 32.
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courts explaining why their children should bear their surnames-
lends support to this observation. For example, in D.R.S. v. R.S.H.
212
the mother stated, "I feel it is best that our names be consistent since
he will be living with me." 3 In In re Rossell,2"4 the mother sought to
change her son's surname to her birth name, which she resumed after
divorce. The court stated that "[s]ince her son is always with her, she
believes he should share her name."' 5 In Hamby v. Jacobson,266 the
mother sought to have all three of her children bear the name
Hamby, a name she acquired from a former husband, and the name
of one of her three children. She testified that "if all family members
had the same last name, the family members would be closer and
more secure."' 7 In In re A.D.,28 a lesbian, who was artificially in-
seminated by an anonymous donor, wanted her child to bear her
lover's name, as the lover acted as a parent to the child. She ex-
plained that the reason for the change, among other things, was "the
symbolism of family. 2 19 While some men may also accept the con-
262. 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
263. Id. at 1267 (Shields, J., dissenting).
264. 481 A.2d 602 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
265. Id. at 602.
266. 769 P.2d 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
267. Id. at 274.
268. 493 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
269. Id. at 405; see also In re Larson, 183 P.2d 688, 689 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947)
(mother's petition stated the reasons for her daughter's name change were the mother's
"divorce from appellant, the award to her of the custody of said minor, her remarriage to
Weir P. Armstrong, and that said minor 'is now a member of the household of her mother,
the said Marion Armstrong, and her stepfather, the said Weir P. Armstrong, and another
child is about to be born to her mother and her stepfather; and it will be to the best inter-
ests of said child.., that she have and bear the surname of her mother' "), overruled by In
re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1980); In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718, 719 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984) (mother argued name change would give child "a more secure feeling of
family unity"); Hardy v. Hardy, 306 A.2d 244, 247 (Md. 1973) ("[S]he says it was because
of the prominence of the Creighton name in that area and because she wanted her child,
who was soon to start school, to have the same last name as the man she loved and was
living with that she requested the child's name be changed.... "); In re Saxton, 309
N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn. 1981) ("In [mother's] words, the proposed surname was desirable
for the children because it would 'reflect the family unit, the Saxton family unit that we
have established here in Minnesota after four years.' "); In re Sakaris, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
1009-10 (Civ. Ct. 1993) (mother's petition stated, "[W]hile [mother] continues to use her
maiden name .... Sakaris, she desires that the child be allowed to legally assume the name
of... Steinman [her fianc6e]. Since the Petitioner, and Mr. Steinman as well as the three
children all live together as a family unit, it makes sense that all of the children use the
same name."); Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ohio 1988) (non-marital child)
(mother testified "I am, I just feel that he is going to be living with me, he is going to be
going to school there, around all of his friends when he grows up they will just ask why his
name is different then [sic] mine, and you know, if his father doesn't visit him regularly he
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cept of associationalism, the name change cases do not reflect these
men's views. Few fathers could emphasize the associational justifica-
tion because the child usually lives with the mother.270
Various factors may help reinforce a woman's view that a child's
surname is an important reflection of the child's physical association
with family. The mother probably gave up her own surname upon
marriage-an act that publicly affirmed her association with her
spouse. Children customarily bear their parents' surname, openly
signaling that the entire family is a unit. Additionally, society tells a
woman that a family is "central to her identity," 27' making mother-
child surname congruence particularly important to many women
who are custodial parents. For these women, the sharing of a com-
mon surname with their children reflects their family relationships
and their social role as mothers.
Section III.C. has argued that the majority of women seem to
view surnames very differently from the majority of men. Most
women do not feel that their birth surnames are integral to their
sense of identity, or that the dissemination of their surnames is cru-
cial to achieve their "immortality" or to demarcate their dominion
over others. Rather, most women believe that a surname can be
fungible and that its primary purpose is to reflect one's association
will say you know, who is my dad and why isn't he coming to see me, which you know, a lot
of kids have, and I just feel that it would be better to keep it mine"); In re Crisafi, 662
N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (noting mother's argument that "they have become
a family unit since her second marriage and by changing the childrens' [sic] names to her
married name, it will help unify the family"); Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 696
(S.D. 1994) (stating that mother resisted the father's request that the daughter's surname
be changed from the mother's surname to his surname because "she wanted herself,
Daughter, and another child by a different father to have the same last name"); cf. B.L.W.
by Ellen K. v. Wollweber, 823 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that mother
testified that her daughter requested that her name be changed after she left foster care
"because she and her mother were 'going to be a family' "); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d
488, 489 (Neb. 1990) (mother testified that "she wanted the name change for her daugh-
ters ... because she wanted them to identify with her in reference to the name 'Brydl' and
to appreciate their Czech ancestry and heritage"). Even a woman who keeps using her
birth name upon marriage sometimes changes her surname if her baby is given the hus-
band's surname. As one woman explained, "I could not have a different name than hers
[the baby]." Ferrarro, supra note 196, at 18; see also Lombard, supra note 15, at 131 &
n.18 (litigants seeking to change their children's names commonly argue that it is impor-
tant for a child to bear the surname of the person with whom the child lives).
270. See supra note 49.
271. See Scott, supra note 12, at 658 ("Indirect evidence indicates that men and women
both still regard a woman's maternal and domestic roles as central to her identity, requir-
ing subordination of other pursuits."); cf. ALFORD, supra note 10, at 157 ("Clearly the
facts that men at marriage retain their surnames, retain their title of respect ('Mr.'), and
are less likely than women to wear wedding rings, suggest that the man's marital status is
of less public and personal significance than the woman's.").
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with family members in the same household.
IV. THE LAW REFLECrS MEN'S CONCEPTIONS OF SURNAMES AND
UNDERVALUES ASSOCIATIONALIST PRINCIPLES
In general, the law views a surname as a component of an indi-
vidual's separate identity. As one court emphasized, "a man's name
is the mark or indicia by which he is distinguished from other
men." 272 The law, in contrast to other disciplines, 2 3 frequently disre-
gards names as markers of association; rather, the courts often
emphasize that names serve to distinguish and differentiate between
individuals.274 In an illustrative case, Greg, a seven-year-old boy, ex-
272. In re Snook, 2 Hilt. 566,568 (N.Y. 1859).
273. For example, social historians tend to focus on how names connect family mem-
bers. Two wonderful articles that discuss how first names help identify significant family
relationships are Daniel Scott Smith, Child-Naming Practices, Kinship Ties, and Change in
Family Attitudes in Hingham, Massachusetts, 1641 to 1880, 18 J. Soc. His. 541 (1985) and
Tebbenhoff, supra note 57. The child-naming patterns in the Hingham study indicated the
importance from the seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century of the nuclear family and the
individuality of children. See Smith, supra, at 543. For example, Smith found that "Five of
six fathers of sons and four of five mothers of daughters in families begun during the colo-
nial period named a child for themselves." Id at 546. In contrast, in the predominantly
Dutch community of Schenectady, New York, naming patterns reveal the importance of
lineally and laterally extended kin over the nuclear family. See Tebbenhoff, supra note 59,
at 569. From 1680 until 1800, over 75% of first sons were named for a grandfather; it was
slightly less for first daughters being named for a grandmother. See id. Hingham differed
greatly: "Approximately eight of every ten first sons and daughters born in Schenectady
between 1781 and 1800 shared the name of a grandparent as compared to less than two of
every ten in Hingham." Id. In Schenectady, there was a clear preference for the paternal
line for first-born children, although there was also a strong pattern of alternating the
names between lineages. See id. at 572-73. The naming system was influenced by how
property was transmitted through inheritance. "Dutch inheritance practices emphasized
that property flowed equally through both the male and female lines and actively pro-
moted the equality of all heirs." Id at 573.
274. See, e.g., In re Ritchie M, 206 Cal. Rptr. 239,241 (Ct. App. 1984) (" 'The name of
a person is the distinctive characterization in words by which he is known and distinguished
from others.' ") (quoting Putnam v. Bessom, 197 N.E. 147, 148 (Mass. 1935)) (denying
application to change name from Thomas Boyd Ritchie III to the Roman numeral "III");
Weathers v. Modem Masonry Materials, Inc., 129 S.E.2d 65, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) ("A
name 'has been defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distin-
guished from other individuals.'" (quoting 38 AM. JUR. Name § 2 (1941)) (excluding from
evidence petition served on Mr. Nelson when defendant's name was Raymond P. Nelson);
Romans v. State, 16 A.2d 642, 646 (Md. 1940) (stating that a name is a "designation or
appellation which is used to distinguish one person from another"); In re Dengler, 246
N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1976) (" 'A name is... used to distinguish a person or thing or
class from others .... '" (quoting 65 CJ.S. Names § 1 (1966)) (denying change of name
from Michael Herbert Dengler to "1069"); Kay v. Bell, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1953) (stating that a name is "'that by which an individual person or thing is desig-
nated and distinguished from others' ") (quoting Uihlein v. Gladieux, 78 N.E. 363, 365
(Ohio 1906)); Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562,564 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (noting a person's name is
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plained to the trial court that he wished to be called both "Greg
Presson" (the surname of his father) and "Greg Kelley" (the sur-
name of his stepfather). He wanted to use his father's surname when
he was with his father, and his stepfather's surname when he was
with his stepfather and his mother." Greg said, "I just love both
names."2716 The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed an injunction
granted by the trial court that would have permanently stopped the
mother from instituting a name change proceeding or from giving the
boy a name other than Greg Presson in any context. 7  The Appel-
late Court of Illinois described the boy as "intelligent" and said that
Greg gave "a great deal of thought to his decision to utilize both the
surnames.""27 Greg chose his binominalism "out of respect for the
feelings of both [his father and stepfather]." 27 9 On further appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and allowed
the trial court to enjoin the mother from changing Greg's surname in
any legal proceeding or official record.20 The Illinois Supreme Court
called Greg's solution "a childlike one, born of immaturity and ea-
gerness not to offend anyone. ''r 1  Just like Ellen Foster's
psychologist,' 2 the court stated, "Greg needs to know his identity.
He is not two people-Gregory Presson and Gregory Kelley."' The
Illinois Supreme Court's belief that a surname represents one's unal-
terable identity-and the court's failure to value a surname's
importance as a marker of association-was starkly and uniquely
visible in the case. However, the court's view is not atypical of how
many courts think about surnames when applying and interpreting
the law related to children's name change petitions. This conception
is consistent with the views held by men generally, as noted in Sec-
tion III.B. above, and it shows little regard for the predominantly
"'one or more words used to distinguish an individual'" (citation omitted)) (denying
child's name change to match mother's and stepfather's surname); see also Joseph B.
Bugliari, Note, Domestic Relations: Change of Minor's Surname: Parental Rights in Mi-
nor's Surname, CORNELL L. Q. 144, 144 (1958) ("A surname is merely an appellation by
which society distinguishes one person with a given name from another with the same
given name.").
275. See In re Marriage of Presson, 465 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ill. 1984).
276. In re Marriage of Presson, 451 N.E.2d 970, 971 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 465
N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 1984).
277. See id. at 972.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Presson, 465 N.E.2d at 90.
281. Id. at 89.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
283. See Presson, 465 N.E.2d at 89.
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female perspective described in Section III.C. above.
Today the courts primarily use three standards for adjudicating
name change disputes between parents of a marital child: (1) a pre-
sumption in favor of the status quo; (2) a "best interest of the child"
test; and, (3) a custodial parent presumption2 4 These labels only
roughly categorize the existing standards; in many respects, the stan-
dards overlap. For example, the "best interest of the child" test is
incorporated to varying degrees in the other standards. 5 In addi-
tion, the "best interest of the child" standard is at times akin to the
presumption in favor of the status quo due to the high burden of
proof that the petitioner must bear2s Courts at times gloss over the
minutiae that differentiate one state's standard from another's, espe-
284. A few states have not yet had an appellate court adjudicate a name change dispute
among parents. Conceivably, these states' standards may differ from those that currently
exist. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.010 (Michie 1996) ("A change of name of a person may
not be made unless the court finds sufficient reasons for the change and also finds it consis-
tent with the public interest."); IDAHO CODE § 7-804 (1990) ("[Court] may make an order
changing the name or dismissing the application, as to the court may seem right and
proper."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (West Supp. 1995) ("[T]he judge, after due
notice, may change the name of the person .... "); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-28-02 (1996)
(stating that name change will be granted if "there exists proper and reasonable cause for
changing the name of the petitioner"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 69.14(1)(F) (West 1990) (noting
that custodial parent chooses surname at birth when parents are separated or divorced);
Steinbach v. Gustafson, 502 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-25-101 (Michie 1988) ("If the court is satisfied that the desired change is proper and
not detrimental to the interests of any other person, it shall order the change to be made,
and record the proceedings in the records of the court."). The three standards set out in
the text often guide courts' resolution of non-marital children's naming disputes as well.
But see infra note 438 and accompanying text (listing state statutes requiring a non-marital
child to assume the mother's name absent an agreement between the parents or until le-
gitimization occurs or paternity is established).
285. See infra text accompanying notes 537-38, 547-48; see also infra note 286.
286. See, e.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981) (stating best interest of
the child standard governs but that a change of a minor's surname should be " 'exercised
with great caution and only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial
welfare of the child necessitates such change'" (quoting Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d
138, 140 (Minn. 1974)); Swank v. Petklovsek, 629 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (App. Div. 1995)
(stating that "[a] court may change the name of an infant if it determines that 'the interests
of the infant will be substantially promoted by the change'" (quoting N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS
LAW § 63 (McKinney 1992))); Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating
best interest of the child standard governs but that "[d]epriving a child of his or her fa-
ther's surname is normally a far-reaching action, and applications for a change of an
infant's surname are usually granted only where the natural father is guilty of misconduct,
abandonment or lack of support"); Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1988) (stating best interest of the child standard governs but that a name change will
be permitted only "'where ... the child's substantial interests require a change of name,
as where the father's misconduct has been such as to justify a forfeiture of his right, or
where his name is positively deleterious to the child'" (quoting 57 AM. JUR. 2D, Name,
§ 14)).
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cially when the states adopt a similar rubric for their rules of deci-
sion. 7 Although subtle differences exist, the tripartite division
allows one to conceptualize the differences among states without be-
coming bogged down in detail that is unimportant to the analysis.
This section describes each of the three standards, illustrates their
use in particular cases, and critiques them. It demonstrates that all
three standards represent the mainly male view of the importance of
surnames, either in the standards' assumptions, justifications, or ap-
plications.
A. Presumption in Favor of the Status Quo
The most conservative of the three standards is the presumption
in favor of the status quo. Under this standard, the moving party has
the burden of meeting a strict criterion before the child's surname
will be changed, although the exact criterion varies considerably by
state. Sometimes the party seeking the name change must prove that
the current name poses a "significant detriment" to the child; 8
sometimes the party need prove "by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that such change will significantly advance" the child's in-
terests; 9 sometimes the party must establish that both parents
consent to the change (unless there has been misconduct by one of
the parents that would eliminate the need for that parent's con-
sent);29' and sometimes the party must prove a combination of these
287. See, e.g., In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 n.5 (Pa. 1992) (wrongly classifying some
jurisdictions as applying the "best interest of the child" test when some of the jurisdictions
are more akin to the presumption in favor of the status quo).
288. See Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Ky. 1990); see also West v. Wright,
283 A.2d 401,403 (Md. 1971) ("The most prevalent basis for allowing a change of name is
where there is proof of serious misconduct by the father which adversely affects the best
interests of his children."); In re Spatz, 258 N.W.2d 814, 815 (Neb. 1977) (stating that
name can be changed "only when the substantial welfare of the child requires [it]").
289. In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426, 429 (W. Va. 1977); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/21-101 (West 1992) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the change is
necessary to serve the best interests of the child"); Norton v. Norton, 595 S.W.2d 709, 711
(Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (requiring substantial evidence that name change is beneficial to the
child); Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 301 (requiring clear and convincing evidence that the sub-
stantial welfare of the child necessitates a change); Beyah v. Shelton, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911
(Va. 1986) (requiring substantial reasons for changing name of non-marital child); Flowers
v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 1977) (requiring substantial reasons for name change in
face of objection by natural father).
290. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.6 (West 1987); Beyah, 344 S.E.2d at 911
(refusing to allow name change for non-marital child over father's objection where father
has not engaged in misconduct that would make it harmful for child to bear his name:
"[I]n the face of such an objection [by the natural father] and the absence of substantial
reasons, the change should not be ordered."); cf. Sobel v. Sobel, 134 A.2d 598, 600 (N.J.
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requirements.29 States that consider whether the party opposing the
name change has engaged in improper conduct usually look for mis-
conduct of a gross nature,292 including abandonment and failure to
support.293 The presumption for the status quo currently exists in at
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) ("[Tlhere is no authority for [the mother] to change the surname
of the child to that of the mother's subsequent husband, unless there are extenuating cir-
cumstances.").
291. See, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 540 P.2d 1277,1280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (permitting name
change over father's objection only where the children's "substantial interests require a
change of name, as where the father's misconduct has been such as to justify a forfeiture of
his rights or where his name is possibly deleterious to the child"); Robinson v. Hansel, 223
N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. 1974) ("[J]udicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor's
surname against the objection of one parent should be exercised with great caution and
only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates such change.").
292 See Hall v. Hall, 351 A.2d 917, 924 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) ("The most preva-
lent basis for allowing a change of name is where there is proof of serious misconduct by
the father which adversely affects the best interests of the children .... There are no hard
and fast definitions as to the type of misconduct required; however, the offense must be of
such great magnitude that the continued use of the name by the children would result in
significant harm or disgrace to them." (citing West, 283 A.2d at 403); see, e.g., W. v. H., 246
A.2d 501, 501-02 (NJ. Super. Ch. Div. 1968) (allowing change where father pleaded guilty
to sexual intercourse with eleven-year-old daughter and impregnated older daughter); In
re Yessner, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902-03 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (allowing change where father was
convicted of manslaughter for choking child's maternal grandfather to death); In re Fein,
274 N.Y.S.2d 547, 554-55 (Civ. Ct. 1966) (allowing change where father was serving life
sentence for second-degree murder, extensively associated with prostitutes, engaged in
extramarital activities, exhibited addiction to gambling, and failed to support children after
his arrest); cf. B.L.W. by Ellen K. v. Wollweber, 823 S.W.2d 119, 121-22 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (finding that substantial evidence existed that changing non-marital child's surname
to mother's surname was in child's best interest as father was awaiting trial for first-degree
murder of four-year-old and had been accused by daughter of sexual abuse); In re Christ-
john, 428 A.2d 597, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (allowing change where father killed child's
stepfather). But see In re Petras, 475 N.Y.S.2d 198, 203-04 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (holding that
father's imprisonment on eleven felony counts of theft by receiving stolen property, along
with him being "less than an admirable person ... as a father," were not compelling rea-
sons to believe ten-year-old's " 'interests... [would] be substantially promoted by [name]
change'" (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 (McKinney 1989))); In re Krcelic, 395
N.Y.S.2d 382, 383-85 (Civ. Ct. 1977) (finding father's disfiguring assault of child's mother
insufficient to support name change in light of falsification of some facts by mother).
293. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.6 (West 1987); Harris, 236 S.E.2d at 430
("Where a father abandons his children, provides no support and maintenance, does not
visit the children, and does not in any other reasonable way, given his position in life and
the opportunities for the exercise of his parental rights, exercise the authority or under-
take the responsibilities of a parent, there is no reason why a mother.., should not be able
to change the name of the child, upon proper notice to the father.") (noting that proof of
abandonment for name change purposes cannot be less than required to divest father of
parental rights under adoption statute); see also In re Robinson, 344 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150
(Civ. Ct. 1972) (granting name change where father had not supported or visited daughter
in five years, and child lives with mother, stepfather, and two stepsisters); In re Proman, 63
N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (City Ct. 1946) (holding that father lost right to object to change of child's
name when he had seen son only once in eight years and contributed nothing to his sup-
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least eight states, and it appears that eight other states also use this
standard to varying degrees in a less explicit manner.295  This stan-
dard used to be the most common.2 96  In some states, the
_291presumption in favor of the status quo has been codified by statute;
in other states, this standard has developed through case law.298
The presumption in favor of the status quo poses various theo-
retical and practical problems for women. Most obviously, the
standard presumes that a surname should be immutable-an as-
sumption reflecting the traditional male view that surnames should
remain constant (except for a woman upon her marriage). The pre-
sumption also favors the paternal surname, as that is the name given
to most marital children.299 The standard takes no account of present
physical association as a criterion that should determine a child's
surname. Accordingly, this standard fails to incorporate the typically
female view of surnames.
Also problematic are the standard's justifications. The standard
has variously been described as an outright preference for the male
port). But see Robinson, 223 N.W.2d at 141 n.4 (stating that failure to consistently make
support payments was "not of such character to evince a total indifference or neglect of his
children over a period of years").
294. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1(c) (1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.6 (West 1987);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4751(c) (West 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-2 (1995); Wearn
v. Wray, 228 S.E.2d 385, 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that written consent of parents is
necessary absent abandonment of the child); Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Ky.
1990); Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Swank v. Petkovsek,
629 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1995); Sheppard v. Wright, 895 P.2d 748,748 (Okla. Ct. App.
1995).
295. See generally supra notes 288-91.
296. See Shipley, supra note 51, at 916.
297. Iowa serves as an example of a state that imposes by statute a very specific and
high threshold for changing a child's surname. Its statute states that both parents must
consent to the name change petition, and if one does not consent, the name can be changed
only if the non-consenting parent has abandoned the child, has failed without good cause to
contribute to the child's support when ordered to do so or to financially aid in the child's
birth, or does not object after notice. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.6 (West 1987); see also
Gail v. Winemiller, 464 N.W.2d 697,698 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (upholding change of child's
surname to mother's surname pursuant to § 674.6 because father failed to pay child sup-
port without good cause). Iowa also allows a child's name to be changed in conjunction
with a divorce, and in that context the best interest of the child standard governs. See In re
Marriage of Gulsvig, 498 N.W.2d 725,729 (Iowa 1993).
298. See Likins, 793 S.W.2d at 122 (requiring "substantial evidence of just cause and
significant detriment" before allowing name change in Kentucky). No Kentucky statute
mandated such a high threshold for changing a child's surname. Cf. Sheppard v. Wright,
895 P.2d 748 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1631-37). Although
no Oklahoma statute states that a mother cannot change a child's surname from that of the
natural father over the father's objection, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals so held and
attributed the position to a statutory prohibition. See id
299. See supra note 50.
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surname,30 as a conservative emphasis on name stability,30' or as a
way to preserve the non-custodial parent's bond with the child. This
last justification was clearly announced in the 1990 case of Likins v.
Logsdon,32 in which the Kentucky Supreme Court held: "We re-
quire a parent seeking to attenuate the relationship between her
former spouse and his child to present objective and substantial evi-
dence of just cause and significant detriment to the child before the
child's name is changed where the petition for change of name is
contested."'3 3 Because so many courts refer to the relationship be-
tween a shared surname and the strength of the non-custodial
parent-child bond (in applying both the presumption for the status
quo and the best interest of the child standard),3' 4 and because this
last concern seems innocuous on its face, I take some time to discuss
its gendered and inaccurate premise.
It is antithetical to most females' experience to believe that the
father-child bond depends upon a shared surname. The typical fe-
male experience of foregoing use of the birth name upon marriage
tells many women that a bond with one's father does not depend
upon such an ephemeral label. The woman and her father love each
other no less when the woman changes her surname upon marriage.
As one women in Susan Kupper's study observed poignantly, "A
300. See, e.g., Kay v. Bell, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208-09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) ("Where ...
the child is born in lawful wedlock, the legal name is the first or Christian name, and the
surname or last name of his or her natural father.").
301. See, e.g., Aitkin County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 909
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("It is in the best interests of such young children to provide them
with stability and continuity.").
302. 793 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1990).
303. Id at 118; see also Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
("A name change risks alienating [the father] and jeopardizes the parent-child relation-
ship."); Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. 1974) ("The link between a
father and child in circumstances such as these [divorce] is uncertain at best, and a change
of name could further weaken, if not sever, such a bond."); Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959,
964 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("The need to preserve the father-child bond is a reason most often
given for the paternal surname presumption." (citing In re Marriage of Presson, 465
N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. 1984)); In re Shipley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (noting that
a name change would "contribute to the further estrangement of the children from their
natural father"); Sheppard, 895 P.2d at 748 (" 'It has been recognized that change of a
child's paternal surname may foster an unnatural barrier between the father and the child
and erode a relationship that should be nurtured. Some authorities believe that whenever
the parents of a child are divorced and the custody is in the mother, the remaining bond
between the father and child is at best tenuous and may be further weakened, if not utterly
destroyed by a change of the minor's surname.'" (quoting In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 387
(Okla. 1980))).
304. See supra note 303; infra notes 395-414 and accompanying text.
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name hardly affects a love relationship.' 305
The cases indicate that men repeatedly raise this bonding argu-
ment, and that women rarely raise a comparable claim. For example,
in a 1996 case, the father "testified that he would feel a closer bond
with child if the surnames were the same, however [the mother] testi-
fied that the change of surname would not affect her relationship
with the child."'36 In an extensive survey of the case law, I have read
no case where a mother sought to impose her surname on her child
in order to maintain the mother-child bond, although this may reflect
the fact that all of the mothers had physical custody of their children.
In a few cases, the custodial mother argued that the existing mother-
child bond, like the father-child bond, could be affected by the
child's surname, but such arguments were usually offered in response
to fathers' similar claims0 7 In addition, while male litigants often
claim a name change will weaken the father-child bond, these men
rarely argue that the name change petition was filed for this purpose.
In one case, a woman admitted that she sought to change the child's
name to weaken the father-child bond,308 but this case stands out as
an anomaly.
Even if some women believe that a name change may affect the
father-child bond, the general proposition is questionable. One need
only consider the numerous heart-warming stories involving parents
and children with different surnames (e.g., step-parents and their
step-children, foster parents and their foster children, and fathers
and their non-marital children),"9 and the divorce rate between peo-
ple with a shared surname,31 to question the link between a shared
surname and a family bond. In other contexts, a shared surname is
not generally perceived either to hinder or further a domestic
bond. Even "children and fathers frequently testify that they
305. KUPPER, supra note 54, at 68.
306. Jarrells v. Epperson, No. 2-96-12, 1996 WL 562052, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 1,
1996) (non-marital child).
307. See infra note 358 and accompanying text. In fact, often it is difficult to tell if the
mother raised the argument, or if the court raised it sua sponte.
308. See Neal v. Neal, No. 20469, 1996 WL 507218, at *2-3 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 6,
1996), rev'd No. 79376, 1997 WL 133418, at *4 (Mo. Mar. 25, 1997) (en banc).
309. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
310. Seesupra note 21.
311. See Kathleen McKinney, The Influence of Choice of Last Name and Career Status
on Perceptions of a Woman and Her Spouse, 19 FREE INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SoC. 3
(1991) (finding, in a study of predominantly white, middle-class college students, that the
respondents believed the selection of a surname had no effect on a marital couple's chance
for success as marital partners, potential parents, friends, or colleagues, or for success in
careers and daily life, or for marital happiness and likelihood of having children).
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would not love each other less if the child bore a different sur-
name."
312
Although courts have been concerned since at least the 1920s
that a child's name change may erode the father-child bond,3 3 no
court has ever satisfactorily explained why the father-child bond
might weaken if the child's surname were changed. One Pennsylva-
nia court gave the following unpersuasive explanation:
It is easy to understand why a father would object to the
name change of a child who shares his surname. A name
change in that case could arguably have some effect upon
the parent-child relationship, at least to the extent that the
child would no longer be held out to the world as the issue
of his or her father.'
4
A New York Family Court said, without further explanation: "[I]t is
easily apparent that this custom strengthens the relationship between
father and child which is not as biologically obvious as the relation-
ship between the mother and child." '315 It seems as if these courts
believe that the father-child bond depends upon others' recognition
of the father-child relationship, which in turn is only possible if the
father and child share the same surname.
It is unconvincing to suggest that patronymy is justifiable be-
cause the father-child bond is not as "biologically obvious" as the
mother-child bond. Women's private birthing experiences, the avail-
ability of bottle feeding and wet nurses, the short time period during
which women tend to breast-feed, as well as gestational and genetic
surrogacy, all make a woman's biological relationship to her children
no more "obvious" to most of the world than the father's biological
relationship. To the extent that a shared surname and third-party
recognition of the father-child relationship historically helped reas-
sure a father that the child was his own, today a paternity test can
more conclusively establish the biological basis for the relationship. 316
312. Doll, supra note 27, at 234 (footnote omitted).
313. See, e.g., In re Epstein, 200 N.Y.S. 897, 898 (City Ct. 1923) (refusing to change
minor's surname to stepfather's surname as it would "foster an unnatural barrier between
the [natural] father and son").
314. In re Richie, 564 A.2d 239,241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (non-marital child).
315. Good v. Stevenson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983 (Fam. Ct. 1982); see also In re Paternity
of Tibbits, 668 N.E.2d 1266, 1268-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that surname has impact
on father-child relationship unlike mother-child relationship because father has to prove
his paternity of a non-marital child).
316. Similarly, it makes no sense that a surname can impact the father/non-marital
child relationship simply because paternity must be proved for the relationship to have
legal consequence. See supra note 315. A shared surname will not be sufficient by itself to
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Despite the unclear rationale for believing that a shared sur-
name is necessary for a viable parent-child bond, courts often accept
very flimsy evidence to support a finding that the father-child bond
will be affected if the child does not bear the patronym. For exam-
ple, in the 1996 case of Morris v. Morris,3 7 the father, Troi Morris,
opposed a change of his non-marital child's surname from Morris to
either Cope-Morris or Morris-Cope. Cope was the mother's sur-
name, and the mother brought the petition after the father stopped
living with her and the child. The father's reason for opposing a
change was as follows: "Wesley... can have a lot of pride in his last
name.... [H]is last name will mean as much as my last name means
to me. And I want him to have that.... He's going to be living with
his mother. It's just what I've got to give to Wesley, and I want him
to have it. '3 9 The father also stated that he had lived with his son for
about six months and wanted to maintain their relationship. 320 The
circuit court concluded that the proposed name change would unduly
interfere with the father-child relationship, and therefore disallowed
it. The appellate court upheld the circuit court's decision, admitting,
rather generously, that the evidence offered by the father to support
his position was not extensive.3 21 Other courts have gone so far as to
take "judicial notice" that the patronym "undoubtedly carries great
significance in the father-child relationship. 322
The social science research that best supports the argument that
a name can affect the parent-child relationship, and what appears to
be the only study of its kind, was conducted by Frank F. Furstenberg,
Jr. and Kathy Gordon Talvitie.3' The study involved 323 predomi-
nantly unmarried teenage mothers324 and explored the following
establish a legal relationship with the child, nor can the fact of diverse surnames stop the
establishment of the legal relationship.
317. 926 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
318. See id at 88.
319. Id. at 89.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. Good v. Stevenson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 981,983 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
323. See Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10. These authors noted that "[a]lmost no
attention in studies of American kinship has been devoted to what would seem to be an
obvious issue of anthropological and sociological interest: how naming patterns structure
and reinforce familial bonds." I at 33.
324. Ninety-seven percent of the mothers were unmarried at conception and roughly
seventy-five percent were unmarried at delivery. See id. at 36. It deserves mention that
the methodology of this study was less than ideal. For example, the study had a non-
representative sample. The sample was composed almost exclusively of African Ameri-
cans in the lower socio-economic strata. See id. at 36 (stating that 91% of those who
participated in the five-year follow-up were African American and describing the socio-
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question: "[D]oes the assignment of patronyms involve a commit-
ment on the part of fathers to participate in the upbringing of their
children?,3"' The authors concluded that there was
a clear and generally consistent association between naming
patterns and paternal involvement in the families of never-
married fathers. When children bore their father's name,
they were much more likely to have regular contact with
their fathers and to receive economic assistance from
them .... [T]he expectation that naming patterns would be
linked to subsequent paternal performance among unmar-
ried fathers seems to be borne out."6
The correlation also applied to those fathers who married, but later
divorced, the mothers. 7
Despite this seemingly forceful conclusion, the Furstenberg and
Talvitie study fails to support any connection between a shared sur-
name and a better quality father-child relationship, at least from the
child's perspective. The authors found that a child with the same
name as his or her father "did not enjoy greater intimacy" with the
non-custodial parent.328 Indeed, children bearing their fathers'
names "tended to have slightly less gratifying relations with [the] fa-
ther., 329  Consequently, "[f]rom the child's point of view, being
economic position of the sample). While research directed at this group is valuable, it is
unclear to what extent one can extrapolate the results to the general population. Also, the
study's design was an afterthought. Almost all of the relevant data was collected from the
mother in the final interview of a five-year study initially designed to assess contraceptive
services provided by a hospital. See icL at 36-37. The fathers were not contacted directly
because "most males simply could not be located without an inordinate amount of time
and expense." d. This observation makes the mothers' characterization of the fathers'
involvement in the children's lives inherently suspect. See hiL at 43. In addition, no regres-
sion analysis was done to eliminate the effect of a surrogate father living in the home on
the biological father-child relationship, an effect which appeared substantial both in terms
of the father's physical contact and child support. See id at 46-47 (stating that 62% of
fathers continued to see their children when the mother remained unmarried, as compared
to only 9% when a surrogate father lived in the home, and that 90% of fathers provided no
financial support when the mother was married to another man, as compared to 59% when
the mother was not married).
325. See id. at 35.
326. ld. at 47-49.
327. "The degree of paternal participation was roughly the same in the two subgroups."
Id. at 45 (comparing children of fathers who had never married the mothers with children
of fathers who had married the mothers but later left the home when the marriages
ended). In addition, the "unmarried fathers provided almost as much (or as little) finan-
cial assistance as did the formerly married males." d. Overall, "the sons of formerly
married couples had more contact with their biological fathers and received greater sup-
port if they bore their names." Id. at 50.
328. Id. at 50.
329. See id. at 51, 56 n.8 (finding that 38% of those with the same name experienced
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named after the father proved to be a mixed blessing. He received
more attention than might otherwise have been the case but at a cer-
tain cost to the quality of his relationship with his father."330  In
addition, the increased financial support and physical contact were
not accompanied by "dramatic or compelling" positive outcomes for
the children.331
More recent research by Frank F. Furstenberg et al. casts further
doubt on the benefits of any increased physical contact with the non-
custodial father. Their 1987 study found that frequency of visitation
by the father and closeness of the father-child relationship had no
consistent effect on measures of child well-being.332 A 1993 study,
using the same database that Furstenberg and Talvitie relied upon
but with a seventeen-year and a twenty-year follow-up, also found
that the amount of contact a non-custodial father has with his child is
a minor factor in obtaining positive outcomes.333 Furstenberg has
recently concluded that "[n]o one knows how to foster stronger and
some difficulty with the father as compared to 14% of those who did not bear his name).
330. Id at 51.
331. See id. at 52. There were some positive results in the areas of behavior problems,
ratings on their personal qualities, and scores on the Pre-School Inventory (a measure of a
child's cognitive skills) for the sons that shared their fathers' names. See id.
332. See-Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Paternal Participation and Children's Well-
Being After Marital Dissolution, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 697-98 (1987) (discussing results
of study involving nationally representative sample of children, aged 11-16, of divorced
parents). The authors suggest that various clinical studies that found contrary results in-
volved "small and unrepresentative samples," casting "doubt on their conclusiveness." Id.
at 696 (citations omitted). In fact, Furstenberg et al. found that it was children's closeness
to their mothers that revealed a clear pattern of strong effects as to children's well-being.
See id. at 698. The authors concluded, "[W]e see no strong evidence that children will
benefit from the judicial or legislative interventions that have been designed to promote
paternal participation, apart from providing economic support." Id. at 700; see also
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 164 ("[T]he evidence supporting beneficial
effects of contact with non-resident fathers was thin and inconsistent.").
333. The authors stated:
A close bond with the outside biological father has the least impact on youth out-
comes. Although the children who had contact with and were strongly attached
to their nonresidential biological fathers were more likely to have high measures
of attainment and more likely to avoid imprisonment and depression, the advan-
tage of the attachments is only marginally beneficial.
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Kathleen Mullan Harris, When Fathers Matter/Why Fathers
Matter: The Impact of Paternal Involvement on the Offspring of Adolescent Mothers, in
THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY 189, at 207 (Annette Lawson and Deborah L. Rhode eds.,
1993). In fact, children with strong attachments to nonresidential biological fathers were
more likely to have their own children earlier than those who were not attached to their
outside biological fathers or had no contact with them. See id. As few Caucasians re-
mained in the study by 1987, the findings are generalizable only to African Americans
living in urban areas. See id. at 192.
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more lasting attachments between children and their fathers, 334 and
emphasized that "the seemingly obvious benefits for children of pa-
ternal participation in disrupted (or even intact) families cannot be
assumed without stronger evidence than has been produced to
date., 35 Although Furstenberg's more recent research does not dis-
pute the importance for children of economic support from
334. Id. at 209.
335. Id. at 191. David Blankenhorn, in his book Fatherless America, argues that a
child's well-being is enriched by a high level of paternal investment. See DAVID
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL
PROBLEM 25 (1995). Blankenhorn identifies violence among young men, child sexual
abuse, child poverty and economic insecurity, and adolescent childbearing as all being
linked to fatherlessness. See id. at 26-48. According to Blankenhorn's thesis, diminishing
these negative outcomes requires a father's co-residency with the children and a parental
alliance with the mother-or, in shorthand, "married fatherhood." See id. at 18. If co-
residency and the parental alliance are absent, fatherhood becomes "essentially untenable,
regardless of how he feels, how hard he tries, or whether he is a good guy." Id. at 19.
While one may agree with BIankenhorn's thesis, married fatherhood is absent when the
disputes discussed in this Article arise. Therefore, even if Blankenhorn's studies support
his proposition, one cannot conclude that a child's use of the father's surname, when the
father and the child live apart and hostility exists between the father and mother (e.g.,
over naming), will produce positive child outcomes. In fact, Blankenhorn admits that
nothing short of eradicating fatherlessness will help. See id. at 48. He states:
Visitation confers almost none of the predictable benefits of fatherhood because
visitation is not fatherhood. Consequently, while children benefit dramatically
from fathers, they often benefit little, if at all, from periodic visits with ex-fathers.
Visitation is a shadow, a painful reminder, of fatherhood-observable and even
measurable in clinical settings, but not nearly substantial enough to register as fa-
therhood, or even almost-fatherhood, on most large-scale surveys of quantifiable
outcomes for children of divorce.
Id. at 299-300 n.58. Moreover, Blankenhorn admits that, over the last two decades, social
scientists and many other influential people in public discourse have argued that fathers
are not very important, although he disputes some of the researchers' findings. See id. at
69-83. Blankenhorn never criticizes Furstenberg's research, and, in fact, quotes him at
various points in his book. Other sociologists have confirmed Furstenberg's conclusions.
See, e.g., Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move Or Not To Move: Psychological
And Legal Considerations In The Relocation Of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q.
305,312 (1996) ("There is no evidence in Dr. Wallerstein's work of many years, including
the ten and fifteen year longitudinal study, or in that of any other research, that frequency
of visiting or amount of time spent with the non-custodial parent over the child's entire
growing-up years is significantly related to good outcome in the child or adolescent.").
Even if one believes that visits by non-custodial fathers lead to positive outcomes, at best,
one would have to admit that the research on this point is "inconsistent." See Jane W.
Ellis, Caught in the Middle: Protecting the Children of High-Conflict Divorce, 22 N.Y.U.
REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 253, 259-61 (1996) (book review). Inconsistent research should
not be a sufficient justification for requiring a child to bear the non-custodial parent's
name in order to promote the bond between the child and the non-custodial parent. In
fact, even Blankenhorn admits that "the idea of children taking their father's name ...
becomes impractical and increasingly hard to justify" in a society where fatherhood is de-
composing. Blackenhorn, supra, at 310 n.31. He says, "Indeed, for growing numbers of
families in our society, the practice may no longer be worth the trouble." Id.
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nonresident fathers, the earlier connection Furstenberg and Talvitie
drew between the payment of child support and a shared name must
now be reevaluated in light of the federally-endorsed child support
collection system. Furstenberg and Talvitie's conclusions stemmed
from research conducted in 1975-80, before such programs ex-
panded.336
Even assuming that a child benefits more from financial support
and physical contact than from the quality of his or her relationship
with the father (a debatable proposition), and that physical contact
leads to positive child outcomes (another debatable proposition),
and that financial support and any resultant physical contact are not
obtainable through the existing child support system (a further de-
batable proposition), Furstenberg and Talvitie themselves cautioned
against drawing any causal connection between the name borne by
the child and the vitality of the father-child relationship. 33 7  They
noted that the bestowal of the father's name may only be "an ac-
knowledgment of the father's willingness at the time of birth to play
an active part in the child's upbringing. As such, the name itself may
have no direct bearing on the future relationship of parent and
336. The child support enforcement system may also provide another avenue to im-
prove parental involvement in the child's life independent of the name the child bears. In
1975, part D was added to Title IV of the Social Security Act. This created the Office of
Child Support Enforcement and set general requirements that states must meet in order to
receive federal money. Before this, child support was generally a province of the states.
The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 required states to adopt certain
tools for enforcing child support obligations, including automatic wage withholding when
payments were in arrears by one month and advisory child support guidelines. The Family
Support Act of 1988 further strengthened the child support enforcement system. Among
other things, it required immediate mandatory withholding and required that the guide-
lines be treated as a "rebuttable presumption," requiring courts to justify any deviation
from the guidelines. It provided periodic review and updating of both the guidelines and
the individual awards. See generally ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL
CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 4-5, 163-69 (1993) (discussing the Acts).
In 1992, Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act, which made it a federal crimi-
nal offense to fail to pay child support obligations to a child in another state. 18 U.S.C.
§ 228 (1994). And title III of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, contains requirements that the states set up child
support distribution units and new hire registries to aid in locating parents with support
obligations. The legal reform was accompanied by a 577% increase in government
spending at the federal and state level on the child support programs between 1976 and
1986. See BELLER & GRAHAM, supra, at 5. While there is some question whether custo-
dial parents generally have received more child support because of the legal reform and
increased spending, small subgroups of black mothers and never-married mothers have
benefited, and the authors noted that the real value of awards would have declined further
had the law not been adopted. See id. at 6.
337. See Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10, at 52.
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child." '338 Other studies, from which one might extrapolate, help dis-
pel the perception that a link exists between a child's surname and
the strength of the father-child relationship. 9
Still other studies indicate that bearing the same name as one's
father may work to a child's detriment. Evidence indicates that the
practice of father-naming (for example, naming a child "Junior")
correlates with psychiatric problems for the child,3 4' as well as with
child abuse.m1 Moreover, the imposition of a biological father's sur-
name on a reluctant child can foster resentment that further harms
the father-child relationship.342 Furstenberg's 1993 study found that a
poor relationship with a biological father was worse than no relation-
ship at all: "[A poor relationship] may interfere with the child
developing a bond with another father figure, disturb his or her rela-
338. Id. at 49. The children's positive outcomes were potentially attributable to
greater "parental involvement," rather than name congruence, see id. at 52, and the
amount of parental involvement may turn on the quality of the relationship between the
parents. See supra note 324.
339. Several researchers have found no impact (or a positive impact) on the marriage
relationship when spouses have different surnames. For example, Susan Kupper's study
found that, "[tihe great majority of the husbands and wives in the survey thought that the
women's name choices [that differed from their husbands' surnames] had either a positive
impact on their marriages or none at all." KUPPER, supra note 54, at 68. Penelope Wasson
Dralle's study found that "[t]here were no differences in ... commitment to marriage as
measured by whether a marriage ended or how it ended" between women who took their
husbands' surnames, those women who kept using their own surnames, and those women
who adopted an alternative. Dralle, supra note 205, at 174. These results, however, may
depend upon the fact that the spouses voluntarily chose different surnames. Alternatively,
these results may be attributable to the women's efforts.
340. See Robert Plank, The Use of Jr."in Relation to Psychiatric Treatment, 19 NAMES
132, 134 (1971) (discussing research supporting the Hamlet hypothesis that sons named
Junior after the father tend to have more neurosis as reflected by the fact that Juniors are
over represented among the neuropsychiatric patients and applicants for psychiatric outpa-
tient treatment); see also infra text accompanying notes 346-47 (extent of father-naming).
341. See Catherine Cameron, The Trouble With Junior: Father-Naming, Child Abuse,
and Delinquency,.71 SSR 200, 201-02 (1987) (finding strong support for the following hy-
potheses among Hispanics and Anglos, but not African Americans, when controlling for
birth order and class: (1) that a higher percentage of father-named adolescents are found
in the institution for delinquent male adolescents, and (2) that in the institution for delin-
quent male adolescents, a higher percentage of parental abuse is recorded in the files of
father-named adolescents than in the files of boys not father-named). As the author ex-
plained, "A potentially abusive father, whose identity is fused with his name-sake's, has a
natural target for hostility. So has the mother, who can displace resentments toward her
lover, her husband, or former spouse onto the boy who bears his name." Id. at 200.
342. See, e.g., Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539, 540-41 (D.C. 1971) (involving sixteen
year old who testified that court order requiring that he assume his father's surname
caused his relationship with his father to deteriorate); Rappleye v. Rappleye, 454 N.W.2d
231, 232 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding trial court's order allowing ten year old to
continue informally to use her stepfather's surname).
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tionship with the mother, or directly undercut the child's ability to
function as an adult." 3 In fact, Furstenberg's 1993 research showed
that a child's relationship with his or her mother and/or stepfather is
probably more important in terms of positive outcomes for the child
than the child's relationship with the non-residential biological fa-
ther." Consequently, to the extent that courts believe surname
congruence is salutary for the adult-child bond, the courts should just
as readily, if not more readily, give a child the surname of his or her
mother and/or stepfather. 5
The Furstenberg and Talvitie study also raises an interesting
question about courts' orientation when they evaluate father-child
bond arguments. Furstenberg and Talvitie focused on the effect of
giving a child the father's first or middle name; the authors did not
explicitly ask about the use of surnames?46 Thus, whatever value ac-
crues to the father-child relationship through a shared name may be
343. See Furstenberg & Harris, supra note 333, at 208.
344. See aL at 193-94; see also supra note 332; Thomas S. Parish & Terry F. Copeland,
The Relationship Between Self-Concepts and Evaluations of Parents and Stepfathers, 101 J.
PSYCHOL. 135,137 (1979) ("[I]ndividuals from father absent families more strongly identi-
fied with their mothers and their stepfathers, but not their fathers."). One third of the
children studied lived with a stepfather or surrogate father even if they had lived with their
biological fathers at some point, and 60% of the children who had never lived with their
biological fathers lived with a stepfather or surrogate father. See Furstenberg & Harris,
supra note 330, at 193. While over one third of the children living with a stepfather were
highly attached to him, only 13% of children reported strong bonds with nonresidential
biological fathers (with no difference between fathers who had been married to the moth-
ers and those who had not or between those fathers who were in the home for six years or
more and those who were never in the home). See id at 196-97. The youths who had close
ties with their stepfathers were "[p]erforming extremely well in early adulthood." See id.
at 204. A similar result existed for those 13% who reported strong bonds with nonresiden-
tial biological fathers. See id. at 204-05. However, the children who showed the best
results had strong bonds and lived with their biological fathers or stepfathers. These
youths "were twice as likely to have entered college or to have found stable employment
after high school, 75% less likely to have been a teenage parent, 80% less likely to have
been in jail, and half as likely to have experienced multiple depression symptoms." Id. at
207.
345. As Joseph Goldstein et al. recognized:
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of relationship by
blood-tie until quite late in their development.... What registers in their minds
are the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who,
on the strength of these, become the parent figures to whom they are attached.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12-13 (1979).
346. See Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10, at 37. While the majority of children in
the study were not named after any family member, children who were so named over-
whelmingly had their fathers' names. Over half of the boys inherited their fathers' first or
middle names (or both), although girls received a variety of the paternal forename only
8% of the time. See id. at 38, 41 (stating that 41% of the sons with unmarried parents and
66% of the sons with married parents were named after their fathers).
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achieved through the sharing of the praenomen. Other studies dem-
onstrate that large numbers of children receive the paternal first
name (or a paternal relative's first name) as a first or middle name.34
It is odd that courts almost never look at the child's first or middle
name when analyzing whether the paternal-child bond will be dam-
aged by a name change. 8 The omission seems odd because at
common law the first name was an integral part of one's name,39 and
347. See Alice S. Rossi, Naming Children in Middle-Class Families, 30 AM. Soc. REV.
499, 511 tbl.8 (1965) (stating that 62% of the children studied were named after a particu-
lar relative, almost invariably consanguineal kin; 42% of the sons were named after their
fathers, rarely after maternal kin; 48% of girls were named for grandparents, with the
maternal and paternal grandparents being approximately equally selected); see also
ALFORD, supra note 10, at 131-34 (discussing a study in southeastern Oklahoma which
revealed that 57% of children receive a first name or middle name from relatives; boys
received a name from a relative 67% of the time, compared to 46% of the time for girls;
34% of boys were named for a patrilineal relative, and only 12% of girls are named for a
matrilineal relative); Thomas V. Busse et al., Identical First Names for Parent and Child,
107 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 293, 293 (1979) (noting that 22% of boys had same first names as
fathers and 3% of girls had the same first names as mothers in study of 1727 students in
grades two through six of a socio-economically heterogeneous suburban school district);
Jill L. Johnson et al., Sociobiology and the Naming of Adopted and Natural Children, 12
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 365, 366 (1991), and research cited therein ("While there
was undoubtedly a decrease in namesaking ... during the nineteenth century, the practice
has always been common and remains so today."); id. 368-73 (discussing naming practices
for natural and adopted children and summarizing other research).
For discussions of research examining the historical practice of namesaking, see gen-
erally ALFORD, supra note 10, at 132-33 ("Presumably, the greater the prestige of a
family, the more it will be concerned with prestige perpetuation."); Cody, supra note 133,
at 569-595 (finding that the father's name was transmitted to the next generation in nine
out of ten slave-owner families, and naming by slaves followed a similar patriarchal pat-
tern, but not to the same extent, after Bible teaching took hold); Johnson et al., supra, at
373 ("The more that parenthood was assured, the less likely the child was to be name-
saked.") (finding that adopted children are more likely than biological children to be
namesaked); Rex Taylor, John Doe, Jr.: A Study of His Distribution in Space, Time, and
the Social Structure, 53 SOC. FORCES 11, 17 (1974) ("Throughout the period [1913 to 1968]
there is a strong and positive association between a father's occupational prestige and the
propensity to name his son after himself.").
348. See, e.g., Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61, 62-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984, no writ)
(ignoring fact that one of the children was a Jr. in discussing preservation of father-child
relationship); Flowers v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 1977) (ignoring fact that one of the
children was a Jr. in discussing the need to improve the "strained father-child relation-
ship"); see also In re Marriage of Presson, 465 N.E. 2d 85, 86 (Il. 1984) (father and son
shared middle name); Michel D.L. v. Martha P. & Charles P., 203 N.Y. L.J. at 28 (May 11,
1990) (son's middle name was father's first name). But see Clinton v. Morrow, 247 S.W.2d
1015, 1017 (Ark. 1952) (concluding that changing child's surname to stepfather's surname
was appropriate because boy experienced confusion and disadvantage from having identi-
cal first and middle initials, and similar names, as father, grandfather, and half-brother); cf.
M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (changing non-marital
child's middle name to the father's surname can achieve "bond").
349. In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758,760 (N.D. 1976) ("By the common law, since very
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the cognomen's purported importance to maintaining the father-
child bond after a divorce is not logically connected to its original
purpose.35 Moreover, in a number of name change cases, the child
and the father bear the same first or middle name.35 In addition, as
women recognize from their own experiences, a first name can have
more personal significance than a surname."52
Despite the lack of social science support for the father-child
bond argument, a father might testify (and a psychologist might con-
firm)353 that the father will treat his child less warmly if his child does
not bear the father's surname.354 Courts should not countenance this
early times, a legal name has consisted of one Christian or given name, and of one sur-
name, patronymic, or family name, the given name being used first and the surname last."
(citation omitted)); see also In re Ritchie III, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 1073-74 (Ct. App.
1984) ("At common law a person's name consisted of a given name and of a surname or
family name."); C.P. Weathers v. Modem Masonry Materials, Inc., 129 S.E.2d 65, 68 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1962) (noting historical implications of person's first name); In re Douglas, 304
N.Y.S.2d 558,560 (App. Div. 1969) (pointing out that people were identified by their first
names long before surnames even developed). At some points in history, a first name was
the more important of one's two names. A man could only have one baptismal name al-
though he could have numerous surnames. See In re Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 568 (N.Y. 1859)
(citing Coke LiH.3, a(m)). In fact, "throughout the early reports the Christian name is
uniformly referred to as the most certain mark of the identity of the individual in all deeds
or instruments." Id. at 568-69.
350. See supra note 108.
351. See supra note 348.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
353. Contrary to what other authors have observed, see, e.g., Doll, supra note 27, at 234
("[T]his impairment of the father-child relationship had been an assumption by the courts,
and fathers had not introduced circumstantial or scientific evidence of harm." (footnote
omitted)), fathers sometimes do employ psychologists to help establish the connection
between the surname and the parent-child bond. See, e.g., Degerberg v. McCormick, 187
A.2d 436, 439 (Del. Ch. 1963) (citing psychiatric testimony that "change of surname of a
child of divorced parents may contribute to estrangement of the child from his father");
Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539, 541 (D.C. 1971) (citing father's psychologist's testimony
that the children's use of the paternal surname was important to the familial relationship);
Azzara v. Wailer, 495 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citing psychologist's tes-
timony that changing child's name would cause estrangement of child from her natural
father). Yet psychologists can also be found who refute the father-child bond argument.
See In re Marriage of Douglass, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1056 (Ct. App. 1988) (describing
expert's testimony that "the particular surname used by a child was not a primary factor in
maintaining parent-child relationships. He stated the most significant factor in maintain-
ing a parent-child relationship is the attitudes and conduct of the parents"); Nellis, 282
A.2d at 540-41 (citing another psychologist's testimony that forcing the child to maintain
the surname would hurt his relationship with his father); Azzara, 495 So. 2d at 278 (citing
another psychologist's testimony that all children should have the same surname as the
people with whom they live to signal normalcy). Social science research helps put this
testimony into perspective.
354. See Garrison v. Knauss, 637 N.E.2d 160, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
father testified that it was in his non-marital daughters' best interest to change their sur-
name to his surname upon the establishment of paternity "for-just for-that paternal
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argument. The father speaks the language of patriarchy when he
says, "I cannot love anyone I cannot label." Men who use such tac-
tics are essentially threatening to withhold their love until they get
what they seek: the perpetuation of the patronym. Since "in few
appellate name dispute cases have the fathers who have wanted their
children to retain their surnames sought custody," '355 the fathers seek
the benefits of a custodial relationship (a close bond with their chil-
dren and a shared surname) without undertaking the responsibilities
of a custodial parent.
Few appellate courts have rejected the argument that the patro-
nym is vital to the father-child bond. The New Jersey Supreme
Court is the only court that has made a normative pronouncement
against entertaining the argument. 56 It recently stated: "The preser-
vation of the paternal bond is not and should not be dependent on
the retention of the paternal surname; nor is the paternal surname an
indispensable element of the relationship between father and
child. 357
More commonly, courts that have wanted to reject the argument
mistakenly have thought that the proper response was to extend the
reasoning to women: "If the name is important to the strengthening
of the father-son relationship, it is just as logical to say it is important
to strengthening the mother-son relationship."358 Yet few women
would argue that their relationships with their children would suffer
if the children did not bear the maternal surname. It is perhaps for
this reason, or perhaps because the mother is typically the custodial
parent, that "'courts largely have ignored the impact a name may
feeling that they are my children").
355. Urbonya, supra note 44, at 814 (citations omitted).
356. See Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856 (N.J. 1995). Other courts have rejected
the argument vdthout questioning its premise. See, e.g., Pizziconi v. Yarbrough, 868 P.2d
1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting father's argument that the child's discontinued
use of his name would weaken father-child relationship by noting that father and child had
bonded); Jones v. Roe, 604 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (reasoning that non-
marital child's name change was not necessary in light of the fact that parents had joint
legal custody of child and custody would promote bond between father and child).
357. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 867.
358. Garrison, 637 N.E.2d at 161 (quoting D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1268 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (Shields, J., dissenting)); see also Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 279
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Leavitt, supra note 42, at 115 (arguing the state equal rights
amendment requires equal consideration be given to the mother-child relationship). Even
when courts consider "the impact of a name on the mother-child relationship," some courts
have limited its potential applicability to "cases where the father is the custodial parent or
where the custodial mother goes by her birth-given surname." In re Marriage of Schiff-
man, 620 P.2d 579,584 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (citing Thornton, supra note 42, at 330).
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have on the mother-child relationship.' ""' Even when the argument
is occasionally made by mothers, courts sometimes exhibit an asym-
metry in their acceptance of the argument. One court recently
proclaimed that "the mother-child relationship is less affected by the
surname used by the child [than the father-child relationship]" and
"something such as a name will not affect significantly the mother-
child condition.""36 The court's rationale for the distinction was that
a mother need not establish maternity through the courts because
"we know the origins of the mother-child relationship, inherently."36'
The court's basis for differentiating between mother and father in
this way suffers from the same logical defects as the previously dis-
cussed justifications for linking a surname to the strength of the
father-child bond. 62 The best tactic is to debunk altogether the myth
that a name can affect the father-child bond, rather than to extend
the argument, with its mixed results, to women.
In sum, the presumption in favor of the status quo is, virtually
by definition, a standaid that entrenches the current practice of pat-
ronymics.
B. Best Interest of the Child Standard
The "best interest of the child" standard is an alternative to the
presumption in favor of the status quo. As the best interest of the
child standard has become ubiquitous in family law, it is no surprise
that courts use the standard to resolve disputes over children's sur-
names.363 In fact, the best interest of the child standard is the most
359. In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Neb. 1990) (quoting Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at
584). See also infra text accompanying note 409.
360. In re Paternity of Tibbitts, 668 N.E.2d 1266, 1268-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(discussing factors to be considered in adjudicating proposed name change for non-marital
child).
361. 1&
362. See supra text accompanying notes 314-16.
363. Use of this standard began in the 1800s to resolve initial custody disputes between
parents. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 237-42 (1985); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of
a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73
NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1072 (1979). Use of the standard has proliferated so that it is diffi-
cult to find a family law case involving children where the phrase is not used. The standard
is now used to resolve disputes in numerous areas, including adoption, neglect proceedings,
and modification of custody orders. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.13(1)(e) (West
1995) ("At the conclusion of the adoption hearing, the court shall .... Dismiss the adop-
tion petition.., if dismissal.., is in the best interest of the person whose adoption is
petitioned."); Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1157, 1314 (1980) ("If a finding of neglect is made, the court is usually bound to dis-
pose of the matter in accordance with the broad standard of the 'best interest' of the
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common method by which courts resolve these disputes;364 by current
estimates, thirty-one states use this standard to determine whether or
not to change a marital child's surname.365
The standard authorizes the court to determine the result that is
best for a child. The parent who seeks to change the child's surname
child."); Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 409(b), 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987) (stating that a
court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless, inter alia, the modification "is neces-
sary to serve the best interest of the child").
364. See generally Cardinal v. Perch, 611 A.2d 515, 516 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1991) ("[T]he
great weight of judicial authority today supports the proposition that a child's last name
should be determined on a 'best interest' standard."); In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa.
1992) ("The best interests of the child is the standard used by an overwhelming majority of
our sister states when reviewing petitions for change of name on behalf of minor chil-
dren.").
365. The states which have adopted the best interest standard by statute or case law are
the following: Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-601(B) (West Supp. 1996); Arkan-
sas: Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Ark. 1988); California: In re Marriage of
McManamy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 217 (Ct. App. 1993); Colorado: Hamman v. County
Court in and for Jefferson County, 753 P.2d 743, 749 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Connecticut:
Delaney v. Appeal From Probate, No. Cv9305212095, 1993 WL 328611, at *4 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 17, 1993); District of Columbia: Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539,542 (D.C.
1971); Delaware: Degerberg v. McCormick, 187 A.2d 436, 439 (Del. Ch. 1963); Florida:
Robertson v. Pfister, 523 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Hawaii: HAW. REV.
STAT. § 574-5 (1982 & Supp. 1992); Illinois: ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-101 (West 1992
& Supp. 1996); In re Craig, 518 N.E.2d 728, 729-30 (il1. App. Ct. 1987); Indiana: IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Michie 1986); In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718, 720 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987); Kansas: In re Morehead, 706 P.2d 480, 483 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Maryland: Law-
rence v. Lawrence, 538 A.2d 779, 781 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Massachusetts: Mark v.
Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758,762 (Mass. 1956); Michigan: Garling v. Spiering, 512 N.W.2d 12, 12
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Mississippi: Marshall v. Marshall, 93 So. 2d 822, 825-27 (Miss.
1957); Missouri: B.L.W. by Ellen K. v. WollWeber, 823 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); Montana: In re Marriage of Firman, 610 P.2d 178, 181 (Mont. 1980); Nebraska: In
re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 488-89 (Neb. 1990); New Mexico: In re Januskiewicz, 731
P.2d 1350, 1351 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 33.430(3) (1995); Penn-
sylvania: In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. 1992); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-49-10(B) (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 1996); Ex parte Stull, 280 S.E.2d 209, 210 (S.C.
1981); South Dakota: Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D. 1994); Tennessee:
Replogle v. Replogle, No. 01A-01-9312-cv-0516, 1994 WL 228227, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 27, 1994); Texas: TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.004(a) (West 1996); Utah: Hamby v.
Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Vermont: In re Wilson, 648 A.2d 648,
650 (Vt. 1994); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Michie 1992); Flowers v. Cain, 237
S.E.2d 111, 112 (Va. 1977); Washington: Hurta v. Hurta, 605 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1979); West Virginia: In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426, 428 (W. Va. 1977); cf. Alabama:
ALA. CODE § 26-11-3(a)-(b) (1992) (requiring best interest standard be used after legiti-
mization of children); New Hampshire: Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 385 A.2d 120, 123 (N.H.
1978) (reasoning that authority exists to deny restoration of birth name to divorced woman
with minor child "if the interests of a child would be adversely affected thereby"); Nevada:
Magiera v. Luera, 802 P.2d 6, 7 (Nev. 1990) ("[T]he only factor relevant to the determina-
tion of what surname a child should bear is the best interest of the child.") (non-marital
child); Rhode Island: Gersuny v. Armstrong, 581 A.2d 718, 719 (R.I. 1990) (applying best
interest of child standard in case involving non-marital child).
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must prove that the proposed change is in the child's best interest."'
A court balances a number of considerations to reach its conclusion.
One treatise writer summarized these factors as follows:
a) the preservation of the father-child relationship; b) the
strength of the mother-child relationship; c) the identifica-
tion of the child as part of a family unit; d) the wishes of the
child; e) the child's age and maturity; f) the nature of the
family situation; g) misconduct of or neglect toward the
child by the parent opposing the change; h) the name by
which the child has customarily been called; i) the opposing
party's conduct toward the spouse and the child during the
marriage. 67
Other factors that have been considered by courts include the length
of time the child has used a name,368 the child's comfort with using a
surname that differs from the custodial parent's surname,369 the
child's alienation from neighborhood children who bear their fa-
thers' surnames,37 ' any negative association or social stigma that has
attached to either the current or proposed name,37 ' the child's safety
if the child lacks a "locally identifiable" name,372 and the petitioner's
motive for seeking the name change.3  Courts do not necessarily ex-
amine all of these factors,374 and none of the factors constitutes a
mandatory consideration.375 The factors are not prioritized in impor-
tance, nor do most appellate courts or statutes set forth an exclusive
366. See Lawrence, 538 A.2d at 781 ("[Clourts from other jurisdictions agree that the
proponent of the change bears the burden of demonstrating that the name change pro-
motes the best interest of the child."); Doll, supra note 27, at 250 ("Women who wish to
change their children's surnames have always shouldered the burden of proof. This is true
even if the father is the plaintiff, trying to prevent the change."); Seng, supra note 24, at
1307 ("The usual rule governing minors' name changes places the burden of proof upon
the mother who seeks to change the child's surname or to add her own name to the
child's.").
367. CLARK, supra note 142, at 548.
368. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980) (en banc);
McManamy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217; Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180, 185 (Ohio 1988).
369. See, e.g., Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 867 (N.J. 1995); Bobo, 528 N.E.2d
at 185; Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651.
370. See, e.g., Cobb by Webb v. Cobb, 844 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (non-
marital child).
371. See, e.g., Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651.
372. See M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543,546 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
373. See, e.g., Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651.
374. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381,384 (Neb. 1982) (emphasizing only five
factors in determining the best interest of the child).
375. See, e.g., Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651 ("The court has broad discretion in determining
what is in the best interests of the children ... and thus which factors the court considers is
a matter of discretion."(citation omitted)).
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list of factors for trial courts to consider;3 76 sometimes no factors at all
are enumerated.3 7 In the final analysis, the best interest of the child
is determined by the virtually unfettered discretion of the trial court.
The indeterminacy of the standard has drawn criticism, and not
378solely in the naming context. One court found difficulty in apply-
ing the standard to a name change dispute because "of the
speculative quality of the inquiry into the effect that the chosen sur-
name would have on the future welfare and happiness of the
child., 379 Commentators have suggested that "[b]oth trial courts and
the spouses are left at sea in these cases.""38 To appreciate the sub-
jective nature of the test, one need only review a case that has been
reversed on appeal to see just how two courts can reach diametrically
opposite conclusions on each factor examined in the best interest in-
quiry.
Just like most other issues involved in divorce litigation, dis-
putes over children's name changes are often settled through
negotiation with the parties bargaining "in the shadow of the law.13 82
The apparent indeterminacy of the best interest standard provides
376. See Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180, 185 (Ohio 1988); Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651.
377. See In re Iverson, 786 P.2d 1, 3 (Mont. 1990) (Barz, J., dissenting) ("[G]uidelines
are needed for the district courts, otherwise, the traditional preference for the father's
name will continue and a subtle form of discrimination against women will prevail."). But
see In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992) ("Specific guidelines are difficult to estab-
lish, for the circumstances in each case will be unique, as each child has individual physical,
intellectual, moral, social and spiritual needs.").
378. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transformation of
American Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 801, 845-46 (1989) (arguing
that the differing conclusions reached by professional groups, special interest groups, and
legal actors using the test "indicates that there are profound problems with the very ar-
ticulation of the test"); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975) (noting
that determination of what is best for a child is "usually indeterminate and speculative");
Scott, supra note 12, at 622 ("The wide-open inquiry that the standard invites often de-
volves into a destructive contest in which each parent competes to expose the flaws of the
other. The eventual determination can be speculative and value-laden .... [I]nconsistency
and imprecision result even among courts that value the past parental caretaking role.").
But see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's
Best-Interest Standard, 89 MicH. L. REv. 2215, 2245-50, 2260-64 (1991) (canvassing the
advantages of discretion).
379. Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856,868 (N.J. 1995).
380. CLARK, supra note 142, at 548; see also Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note 16, at 184
(stating that the best interests test is vague and unpredictable).
381. See, e.g., Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273,275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
382. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979); Scott, supra note 12, at 643
("Most divorce settlements and custody arrangements are decided through a process of
negotiation between the spouses.").
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little guidance for such bargaining, and as a result it can cause a party
to trade economic benefits to obtain the desired name for the child.
A vivid example of one party's willingness to trade economic bene-
fits to secure a particular surname for a child was seen in D.R.S. v.
R.S.H 83 There the trial judge indicated that he would be inclined to
reduce the father's support payments if the child's surname were not
changed to the father's surname. The mother responded that she
would forego all support if the child kept the mother's surname.384
The criticism that the best interest test is gender biased is not
new. Scholars have commented that the standard is a "'subterfuge
to ... perpetuate the paternal [surname] preference.' ""' Jurists
have acknowledged the criticism, but have continued to use the stan-
dard. They deny that gender bias necessarily influences the best
interest inquiry, and they pledge to apply the standard in a neutral
manner. 86 For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont, while reaf-
383. 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
384. See iU. at 1259 (non-marital child); see also Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note 16, at 166
(using the best interest test to decide a child's surname during divorce proceedings "adds a
new aspect to the power struggle within divorce proceedings"). But cf MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 273 (not finding custody being used as a bargaining chip in
divorce negotiations).
385. See Doll, supra note 27, at 233 (quoting Hamby, 769 P.2d at 278); see also Mac-
Dougall, supra note 24, at 131 (arguing that courts implicitly adopted a presumption for
the father's name when applying the best interest standard in disputes over renaming mari-
tal children originally given fathers' names); Thornton, supra note 42, at 304 (stating that
recent decisions cast doubt on whether courts really consider the children's best interests
or merely defer to the father's wishes).
386. See Pizziconi v. Yarbrough, 868 P.2d 1005,1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (non-marital
child) ("[Courts should not give greater weight to the father's interest in having the child
bear the paternal surname .... "); In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal.
1980) (en banc) (employing the best interest standard but indicating that the father's name
would no longer be given preference); Jones v. Roe, 604 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992) (non-marital child) ("[A] court should not attribute greater weight to the father's
interest in having the child bear the paternal surname than to the mother's interest in
having the child bear her name.... The current trend of the cases is that the right of the
father to have the child bear his name is no greater than that of the mother to have the
child bear her name."); Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Mont. 1983) (applying
best interest test and adopting district court finding that husband had no "preference or
natural right to have his daughter bear his surname"); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 491
(Neb. 1990) ("[T]oday's trend is toward parental and marital equality in reference to chil-
dren.... "); Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381, 382 (Neb. 1982) ("Today, patrimonial
control of surnames has virtually disappeared."); Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 867
(N.J. 1995) ("[]n resolving disputes over surnames we apply the best-interest-of-the-child
standard free of gender-based notions of parental rights."); K.K. v. G., 530 A.2d 361, 363
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (non-marital child) ("The right of a mother to have her
child bear her name must be recognized as equal to that of the father." (footnote omit-
ted)); Spence-Chapin Serv. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 421 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (Sup.
Ct. 1979) ("[N]either parent has a right superior to the other to determine the surname of
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firming the propriety of using the standard, stated in In re Wilson,"7
"We agree that the best interests standard should not be used to give
greater weight to the paternal surname."388 In fact, some courts spe-
cifically adopted the best interest standard in order to combat the
assumption that a father had a primary right to have his child bear
his surname. 9
Yet despite judges' proclamations that the best interest of the
child standard is no longer a subterfuge for a paternal surname pref-
erence, the interpretation and application of the best interest test still
favors the male surname. One commentator observed that the ear-
lier criticism of the best interest standard has caused "the tenor, if
not always the holdings, of recent decisions ... [to] become more
equitable.""3 ' Simply, the factors that go into a best interest determi-
nation often reflect men's understanding of a surname's importance.
Even in cases where women ultimately prevail, women are fighting
on turf that favors their opponents. This section now analyzes how
the standard reflects men's conceptions of surnames and undervalues
associationalist principles. 9'
the [non-marital] child."); In re Sakaris, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013 (Civ. Ct. 1993) ("Neither
parent has a superior right to determine the surname of a child and the question is always
whether the best interests of the child will be served by the proposed change."); Bobo v.
Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180, 184-85 (Ohio 1988) ("We ... refrain from defining the best-
interest-of-the-child test as purporting to give primary or greater weight to the father's
interest in having the child bear the paternal surname.... In these times of parental
equality, arguing that the child of unmarried parents should bear the paternal surname
based on custom is another way of arguing that it is permissible to discriminate because
the discrimination has endured for many years."); Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 700
(S.D. 1994) ("[IThe custom of giving a child the father's surname should not serve to give
the father an advantage. Only the child's best interest should be considered by the court
on remand."); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273,278 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[L]ip-service
to the best interests of the child should not be used as a subterfuge to nevertheless per-
petuate the paternal preference.").
387. 648 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1994).
388. l& at 650.
389. See, e.g., Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; Hamby, 769 P.2d at 276-77.
390. See Doll, supra note 27, at 237.
391. While there may be parts of the best interest inquiry that seem on the surface to
favor the women's perspective, I believe the undiscussed factors tend, at best, to be gender
neutral. For example, "the identification of the child as part of the family unit," see supra
text accompanying note 367, could be used to either party's advantage, depending upon
who the court sees as the relevant family unit. Similarly, "the opposing party's conduct
toward the spouse and the child during the marriage," it, could be used to either party's
advantage, as the factor would make relevant evidence of the opposing party's good and
bad conduct.
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1. Child's Interest in Preserving Relationship with Father
Critics who have complained of gender bias in the best interest
standard have focused almost exclusively on this factor, noting that
the father's interest in his relationship with his child is often consid-
ered determinative by the courts. 92 The critics argued that it was
improper to consider the father's interest (including the father's right
to have the child bear his surname) when the exercise was supposed
to be child-focused. While that problem sometimes persists today,
393
most litigants and courts recognize that the critics were correct. Con-
sequently, male litigants now make a different, but related, claim:
they state that the quality of the parent-child relationship will be af-
fected if the child bears another last name, and that relationship
affects the child's best interest. Courts understand the distinction
between the former and latter arguments, and accept the new ver-
sion. For example, in In re Lone the court stated:
To the extent that the paternal 'right' represents a recogni-
tion of a father's interest in perpetuating his own name or
in protecting his ego or in preserving his perceived male
prerogatives, it may have little or no relevance to the best
interests of the child or the propriety of a name change.
But to the extent the 'right' recognizes the father's interest
in maintaining his relationship with his child for their mu-
tual benefit, it becomes highly relevant. 94
In the context of the best interest inquiry, between 1990 and
1996 numerous appellate courts have mentioned and given credence
to the argument that a name change affects the father-child bond.9
392- See Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 585 (Mosk, J., concurring); Doll, supra note 27, at 241;
Seng, supra note 24, at 1339-41; Thornton, supra note 42, at 323; Urbonya, supra note 44,
at 796-97.
393. See Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 867 (N.J. 1995) (explaining that some
courts "rely on traditional presumptions that obscure a clear evaluation of what constitutes
the child's best interests. Those courts have continued to favor the retention and use of
the paternal surname by treating the child's best interest as synonymous with the father's
best interests"); see also D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("In
determining whether a change of name will promote the child's best interests, courts look
to various factors. First, significant consideration is given to the father's interest in having
his child bear the paternal surname in accordance with tradition.").
394. In re Lone, 338 A.2d 883, 887 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); accord In re Mar-
riage of Douglass, 252 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of Omelson,
445 N.E.2d 951, 955-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citing Lone, 338 A.2d at 887).
395. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McManamy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216,218 (Ct. App. 1993);
Delaney v. Appeal from Probate, No. Cv9305212095, 1993 WL 328611, at *2 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 17, 1993); In re Mattson, 608 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (non-
marital child); In re Paternity of Tibbitts, 668 N.E.2d 1266,1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (non-
marital child); Neal v. Neal, No. 20469, 1996 WL 507218, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 6,
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Some commentators have suggested that this consideration is the fac-
tor that courts weigh most heavily when evaluating a child's best
interest.39 While it is not a new phenomenon for the courts to con-
sider the father's ongoing relationship with his children in a best
interest inquiry,3 97 two recent cases provide excellent examples of
how this factor is often determinative: In re Wilson,39 a 1994 deci-
sion from the Supreme Court of Vermont, and In re Crisafi,399 a 1995
decision from the Court of Appeals of Ohio.
In re Wilson involved two marital children who received their fa-
ther's surname, Wilson, at birth. At that time, their mother had the
name Pomerleau-Wilson.41' The couple later divorced and the
mother resumed use of her birth name, Pomerleau. The mother ob-
tained both legal and physical custody of the children.41 During the
next five years, the mother remarried, yet she kept using her birth
name exclusively. When the children were ten and five years old, the
mother sought to change the children's surnames to Pomerleau, a
name they had already begun using at school.42 While the probate
1996) ("[T]rial court could have reasonably concluded that the name change might aid in
the preservation and development of the father/son relationship."), rev'd No. 79376, 1997
WL 133418, at *4 (Mo. Mar. 25,1997) (en banc); Morris v. Morris, 926 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996) ("The Circuit Court could have appropriately concluded that the proposed
name change would unduly interfere with [the father's] relationship with his son.") (non-
marital child); In re Crisafi, 662 N.E.2d 887, 889 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); In re Wilson, 648
A.2d 648, 651 (Vt. 1994); In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161-62 (Pa. 1992); Keegan v. Gu-
dahl, 525 N.W.2d 695,701 (S.D. 1994) (stating that mother "risks eroding the natural bond
between father and child if she imposes her surname upon the child" and that "a father of
an infant child has a natural right to have a child bear his name") (Henderson, Retired J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. supra text accompanying notes 302-03.
396. See Doll, supra note 27, at 241; Seng, supra note 24, at 1339; Thornton, supra note
42, at 334-35.
397. See, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 540 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1975); Degerberg v.
McCormick, 187 A.2d 436, 439 (Del. Ch. 1963); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); In re Marriage of Presson, 465 N.E.2d 85, 89 (I11. 1984); In re Mar-
riage of Omelson, 445 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983); D.H.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d
1257, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (non-marital child); West v. Wright, 283 A.2d 401, 404
(Md. 1971); Mark v. Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758,762 (Mass. 1956); Marshall v. Marshall, 93 So.
2d 822, 825 (Miss. 1957); Firman v. Firman, 610 P.2d 178, 181 (Mont. 1980); In re Spatz,
258 N.W.2d 814, 816 (Neb. 1977); Lone, 338 A.2d at 887; Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562, 567
(Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1953); Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964,
writ granted); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984, no writ); Flowers
v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 1977); Daves v. Nastos, 711 P.2d 314, 318 (Wash. 1985)
(en banc).
398. 648 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1994).
399. 662 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
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court granted the mother's petition, the superior court reversed, and
the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of Vermont.4°3 The su-
preme court affirmed the superior court's decision.
The supreme court confirmed that the "best interest of the
child" standard governed the adjudication of a name change petition
submitted on behalf of a minor child, even though the mother had
legal custody.405 Although the statute did not specify what factors
had to be considered in the best interest analysis, the supreme court
identified the factors that other courts had considered.40' The su-
preme court affirmed because it found that the trial court considered
many of these factors, giving weight to some, and discounting others.
What was most interesting, however, was the supreme court's re-
sponse to the mother's claim that the trial court improperly weighed
the impact of the name change on the children's bonds with each of
the parents. The supreme court stated:
We also cannot agree that the trial court improperly
weighed the factors considered. The court concluded, and
mother does not disagree, that the children have a strong
bond with mother and her maternal family, so that while
changing the children's surname to Pomerleau might help
them identify with her family unit, "there is no need to
strengthen the bonds" further. In contrast, the court found
that father's relationship with the children is "one already
strained by the pressures of a work schedule, and the pres-
sures of family politics since the divorce," and a change will
likely detrimentally affect the children's relationship with
their father and draw them further away from him.'O'
When the mother suggested that the best interest analysis, as applied
by the trial court, made it "almost impossible to win a name change
403. See id.
404. See id. at 652.
405. See id. at 650. Name change decisions have been differentiated from other deci-
sions over which a legal custodian has authority. See infra note 521 and accompanying
text.
406. These factors included:
the child's preference, taking into account the child's age and maturity; the length
of time the child has used the surname; the effect of a surname change on the
preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent;
whether the child might feel embarrassment or discomfort bearing a surname dif-
ferent from the rest of the family; whether any negative association or social
stigma has attached to either the current or proposed name; the motives of the
moving parent; and any other factor relevant to the child's best interest.
* Wilson, 648 A.2d at 651.
407. Id
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petition when the children bear the name of the noncustodial par-
ent,""8 the supreme court agreed:
It is true that the custodial parent and the children, having
regular contact and the primary home, have a greater op-
portunity to maintain their psychological relationship
without having to rely on the symbol of a name, and this
fact may weigh heavily in support of retaining the noncus-
todial parent's surname. But the determination is case
specific, and here the trial court found that the best way for
the children to maintain close contact with both parents was
to retain the noncustodial parent's surname.49
In re Crisafi involved a mother who sought to change the sur-
name of her minor children to her remarried name, and her ex-
husband opposed it. The Ohio appellate court affirmed the trial
court's denial of her application, applying the best interest of the
child test.410 What became most relevant in the Crisafi case was not
the various best interest factors enumerated in earlier cases, but
rather the referee's finding "that the natural father has demonstrated
a continuing interest in his children and the name change might lead
to 'possible alienation and estrangement between the children and
their natural father.' ,,41' This factor was determinative, despite the
fact that the former husband had "not been diligent in taking advan-
tage of his visitation rights" and was "substantially behind" in his
child support payments. Nor was the mother's argument, which
was based on association, persuasive:
Debra Hobt argues that they have become a family unit
since her second marriage and by changing the children's
names to her married name, it will help unify the family.
This position, although well founded, fails in light of the
possible alienation and estrangement between the children
and their natural father. 3
The court concluded:
In absence of such evidence [that it clearly is in the child's
best interest to change the name], as here, it would not con-
tribute to the child's best interest to permit interference
with the usual custom of succession to the father's name or
408. Id.
409. Id. at 651-52.
410. See In re Crisafi, 662 N.E.2d 887, 888-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
411. ld. at 888.
412 Id
413. Id. at 890.
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to foster any unnatural barrier between the father and
child.414
These two cases illustrate the weight that courts place on pre-
serving the father-child relationship, and help to explain why non-
custodial fathers emphasize this factor in litigation over children's
surnames. The sexism inherent in this factor, as described above in
Section IV.A., calls into question the supposed neutrality of the best
interest test.
2. Child's Interest in Retaining Long-Used Surname
Courts attempting to determine the best interest of the child of-
ten attach great significance to the length of time the child has used a
surname.41 1 Courts assume that children's identities are bound up
with their surnames, and that name stability is necessary for a stable
sense of identity. 6 Some courts have suggested that it is harmful to
change a child's surname repeatedly, absent some showing that
strong benefit will result from the changes. 7
These assumptions contrast sharply with the typical female view
of surnames. As noted in previous sections, most women do not be-
lieve that one's stable sense of identity is dependent upon one's
surname. Women tend to change their surnames upon marriage, of-
ten after using their birth names for decades. Although no empirical
research speaks to whether most women feel their children's sur-
names are just as alterable, women who seek to change their
children's surnames probably believe so. Courts (as well as re-
414. ld. at 889.
415. See In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) ("[T]he
length of time that the child has used a surname is to be considered. If, as here, the time is
negligible because the child is very young, other facts may be controlling."); see also In re
Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298,302 (Minn. 1981) (stating that while no preference is accorded to
the maternal or paternal surname, "[d]ue deference is given, however, to the fact the child
has borne a given surname for an extended period of time"); Aitkin County Family Serv.
Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (non-marital child) (calling
length of time child bore name one of two factors that "are particularly important").
416. Courts consider the link between identity and a surname to be strong even if a
child has not borne the surname for a long time. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Omelson, 445
N.E.2d 951, 957 (I1. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that child was five years old when name
change was sought); In re Lone, 338 A.2d 883, 887-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)
(same). See generally Dannin, supra note 42, at 174 ("[W]here the name desired has been
used since infancy there would be a reasonable ground for granting a change of name"
because of the "child's sense of identity."); Thornton, supra note 42, at 327 ("[C]ourts give
significant weight to the fact that a child has been continuously known by a nonpaternal
surname for a long period of time and consider whether the child might perceive a change
back to the paternal surname as an attempt to destroy his identity.").
417. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McManamy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216,218 (Ct. App. 1993).
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searchers) should explore this possibility.
There is some empirical research that has examined whether
children believe that a constant surname is integral to a stable sense
of identity. A study by Carol Guardo and Janis Beebe Bohan of
children age six to nine sought to ascertain whether those subjects
believe a child could "assume an identity different from his own and
yet not give up his own personal identity.""41 One of the questions
asked was whether the child would maintain the same identity if his
or her name were taken away.419 While the study found that younger
children resort to nominal realism,4 20 "[b]y the age of 8, however, the
recognition that names are arbitrary designations and not guarantees
of identity was clear-cut. As one precocious [subject] put it:
'Because my name isn't what I am. It's just my name!' ,421 Another
girl, when asked if she would remain the same if her name were
taken away, stated, "I'd still be the same person. [Examiner: what
stays the same?] My per-son-al-i-ty? 4 22 There were even some chil-
dren under eight years old who recognized that a name is "not the
essential anchor of identity, but rather personaeity, the feeling of
being a singular and personal identity, is.""
Guardo and t9ohan's study indicates that there is only a short
time frame in which a child believes that his or her name is essential
to his or her identity. Before a certain age, the child is too young to
be concerned with such considerations.424 After a certain point, the
418. Carol J. Guardo & Janis Beebe Bohan, Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in
Children, 42 CHILD DEV. 1909,1912 (1972).
419. See id. at 1913.
420. "Nominal realism," as used by Jean Piaget in The Child's Conception of the World
81, 83 (1929) (Joan Tomlinson & Andrew Tomlinson trans., Littlefield, Adams & Co.
1971) and adopted by Guardo & Bohan, supra note 418, is comprised of both ontological
nominal realism and logical nominal realism. The former means that "[t]he child considers
names as being 'in' the object and 'generated' by the object (rather than produced by the
subject)," and the latter means "[t]he child considers names as being endowed with intrin-
sic values (instead of giving them conventional meaning)." ANTONIO M. BATrRO,
PIAGET: DICTIONARY OF TERMS 141 (Elizabeth Rtltschi-Hermann & Sarah F. Campbell
eds., 1973).
421. Guardo & Bohan, supra note 418, at 1918; see also PIAGET, supra note 418, at 81,
83 (finding that after an average age of ten, children agreed that names could be changed,
which reflected a decline of ontological realism: that names are tied up to the things they
represent).
422. Guardo & Bohan, supra note 418, at 1920.
423. 1d. at 1919.
424. See Jones v. Roe, 604 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that two-and-
a-half-year-old, non-marital girl was "too young to have achieved any significant identifi-
cation with her last name"); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Neb. 1990) (citing
psychologist's testimony that two-year-old child is too young to identify with a specific
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child understands the disjunction between one's surname and one's
identity. Guardo and Bohan's results suggest that girls may recog-
nize at an earlier age than boys that a name is not an essential
identity anchor.4" This difference may presage the divergence of the
genders' views in later life, as noted in Sections III.B.1 and III.C.2
above, though it may be erroneous to equate a child's belief in
nominal realism with an adult's sense of self-structure. Guardo and
Bohan's study supports a case-by-case examination of children's de-
pendence upon their surnames for their sense of identity, with the
caveat that the inquiry is relevant only for children within a narrow
age range.
Even for children within the relevant age range, the length of
time a child has borne a surname is an inaccurate proxy for the iden-
tity issue. Rather a court must engage in a careful examination of a
child's particular beliefs and circumstances. First,. a child may not
actually experience any discontinuity when his or her surname is
changed to coincide with the custodial parent's surname. A child
may find that changing his or her surname to match his or her physi-
cal custodian's surname provides more stability than retaining the
surname of a departed parent. Guardo and Bohan did not explore
the interaction of identity and association. Second, a child may ex-
perience no discontinuity when his or her surname is changed
because the child's "core" sense of identity may be more closely in-
tertwined with the child's first name than with the cognomen.426
Psychologists often refer to a child's first name when speaking about
the importance of a child's name to his or her sense of self.427
surname); In re Rossell, 481 A.2d 602, 606 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (concluding
that two-year-old child "is too young to have achieved any significant identification with
his last name"); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
two-year-old child was "too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby").
425. See Guardo & Bohan, supra note 418, at 1919.
426. Various social scientists believe that the first name symbolizes one's "core iden-
tity." ALFORD, supra note 10, at 52, 141 (stating that while surnames "place an individual
in a family group," which has a certain social significance, "it is the first names, for the
most part, that symbolize personal identity"); see also Wilbur G. Gaffney, Tell Me Your
Name and Your Business; or, Some Considerations Upon the Purposeful Naming of Chil-
dren, 19 NAMES 34, 35 (1971) (positing that one's character [and one's profession] is
determined by the first name under which one grew to adulthood); Holt, supra note 10, at
296 (explaining that the first name or nickname is one of the words which individuals use
to refer to oneself after ego development). Other authors' sweeping statements about how
a name is the "most important anchorage to our self-identity throughout life" are often in
the context of first names. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, PATrERN AND GROWTH IN
PERSONALITY 117 (1937) (citing 0. Strunk's research that people who dislike their own
first names generally do not like themselves).
427. See ALLPORT, supra note 426, at 115 ("He hears constantly 'Where is Johnny's
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Guardo and Bohan did not ask separately about first and last
names.4 8 Finally, a court should ascertain whether any discontinuity
would in fact be harmful. Guardo and Bohan reached no conclusion
as to whether discontinuity itself had harmful consequences (or,
rather, whether some children perceive discontinuity as a positive
status change). For example, it seems that young girls receive the
message that their last names will change at marriage, and they per-
ceive that this change will lead to discontinuity. 9 If girls view this as
a positive change, then perhaps they will not be disturbed by a name
change upon their parents' divorce, even though the situations differ
dramatically. In fact, some writers speak of the ease with which chil-
dren undergo a change of name, which may mean that children do
not find discontinuity troublesome.4 10 A child's sense of identity may
be resilient because it is potentially grounded not solely upon his or
her surname, but also upon other factors such as the continuity of
care from a custodial parent.' Overall, merely looking at the length
of time a child has used a surname would inaccurately assess harm to
nose?' 'Where are Johnny's eyes?' 'Good Johnny,' 'John naughty.' By hearing his name
repeatedly the child gradually sees himself as a distinct and recurrent point of reference.
The name acquires significance for him in the second year of life. With it comes awareness
of independent status in the social group."); see also Falk, supra note 100, at 651 ("Names,
which form so important a part of identity from the very beginning of life, when the moth-
ering person addresses the baby by his name, or 'name of affection' (diminutive) as pet
names are called in Hebrew, come to symbolize the identity of the person."); Mary V.
Seeman, Name and Identity, 25 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 129, 129 (1980) (suggesting that
many of identity's attributes-e.g., ethnic tradition, religion, ancestry, gender, social class,
birth order, etc.-are reflected in the first name given to a child at birth).
428. Similarly, the work by Jean Piaget asked only about first names. See PIAOET,
supra note 421, at 63, 81.
429. See Guardo & Bohan, supra note 418, at 1919.
430. See Holt, supra note 10, at 297-98. Holt explains:
He [a child of five or six] is aware of that as his name; that is what is attached to
him and an inseparable part of him, just as the brilliant thing in the sky is the sun.
The most complete identification, and ego-involvement, with a name, then, does
not necessarily mean, in a child, that the name is the felt core of his personality
and center of his inmost self. The ease with which children undergo a change of
name shows this. The name may as easily be altered as any other mental set in
the plastic mind of the child. It is an identification based on a naive conception of
the world, which Piaget has so admirably set forth, and only a little different from
identification of other things and their names.
Id. Holt also relates that a child's name may become an object of importance when the
child enters school and the whole name is used frequently. See id. at 298-99.
431. Cf Louis BREGER, FROM INSTINCr TO IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PERSONALITY 333 (1974) ("The self develops by modeling, imitating, and eventually in-
ternalizing-making a part of itself-persons of emotional significance."); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in
Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 339 (1994) (suggesting children's identities are
determined by their "own experiences of family attachment").
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the child from changing the surname.
A myopic focus on the length of time a child has borne a sur-
name also disadvantages. First, such an approach accords undue
deference to the initial naming decision.432 Custom dictates that a
child usually receives the paternal surname at birth, and often little
or no thought goes into that decision. By according great importance
to the child's prior use of a surname, the court reduces the possibility
that a child will ever bear the matrilineal surname. Second, the em-
phasis on the importance of surname stability for children results in
penalizing women for society's custom that women change their sur-
names upon marriage. Some courts fear that if they allow a child to
bear his or her mother's surname, the mother may remarry shortly
thereafter, and then the mother's and child's surnames will again dif-
fer, or worse yet, the mother may then seek yet another name change
for the child.433 Some courts disbelieve a mother who proclaims that
she will not change her surname upon a subsequent marriage if the
petition to change the child's name is granted.434 Rather, these courts
speculate about a mother's future relationships, discount the
mother's intentions with regard to her own surname, and assume
that a further name change for the child will be harmful.
In sum, the courts' emphasis on the length of time that the child
has used a surname leads to a gender-biased, and at times inaccurate,
application of the best interest standard. The length of time a child
has used a surname is a poor proxy for determining the harm the
child may encounter, if any, from a surname change. This temporal
criterion accords undue priority to the initial naming decision, with
the effect that it "freezes" in time the practice of patronymy followed
by most marital parents. The temporal test also perpetuates patro-
432. A court, however, may focus on the length a child has used a name adopted infor-
mally. See supra note 416 and articles cited therein. In such a case, the inquiry can benefit
the custodial parent.
433. See, e.g., In re Mattson, 608 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (non-marital
child) ("Should her mother get married and, as is customary, adopt her husband's surname,
Kimberly would once again be in the position of having a different name from her
mother."); Hauge v. Asmussen, No. C9-91-154, 1991 WL 151369, at *4-*5 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 13, 1991) (finding reasonable trial court's determination that mother's, but not fa-
ther's, surname might change on remarriage and that, therefore, child should bear father's
surname); Jarrells v. Epperson, No. 2-96-12, 1996 WL 562052, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 1,
1996) (non-marital child) (same); see also In re Marriage of Douglass, 252 Cal. Rptr. 839,
844 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Father's assumption mother may again change her name, while
speculative, is not unreasonable in view of her history."); Hamby v. Johnson, 769 P.2d 273,
280 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (mentioning and rejecting trial court's reasoning on this point).
434. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 926 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (non-marital
child); see also supra note 433 and cases cited therein.
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nymics by encouraging courts to assess the likelihood that a child's
name will be changed again in the future and by assuming that such a
change would be harmful to the child.
3. Child's Interest in Avoiding Stigma of Illegitimacy
Many courts applying the best interest test inquire into whether
a surname subjects the child to stigma or ridicule. Courts not only
consider stigma arising from a true fact (for example, that the child's
father is a notorious criminal), but also stigma arising from the infer-
ence, whether true or false, that a child who bears his or her mother's
surname is illegitimate.435 Children of unmarried mothers customar-
ily take their mothers' surnames,436 although many non-marital
children take their fathers' surnames.437 Statutes in some states still
require that a non-marital child assume the mother's surname absent
an agreement between the parents, or at least until legitimization oc-
curs or paternity is established.43 Fathers who are litigating surname
435. See LEBELL, supra note 32, at 31 (stating that it is the fear the child will be labeled
"illegitimate" that contributes to patronymics generally); MacDougall, supra note 24, at
152 ("One of the spoken and unspoken objections to recognizing a child's right to bear its
mother's surname has been that, because customarily non-marital children are known by
their mothers' surnames, society will stigmatize marital children as 'illegitimate' if they
also carry their mothers' surnames."); Maclean, supra note 100, at 98 (arguing one obtains
symbolic illegitimacy by public rejection of the father's name); cf. In re Maliszewski, 615
N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (changing child's surname would wrongly imply to third
parties that the child is the natural or adopted daughter of the custodial parent's current
husband).
436. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 202; see, e.g., Cardinal v. Perch, 611 A.2d 515, 517
n.2 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1991) (explaining that before 1989, when the State Solicitor made ex-
plicit that the practice was not to continue, "Delaware hospitals frequently refused to
allow mothers of illegitimate children to give the children any surname except their
own."); Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 366 N.E.2d 717, 720
(Mass. 1977) (noting that for over two hundred years, this was the custom and practice in
Massachusetts with respect to the recording of births by city and town clerks); Bobo v.
Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180, 183-84 (Ohio 1988) (stating that at early common law "it became
the custom that an illegitimate child assumed the mother's surname at birth").
437. See Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10, at 40-41 (stating that it was "common
practice" for the child to assume the fathers' names prior to wedlock in couples where the
mother married the father after delivery, and that 43% of the boys and 46% of the girls
assumed their fathers' last names even when their parents remained unmarried throughout
the study); see also LEBELL, supra note 32, at 31-32 ("Whether or not a child's mother
keeps her maiden name, parents tend to give their children their father's last name even
when the parents are not married.").
438. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-205(e)(1)-(5) (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-
9(e)(1)-(5) (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-13 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-34(B)(1)(a)(iv) (West Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02.1-13(6) (1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.09(F) (Anderson 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-13.3
(Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-305(b)(1)-(2) (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-
411(d) (Michie 1994). For cases discussing the various state statutes that require or re-
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disputes sometimes assert that if the child adopts the maternal sur-
name, the child will suffer societal opprobrium as an apparent
"bastard." '439 When courts accept the equation between the matro-
nym and illegitimacy, they engage in a subtle, but real, form of
sexism.
Many judges have expressed the concern that a child might be
labeled illegitimate if the child does not bear the patronym. For ex-
ample, upon the establishment of paternity in one case, the trial
court felt "very strongly" that the child should have the father's sur-
name:
I want you to understand how I feel about that .... I think
in this society it's obvious to everyone who wants to give
her difficulty about it that she was born out of wedlock. My
feeling is it's just one more cross that she shouldn't have to
bear. If she has her mother's name she may as well have
CBOW [child born out of wedlock] tattooed on her fore-
head."'
Other judges have expressed similar sentiments."' Yet courts' con-
quired the practice, see, e.g., In re Pizziconi, 868 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993);
M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543,545 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994); Bobo, 528 N.E.2d at 184;
In re Lott, No. 02A01-9507-JV-0015, 1996 WL 383299, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10,
1996).
439. See infra note 441.
440. Garrison v. Knauss, 637 N.E.2d 160, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing trial court).
While the appellate court found that the trial court's views were unsupported by the rec-
ord, the appellate court did not indicate that the view was inappropriate. See id. at 161-62.
441. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 586 n.1 (Cal. 1980) (en banc)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that "use of mother's surname may subject the child to the
unjustified stigma of illegitimacy"); D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (stating that changing the non-marital child's name to that of his father would avoid
a "fair indication that the child is illegitimate"); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d
303, 307 (Md. 1985) (holding that child should bear father's surname); Cohee v. Cohee,
317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Neb. 1982) (rejecting trial court's reasoning on this matter and or-
dering that child bear hyphenated surname); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477,
481 (App. Div. 1994) (changing child's surname to father's "merely reinforces the princi-
ple of legitimacy"); Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 701 (S.D. 1994) (Henderson,
Retired J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that natural mother's name
choice for child meant that "the child's birth name would be illegitimate"); In re Harris,
236 S.E.2d 426,429 (W. Va. 1977) (commenting that "a child's bearing a woman's maiden
name does give fair indication that the child is illegitimate"); see also Thornton, supra note
42, at 307 ("Governmental interests purportedly advanced by requiring a legitimate child
to assume a particular surname include ... in the case of paternal surname laws, avoiding a
presumption of illegitimacy that might arise if the child were given the mother's birth-
given surname .... "); cf Beyah v. Shelton, 344 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Va. 1986) (refusing to
allow non-marital child who had father's surname to change to mother and stepfather's
surname even though mother contended it would prevent others from embarrassing the
child with questions about the child's origin); Katharine Tummon, Re Paula and Wright:
Children's Surnames and the Equality of Married Women, 1 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 547, 548
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cerns about the stigma of illegitimacy are ironic when a dispute in-
volves a marital child. Courts tend to deny name change petitions
instituted by fathers of non-marital children who want their children
to bear their surnames."2 So while courts "protect" marital children
from the stigma of illegitimacy by requiring these children to bear
their fathers' surnames, even though these children are legitimate,
the courts continue to allow non-marital children-who, according to
the argument, need the protection-to bear their mothers' surnames
and to be labeled as illegitimate.
Moreover, determining a child's birth status from the child's
surname is an exercise fraught with complications. Of course, some
marital children bear their mothers' birth names or their mothers'
remarried names; both of these names probably differ from the
names of the children's biological fathers. To confuse matters fur-
ther, non-marital children can bear their fathers' surnames.43 As one
judge wisely observed:
The use of mother's maiden name is not an indication of il-
legitimacy without knowledge that, in fact, the surname is
the mother's maiden name. People who know the mother
(1986) (explaining that a requirement that married women give their children their hus-
band's surnames, later held to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was
based upon this concern). But see In re Toelkes, 545 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Idaho 1976)
(reversing trial court decision denying petition to change child's name to mother's sur-
name); In re Wheat, 794 S.W.2d 710,714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting assumption that it
is detrimental for a child and mother to have the same surname); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769
P.2d 273, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that it was in the best interest of the chil-
dren to have their mother's surname); Lufft v. Lufft, 424 S.E.2d 266, 268 (W. Va. 1992)
("[T]here is little reason to fear the stigma of illegitimacy today.").
442. See Doll, supra note 27, at 245-46 & nn.128-29 ("[The] times when women succeed
in such disputes are more often situations in which the father asks for the change of a non-
marital child's name to his, either in a separate action or during a paternity proceeding.
On the other hand, women tend to lose contests for the modification of their marital chil-
dren's name when the parties are divorced."); see id. at 246 nn.128-29 (finding that out of
15 reported appellate cases involving non-marital children between 1985 and 1990, women
succeeded in 10 of them; in 14 cases involving marital children during the same time pe-
riod, women succeeded in only 6 of them). Doll attributes this phenomenon to the fact
that "traditions die harder in cases of divorced couples" and "nonmarital children usually
have never borne the patronymic [so] the father's interest, if any, cannot be as extensive as
when the children have used his surname." Id at 247. An additional reason women may
prevail is that the father normally bears the burden of proof in these non-marital child
cases. See, e.g., Durham v. McNair, 659 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Of
course, women do not always prevail in disputes over non-marital children's surnames. In
fact, the Indiana Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that strongly supports giving
a non-marital child the father's surname if the father pays support, exercises visitation, and
participates in the life of his child. See In re Paternity of Tibbitts, 668 N.E.2d 1266, 1269
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
443. See supra note 437.
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well enough to know her maiden name will doubtless also
know whether she has ever been married and whether the
child is illegitimate. Others, who do not know mother so
well, will not be aware that the name shared by mother and
child is actually mother's maiden name and will not be sur-
prised by the fact that mother and child have the same
surname. Rather, a child bearing a different name from the
mother is as likely, if not more so, to raise inquiry as to the
circumstances resulting in the name discrepancy.'
Courts and others have, at times, failed to grasp this complexity."5
Even assuming that one can infer a child's legitimacy from his or
her surname, severe legal "stigma" no longer attaches to the non-
marital child status."6 Sixteen states have adopted the Uniform Par-,
entage Act,"'7 which eliminates distinctions between non-marital and
marital children, and three states have adopted substantially similar
444. D.R.S, 412 N.E.2d at 1268 (Shields, J., dissenting).
445. For example, in computing census data, the California Division of Vital Statistics
has gone so far as to assume illegitimacy if the mother and father have different surnames,
even if the child bears the paternal surname. See Ann Bancroft, What's in A Name? Le-
gitimacy, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 4,1996, at N8.
446. Writer Marie Maclean has suggested that illegitimacy, coupled with use of a
mother's surname, actually benefits children because it is "an oppositional force, contained
by society but nevertheless individually enabling." Maclean, supra note 100, at 103. This
"double exclusion" has been for some people "positive freedom from the law of the Fa-
ther." Id at 100; see also id. at 100-01 (arguing that the names of two mythic female
bastard revolutionaries, Olympe de Gouges and Flora Tristan, gave them power to reject
the patriarchal order). She summed up the value of the double exclusion:
Instead of the schizoid divisions and rigid gendering of conventional social codes,
delegitimization involves a conscious exploitation of difference and multiplicity.
My argument runs something like this: one can look at naming, and hence at ge-
nealogy, in two ways, either as a direct line, the male name, law, the arbitrary,
convention; or one can look at it as a line of flight, in which the name of the
mother, because it constantly shifts sideways, and can never be grasped, is the
ground of difference and not merely of absence.
What illegitimacy does, by making the line of flight tangible and by
breaking the continuity of the name, is to actualize transgression, but also to
point to a way of using drift for one's own purposes. So one can argue that ma-
triarchy merely substitutes another form of the symbolic order in its law, whereas
illegitimacy, especially when not socially reintegrated, offers a genuine disconti-
nuity. Myths of ex-centricity [sic], of boundaries and extremes, of inclusion and
exclusion, encourage the enactment, in discourse or in life, of the belief that the
exception [bastardy] can always overcome the rule.
Id. at 105-06.
447. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). The following states have
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. See UNIFORM LAW COMM'RS, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 101 (1996-97 Reference).
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legislation. 448 Various United States Supreme Court cases have ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny to legal distinctions drawn between
children based upon the marital status of their parents."9 The Child
Support Enforcement Act has helped further erode state law distinc-
tions." Social stigma also has been minimized, in part, due to the
increase in the number of non-marital children. 1
A court's refusal to allow a marital child to bear the mother's
surname for fear that the child will be labeled a bastard builds upon
the double standard that attends an unmarried mother's predica-
ment. While society generally tolerates men who engage in non-
marital sex,452 women are upbraided for their sexual transgressions.4
Unmarried fathers escape public condemnation, but unmarried
pregnant women, with their "protruding profile," represent a more
obvious financial burden on taxpayers and thus a more obvious tar-
get.4  Society allows these women to remedy their transgression of
society's double standard by accepting a man into their lives, if not
through marriage, then at least by their children's use of the patro-
nym upon establishment of paternity.4 As one author explained,
"The notion of illegitimacy is a convention by which a woman and
her child are to be despised unless they acknowledge the role, the
448. See UNIFORM LAW COMM'RS, supra note 447, at 101 (citing Illinois, Ohio and
Texas).
449. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535,
538 (1973).
450. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A) (1994).
451. In 1990, of the children living in female-headed households, approximately 32%
had a mother who had never married. This percentage has increased steadily across the
last four decades. The percentage was 3.9% in 1960, 9.3% in 1970, and 15.5% in 1980.
See BLANKENHORN, supra note 335, at 18 tbl. 1.2.
452. See CLARK E. VINCENT, UNMARRIED MOTHERS 3-4 (1961).
453. See id. at 3-5. In 1980, scholars noted, "[L]ittle has changed during the past two
decades." Furstenberg & Talvitie, supra note 10, at 31.
454. See VINCENT, supra note 452, at 4; Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking Dependency:
The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181, 2192 (1995) ("Intimate groups
that do not conform to this model [the nuclear family] historically have been labeled
'deviant' and subjected to explicit state regulation and control justified by their noncon-
formity .... The broad general target is unmarried women with children, and the attacks
on these mothers are the opening salvo of a reactionary plan to discipline women who do
not conform to the roles they are assigned within the traditional scheme of the family.");
id. at 2197 (explaining that unwed mothers are singled out as the cause of crime, poverty,
and societal decadence); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106(1995) (describing how unmarried mothers on public assistance are characterized as
"constituting the cause as well as the effects of poverty"); id. at 101-18 (discussing the
perceptions regarding unmarried mothers and poverty).
455. See supra text accompanying note 438.
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fact of the father. And this is done by conferring the father's name
on the child." ' To require a marital child to bear the patronym res-
urrects all of these sentiments, albeit in a context in which they are
totally inapposite.
A woman seeking to change her marital child's surname to her
own surname probably will confront, either explicitly or implicitly, a
court's bias against the non-marital child status. When the best in-
terest inquiry is skewed by an assumption that the maternal surname
carries the stigma of bastardy, the supposed gender-neutrality of the
best interest standard is highly suspect.
4. Motives of Moving Parent
While it may appear unexceptional for the court to evaluate the
moving parent's motives for instituting a name change action, this
consideration can actually work a hardship upon women. The
mother is almost invariably the moving party.4 7 The court rarely
questions the motives of the nonmoving party, who is usually the fa-
ther, although this information is as relevant to the best interest
inquiry as are the mother's motives. Even when both parents need
to explain their motives, courts sometimes devalue mothers' state-
ments about their motives, making it unlikely that courts will find
mothers' reasoning persuasive. In contrast, fathers' claims of
"tradition," "custom" and "right" still hold some sway with courts.
A woman seeking to change her child's surname is typically the
custodial parent.458 She frequently wants the child's surname to
match her own surname or the surname of other household members
for the purpose of demonstrating physical propinquity.4 19 But courts
have never considered this notion of associationalism to be a
"fundamental interest" or a "right," nor have they even made it an
enumerated factor to consider under the best interest inquiry. As a
consequence, and because women's views are often devalued in gen-
eral,460 a woman's articulation of her motive sounds more like a mere
456. LEBELL, supra note 32, at 42.
457. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 49.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 262-69.
460. See Chodorow, supra note 60, at 174-76; see, e.g., BECKER ET AL., supra note 60, at
563 (stating that throughout the law and policy debates over the birth and care of children
"one theme reappears: the legal, economic and social devaluation of the work of raising
children-either because the care of children has traditionally been 'women's work' or
because child care is undervalued in its own right and has therefore become women's
work. Yet women themselves value their relationship to their children with an intensity
the economic system does not share."); West, supra note 60, at 58 ("Nurturant, intimate
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description of her family's living arrangement: it rings hollow.
Because associationalism is sometimes given little or no weight
by the courts,461 particularly because the advantages of associational-
ism have not been translated into benefit for the child, women at
times emphasize secondary considerations for their petitions. For
example, women claim that changing their children's surnames
would make the women's lives "less confusing" or would reduce
their "embarrassment. 4 62 While these considerations may be salient
for many women, Kupper's investigation of why women keep their
birth names upon marriage suggests that these arguments are
"generally cited only as secondary factors in women's decisions.
Usually, the primary factors involved more positive convictions. 4 63
In Kupper's study, the positive convictions included, among other
things, the desire to declare publicly a connection to the woman's
birth family.464 Various factors suggest that women may also have
"more positive convictions" for changing their children's surnames
than their expressed motives sometimes reflect, including a woman's
own naming experience, the custom that a child in the intact family
bears the parents' surname, a woman's social validation as mother,
and the benefit of associationalism for children.465 I believe the most
powerful, positive, and sometimes unspoken motivation for women
in these contests is their commitment to associationalism: the belief
that a surname functions as a highly symbolic instrument to proclaim
physical propinquity.
When a woman emphasizes her secondary reasons for changing
her children's surname, the persuasiveness of her argument declines.
Not only is her enthusiasm for a common surname tempered by the
labor is neither valued by liberal legalism nor compensated by the market economy.").
The general devaluation of things female may also have an essential component. See, e.g.,
CHODOROW, supra note 60, at 185 (stating that exclusive maternal care "creates men's
resentment and dread of women" and through this process "men come to reject, devalue,
and even ridicule women and things feminine").
461. See infra text accompanying notes 502-05; see also supra text accompanying note
413.
462. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, No. 20469, 1996 WL 507218, *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 6,
1996) (" 'I think it would be confusing when he gets in school and my name is Gintz and his
isn't.' "(quoting mother in trial transcript)), rev'd No. 79376, 1997 WL 133418, at *4 (Mo.
Mar. 25, 1997) (en banc); infra note 466. Women also emphasize their children's embar-
rassment. See infra Section IV.B.5.
463. KUPPER, supra note 54, at 48. Kupper found that arguments such as convenience,
simplicity, credit, or laziness were only secondary factors in women's decisions. See id. at
47-48.
464. See id. at 33.
465. See supra notes 50, 121, 250, 271 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
notes 479-87, 615-24.
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omission or deemphasis of her associationalist justification, but the
"convenience" and "embarrassment" arguments carry little weight in
the best interest inquiry, especially when counter-balanced by a fa-
ther's "right" to have his child bear his surname.466 The father's
interest is considered historical and important, while the mother's
interest is considered pedantic, if not selfish.467
Even if a judge accords substantial weight to the woman's sec-
ondary arguments, the court may resolve the mother's concerns to
the mother's detriment. For example, in Neal v. Neal,465 the court
accepted that it might be embarrassing and inconvenient for a custo-
dial mother and child to bear different surnames, but remedied the
problem by ordering that the child's name be changed to the father's
surname and that the custodial mother be denied restoration of her
466. See D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("Several courts
have rejected the argument that a child should forfeit the paternal surname to lessen ma-
ternal inconvenience or confusion; the father's interest in having the child bear the
paternal surname is deemed more significant than the mother's interest in avoiding embar-
rassment." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 540 P.2d 1277, 1280 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1975); In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968), overruled by In re Marriage of
Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1980) (adopting best interests test); In re Marriage of Pres-
son, 465 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. 1984); In re Mattson, 608 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-88 (Ill. App. Ct:
1993) (non-marital child); In re Paternity of Tibbitts, 668 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (non-marital child); Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Ky. 1990); West v.
Wright, 283 A.2d 401,404 (Md. 1971); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 538 A.2d 779, 781 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1988); Hall v. Hall, 351 A.2d 917, 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Robinson v.
Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. 1974); In re Seif, 243 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (Sup. Ct.
1963); In re Simon, 148 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16-17 (City Ct. 1955); In re Otis, 126 N.Y.S.2d 651,
654-55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988); Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 701 (S.D. 1994) (Henderson, Retired J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part); Beyah v. Shelton, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Va. 1986) (non-
marital child); Flowers v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 1977); Karnezis, supra note 51, at
1095 ("Because the father's interest in having the child bear the paternal surname is usu-
ally given significant consideration in weighing his opposition to the name change, the
contention that a child's name should be changed merely to save the mother from incon-
venience, embarrassment, or confusion is ordinarily given little or no consideration.");
Shipley, supra note 51, at 915 (same).
467. For example, when a woman remarried less than two weeks after her divorce de-
cree was entered, the court attributed to the mother's self-serving interests her application
on behalf of her two minor children. The judge wrote:
I had the distinct impression that she wished to hide the failure of her first mar-
riage, and that her convenience would be promoted more than her children. I can
see no reason why this court should serve the interests of those who arrange their
marriage relationship for their own convenience and seek our aid to relieve them
of the embarrassment it gives them.
In re Simon, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
468. No. 20469, 1996 WL 507218 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1996), rev'd No. 79376, 1997
WL 133418, at *4 (Mo. Mar. 25, 1997) (en bane).
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birth name.469 Absent was any sort of recognition, implicit in associa-
tionalism, that the shared surname should be one of the custodial
parent's choice.
In sum, the standard requirement that a moving party state a
"motive" is not as gender-neutral as it appears on its face. Women's
motives are scrutinized more often than are men's, and women's
concerns are accorded less weight than those of men.
5. Child's Interest in Avoiding Embarrassment or Discomfort
In the best interest analysis, courts consider whether the child
might feel embarrassment or discomfort bearing a surname different
from the rest of the custodial family. This factor arguably overlaps
with the concept of associationalism,47" although the two considera-
tions are distinct. The concepts differ because the "discomfort
factor" focuses on the problems a child encounters from bearing a
particular surname, as opposed to the salutary reasons to label
household family members with one surname. The discomfort factor
also does not aid in achieving a common surname for the custodial
family if the child is ambivalent about sharing the custodial family's
surname or if the child wants to retain the non-custodial parent's
surname.
While a child's embarrassment or discomfort is obviously impor-
tant to the best interest inquiry, courts do not always accept the
argument that a particular child's emotional well-being requires that
the child bear the same cognomen as his or her custodian.47" ' The ar-
469. See id. at *4.
470. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Douglass, 252 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (Ct. App. 1988)
("The mother's argument centered around the fact that she and her two sons, aged six and
eight, all share the same last name .... She expressed concern the child will bear an em-
barrassment or discomfort from having a surname different from the rest of his family
members with whom he resides.").
471. See Degerberg v. McCormick, 187 A.2d 436,440 (Del. Ch. 1963) ("In the absence
of such misconduct on the part of the father as to bring shame and disgrace upon the child,
this defense [that it would be embarrassing and humiliating to the child to carry the fa-
ther's surname] has been consistently rejected by the courts .... So, also, has the
argument that refusal to permit a change of name to coincide with other members of the
stepfather's household would give the child a feeling of insecurity."); In re Mattson, 608
N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (II1. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that teasing of young non-marital child on
three occasions by classmates that caused some confusion and embarrassment "is insuffi-
cient to demonstrate clearly that a change is in her best interest"); In re Spatz, 258 N.W.2d
814,815 (Neb. 1977) (rejecting psychiatrist's testimony that it would be best for children to
bear mother's and stepfather's name because "they were sensitive children who were in
need of a stable home situation and identity and it would be detrimental to their personal-
ity growth and development for them to be called by a name other than Laflan"); Michael
D.L. v. Martha P. and Charles P., 203 N.Y.L.J. 28, col. 5 (May 11, 1990) (App. Div. 1990)
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gument has had the least impact in states like New York, where
courts require a compelling reason to change a child's name: Confu-
sion and psychological disadvantage to the child are insufficient,
without more, to justify the name change.r 2
Courts that have minimized the importance of the "discomfort"
(dismissing child psychiatrist's testimony about the dire consequences that would befall the
children if they took the surname of their non-custodial father; there would be no change
in the composition of their family unit and the prediction seemed unlikely, especially" '[i]n
this day of divorce and remarriage'" (quoting guardian ad litem in the case)); Nitzberg v.
Board of Educ., 104 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (rejecting mother's argument that
"child will lack a sense of security unless he can 'completely identify himself with his own
home'" and instead stressing the "usual custom" of succession to the paternal surname
and the possible barrier between father and child); Simon, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17 (rejecting
claim that children feel insecure from having father's surname and not stepfather's and
mother's surname because "[t]here can be no stronger bulwark for their character or
greater aid to their emotional maturity than to identify themselves with a father who loves
them"); Dolgin v. Dolgin, 205 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965) (ordering reinstate-
ment of father's surname after mother changed children's names to that of stepfather);
Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964, writ granted) (denying name
change application despite uncontested psychologist's testimony that "change of name
would benefit the minor in that it would relieve him of the embarrassment and emotional
upset involved in explaining why he has a different name than that of the household in
which he lives"); see also Thornton, supra note 42, at 326 ("Courts usually deny name
changes when they are requested primarily for the purpose of integrating a child into a
new family unit, reasoning that the biological father's interest in maintaining his relation-
ship with the child is of greater importance."). But see Clinton v. Morrow, 247 S.W.2d
1015, 1017 (Ark. 1952) (affirming trial court's decision to allow name change to child's
stepfather's name); Delaney v. Appeal from Probate, No. Cv9305212095, 1993 WL
328611, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 1993) (allowing name change to mother's birth
name based in part on psychological testimony); Binford v. Reid, 63 S.E.2d 345, 346 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1951) (permitting name change to mother's birth name); Jones v. Roe, 604
N.E.2d 45,48 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (refusing to allow name change of non-marital child to
name of natural father); Aitkin County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906,
909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to allow name change of non-marital child to non-
custodial father's surname); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Neb. 1990) (allowing
divorced mother to change children's names to her premarital surname); In re Shawn Scott
C., 520 N.Y.S.2d 821, 821 (App. Div. 1987) (refusing to allow name change of non-marital
child to natural father's surname); In re Robinson, 344 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (Civ. Ct. 1972)
(granting application to change child's name from her natural father's name to her stepfa-
ther's name); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420,423-24 (Tex. 1968) (upholding trial court's
decision to allow first name and surname change of child, so that child used stepfather's
surname); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (allowing name
change to custodial mother's surname).
472. See In re Maliszewski, 615 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1994); see also Good v.
Stevenson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983 (Fain. Ct. 1982) ("Embarrassment from having a differ-
ent name than the mother and inconvenience therefrom to the mother have been held to
be an insufficient basis for changing a child's name."); Simon, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 14 ("The
children can never be confused or embarrassed by the use of the name of their father who
loves them and is willing to spend time and effort in their guidance."); Nitzberg, 104
N.Y.S.2d at 421 (finding without merit the argument that the child "will lack a sense of
security" unless he took his stepfather's surname).
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criterion have done so for a variety of reasons, including the follow-
ing: other jurisdictions' hostility to the argument and the apparent
lack of academic literature supporting the argument. One court ob-
served that "'the cases of other jurisdictions almost uniformly have
rejected contentions that a child's psychological health requires that
his name conform to that adopted by his mother on remarriage.' ,,171
Another court found no academic literature to help it determine
what the psychological effects might be.474 Even psychological testi-
mony that a child would benefit from a name change has been
discounted in the absence of academic research on this topic.473 The
court in one case went so far as to dismiss a psychologist's opinion
because it was not based on any medical research, studies, or trea-
tises.4 76 Another court exhibited a distrust of psycho-social evidence
generally.
477
A review of the psychological literature establishes that courts
have correctly recognized the lack of academic studies specifically
addressing this particular point.478 Yet some available research does
indicate that a child's psychological well-being may benefit from
sharing the physical custodian's surname. For example, social sci-
ence literature suggests the importance to children of coherent
blended families that accept them,4 79 as well as the benefit of a secure
custodial parent-child bond after divorce.4' As some courts have
473. In re Marriage of Omelson, 445 N.E.2d 951, 957 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting In re
Lone, 338 A.2d 883, 887 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)).
474. See Lone, 338 A.2d at 887.
475. See, e.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn. 1981) (discussing testimony
that name change would be beneficial for child's self-esteem); Halloran v. Kostka, 778
S.W.2d 454, 455-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing testimony that child might experi-
ence embarrassment or anxiety if she were forced to use a different surname from that
used by her mother and adopted sisters).
476. See Halloran, 778 S.W.2d at 456.
477. See Dolgin v. Dolgin, 205 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
478. The review of the literature was done primarily through reviewing GRETA W.
STANTON, CHILDREN OF SEPARATION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PRO-
FESSIONALS (1994).
479. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 345, at 14 ("As much as anything else, he
[a child] needs to be accepted, valued, and wanted as a member of the family unit consist-
ing of adults as well as other children."); Lucile Duberman, Step-Kin Relationships, 35 J.
MARR. & FAM. 283, 292 (1973) ("Solidarity, the concept of themselves as one functioning
unit, must be carefully cultivated if it is to be achieved."); Patsy Skeen et al., Blended
Families: Overcoming the Cinderella Myth, YOUNG CHILDREN, Jan. 1984, at 64, 68
("Solidarity must be reestablished, and status, duties and privileges must be redefined in
the context of the new family system." (citation omitted)).
480. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 345, at 17, 20, 31; see also Wallerstein &
Tanke, supra note 335, at 311 ("All'of our work shows the centrality of the well-
functioning custodial parent-child relationship as the protective factor during the post-
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recognized, bearing the same surname as the custodial parent may
contribute to a child's feelings of acceptance and security.48' In addi-
tion, a shared surname may help some children adjust to divorce
and/or a new stepfamily. One study noted that same-surname step-
families experienced fewer painful consequences from the step-
relationships or from the process of adjustment.8 These families
also "may have been permitted to pass as 'normals' and allowed
greater privacy than they would have had if they were seen as step-
families. 483 Another study reported that seventy-one percent of its
adolescent subjects who lived in stepfamilies had different surnames
from other family members, and that eighteen percent felt that the
lack of a shared surname was stressful.484 Children in stepfamilies
who keep their non-custodial fathers' names "often feel embar-
rassed, particularly at school or church where the difference becomes
conspicuous. The child suddenly finds himself or herself having to
explain why he or she has a different name than his or her own
mother!" 5 Furthermore, common sense indicates that it can be very
important for a child to have the same surname as those with whom
he or she lives. As one court explained:
A child whose name is not changed may feel rejected by the
mother's resumption of her maiden name ... or the
mother's assumption of the surname of a new husband ....
Mother may be considered "deserving of rejection or con-
tempt" for the failure to share her new name with her child.
That same failure may be construed to be "an attempt by
his mother to deceive him as to his true identity," namely,
the child of his mother. It may be considered" 'a statement
by his mother and step-father that his true identity is a sham
divorce years. When courts intervene in ways that disrupt the child's relationship with the
custodial parent, serious psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the par-
ent.").
481. See Aitkin County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (non-marital child); see also Magiera v. Luera, 802 P.2d 6, 8 (Nev. 1990)
(finding that non-marital child may experience "confusion about her identity, difficulties in
school and society, and embarrassment among friends" unless she bears custodial mother's
surname).
482. Rachel Filinson, Relationship in Stepfamilies: An Examination of Alliances, 17 J.
COMP. FAM. STUD. 43, 57 (1986) ("Two-thirds of the stepfamilies had the same last name
although only a minority of stepchildren had been legally adopted by a stepfather."
(emphasis omitted)) (studying children who were related by blood to only one of the un-
married heterosexual adults cohabiting in the household).
483. See id
484. See Patricia Lutz, The Stepfamily: An Adolescent Perspective, 32 FAM. RE-
LATIONS 367,372 (1983).
485. HAROLD H. BLOOMFIELD, MAKING PEACE IN YOUR STEPFAMILY 75 (1993).
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and embarrassment to them and others.' ""'
Finally, the psychologists' testimony in the various cases tells a fairly
compelling story about the harm children can experience when their
surnames differ from their custodial parents' names.
48 7
Children themselves often indicate that they want to share the
same surname as their custodial parents. As one court noted,
"Children, as they grow older, generally prefer to use the name of
the parent with whom they live., 418  Yet children's preferences are
often ignored by courts.489 Disregarding children's views conveys to
486. In re Rossell, 481 A.2d 602, 605 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (quoting In re
Lone, 338 A.2d 883,887 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)); accord Rothstein Petition, 28 Pa.
D. & C.2d 665, 669 (C.P. Montg. 1962) (finding that childish curiosity, comment, and deri-
sion when a child has a different name than her mother are "bound to" adversely affect
child's personality).
487. See, e.g., Johnson v. Coggins, 184 S.E.2d 696,696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that
medical testimony showed older child suffered emotional disturbance because name dif-
fered from mother's); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Tex. 1968) (citing
pediatrician's testimony that there is "'quite a bit of emotional trauma to a child when he
suddenly finds out... that he doesn't have the same name as the family,'" and psycholo-
gist's testimony that he thought it "'psychologically... possible and probable that there
will be some impairment to the child if his name is changed back to William C. King II' ");
Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580,581 (Tex. App. 1964, writ. granted) (citing psychologist's
testimony that "change of name would benefit the minor in that it would relieve him of the
embarrassment and emotional upset involved in explaining why he has a different name
than that of the household in which he lives"); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 274 (Ut.
1989) ("[D]ifferent surnames in a family disrupt the children's identity with themselves
and their family, divide family unity, adversely affect security and could hinder develop-
ment."); see also supra notes 471, 475.
488. Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 421 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300
(Sup. Ct. 1979) (non-marital child).
489. See, e.g., Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(disregarding twelve-year-old child's preference); In re Marriage of Presson, 465 N.E.2d
85, 88 (III. 1984) (disregarding seven-year-old child's preference); In re Marriage of Omel-
son, 445 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (disregarding eight-year-old child's
preference); Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Ky. 1990) (disregarding twelve- and
fourteen-year-old children's preferences); Mark v. Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758, 761-62 (Mass.
1956) (minimizing importance of ten- and thirteen-year-old children's preferences); In re
Thomas, 416 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (minimizing importance of nine-and-a-
half-year-old child's preference); Lone, 338 A.2d at 885 (minimizing importance of six-
year-old child's preference); In re Sakaris, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013 (Civ. Ct. 1993)
(disregarding evidence of five-year-old child's preference); Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562,
567 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (disregarding seven-year-old child's preference); Replogle v. Replo-
gle, No. 01-01-9312-ev-00516, 1994 WL 228227, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 1994)
(rejecting evidence of seven-year-old child's preference); Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d
454,456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (minimizing importance of six-year-old child's preference);
Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984, no writ) (minimizing importance
of eleven- and fourteen-year-old children's preferences); In re Wilson, 648 A.2d 648, 651
(Vt. 1994) (noting that trial court disregarded five- and ten-year-old children's express
preferences because the " 'children tend to say what they believe the questioner wants to
hear' " (quoting trial transcript)).
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children that society gives little weight to the view that a name is an
associational label. ' In the end, the law frequently rebuffs children
in the same way it ignores their mothers.
Courts would benefit from a study assessing the importance to
the child of a shared surname with the custodial parent. However,
the absence of such research should not stop courts from accepting
the fact that children can suffer when their surnames differ from their
custodial parents' surnames. The lack of social science support (or
even expert testimony in some cases) has not hampered courts from
accepting the argument that the bond between non-custodial parents
and their children is affected by a name change. As one court ob-
served, it offends notions of equality to deny that a child's
psychological health may require changing the child's surname to
correspond with the rest of his family when the opposite argument is
readily accepted.49' While a court might elect to accept neither ar-
gument (or both arguments) until more research exists, it would be
rational for a court only to accept the "discomfort" argument. The
message implicit in the father-child bond argument (that love de-.
pends on a label) is problematic, while the same is not true of the
discomfort argument (that a name has associational significance).
Yet numerous courts do exactly the opposite. They readily accept
the parental-child bond argument, and ignore the discomfort argu-
ment. Consequently, these courts fail to recognize that
associationalism (articulated by some children as discomfort) should
be at least as important, if not more important, than the parent-child
bond argument in assessing the best interest of the child.
6. Any Other Factor Relevant to Child's Best Interest
A court's ability to consider any other factor relevant to the
child's best interest is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this
criterion allows courts to cloak further their preference for the pa-
ternal surname by finding obscure reasons to justify their choice. On
the other hand, the criterion potentially allows for consideration of
490. For a possible implication of such socialization, see David J. Herring, Exploring
the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for Permanency Planning for Children, 26
LOY. U. C-. LJ. 183, 236-38 (1995) (arguing that families are essential for developing
children's associational skills which are necessary for the proper functioning of a pluralistic
democracy).
491. See In re Rossell, 481 A.2d 602, 605 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). That court,
mocking fathers' traditional argument, stated: "It certainly could be concluded 'that the
realities are that the ... [mother's] name represents the ... [child's] identity, his ...
[maternity] and a remaining bond with his ... [mother].'" Id. at 605 (quoting Lone, 338
A.2d at 887-88).
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associationalism, but some courts decline this opportunity because
associationalism is not specifically enumerated or defined as a best
interest criteria (nor even raised by litigants in many cases).
Judges will almost certainly bring their personal beliefs to bear
when permitted to consider "any factor" they deem relevant. The
mostly male judiciary tends to harbor the same beliefs that are com-
mon to men generally. 2 In addition, some judges exhibit outright
hostility towards the perceived feminist influence behind nontradi-
tional naming decisions. For example, a federal judge in Oregon
ordered an attorney to use her husband's surname and to drop the
appellation "Ms." 493 The transcript in another case revealed that the
judge stated, " 'I absolutely think [giving a child his or her mother's
surname] is absolutely wrong. I am violently opposed to it. If they
want to play women's lib, then let them call it all by themselves.' """9
Other judges have a hard time departing from the traditional cultural
pattern. As one judge stated,
I need to be convinced that it is not in the best interest of
the child to bear his father's name. I've said many times
that it's the American way for a child to bear his father's
name, to grow up with the father's name. All of us have
our Father's name, everyone in the courtroom today.495
492. Most state court judges are men. See generally Marianne Githens, Getting Ap-
pointed to the State Court: The Gender Dimension, 15(4) WOMEN & POL. 1, 8 (1995)
(reporting that in 1989 nine percent of judges sitting on Maryland's state courts were
women). Men tend to be less inclined than women to accept nontraditional naming deci-
sions. See Scheuble & Johnson, supra note 67, at 753 (finding in study of college students
that "women are both far more accepting of nontraditional marital name choices and more
tolerant of choices made by others than are their male counterparts"). Yet just like men in
the general population, some male judges' views diverge from the "typical" male view.
For example, Judge Douglas Ginsburg married Hallee Morgan in 1981, an obstetrician-
gynecologist. Their daughter, born in 1985, is also named Hallee Morgan. Ginsburg ex-
plained his daughter's name by saying, "It is a modern marriage taken to the ultimate."
See Jacob V. Lamar, Jr., If at First You Don't Succeed- Reagan Picks Another Conservative
for the Court-or So He Hopes, TIME, Nov. 9, 1987, at 52,52.
493. See Tara Bradley-Steck, Judicial Decorum's Hit and Ms., OREGONIAN, July 14,
1988, at A14. The judge subsequently apologized. See Tara Bradley-Steck, Judge Apolo-
gizes for Ms.-Treatment, OREGONIAN, July 15, 1988, at A20.
494. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Shields, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting trial court); see also Keegan v. Gudahl, 525 N.W.2d 695, 701 (S.D. 1994) ("In
this day of law by acceleration and whirl, augured by the feminist movement in the field of
domestic relations, why not make an inaccurate certificate!") (chastising mother who omit-
ted father's name from child's birth certificate and gave child mother's surname)
(Henderson, Retired J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
495. In re Lott, No. 02A01-9507-JV-0015, 1996 WL 383299, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
10, 1996); see also Hall v. Hall, 351 A.2d 917, 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (" 'I just think
that it is just horrendous that a parent who has been divorced from her husband would
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Numerous gender bias reports hint at the fact that these examples
may not be isolated.496
Even if appellate courts vigilantly disallow favoritism for the
male surname when it is brought to their attention, litigants rarely
appeal. The following news report captures the slight probability
that a trial court's prejudice will be corrected by an appellate court:
Judge Harvey Moes, 65, of Hillsdale County First Judicial
Court in Michigan, refuses to let divorcing mothers stop
using their ex-husbands' names, saying that mothers
shouldn't have names different from their children. Judge
Moes appears to know his policy violates a Michigan law
that allows a woman to return to her birth name, since he
invites women to appeal, promising they'll win. "But," says
a local lawyer, "the majority of women in our county can't
afford the thousands in appeal costs." '497
In addition, cases like Dattilo v. Groth498 indicate that an appeal
does not always work, even when an error seems manifest. The trial
judge in Dattilo added the father's surname to a child's middle name
over the vehement opposition of both the child and the mother.
While the appellate court found that the trial court had incorrectly
required the mother to prove that the change would be harmful to
the child (even though the father had instituted the name change pe-
tition), it concluded that the evidence supported the ultimate
result.499 The dissenting judge disagreed, finding that the father pre-
sented no evidence that satisfied Illinois' statutory requirement of
clear and convincing proof. The trial court, in fact, had admitted that
"[t]here has not been a great deal of evidence along those lines" and
even attempt to change that child's name and, in a sense, cut off the parental rights of the
father. I was very upset about it.'" (quoting circuit court of Baltimore City chancellor));
MacDougall, supra note 24, at 158 ("Courts at all levels rarely evidence a judicial detach-
ment in ruling on the issue. To the contrary, they all but openly express their clear desire
to retain the traditional presumption of the paternal surname, particularly where children
are older."); Dannin, supra note 42, at 170 ("Many judges have been influenced by per-
sonal bias.... ."); cf. Judge Rules "--person" is Non Grata, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1976, at
41 (Justice John Scileppi, Suffolk County, denied petition to change name from Ellen
Donna Cooperman to Ellen Donna Cooperperson stating: "'This would truly be in the
realm of nonsense.' ").
496. See, e.g., Judith M. Billings & Brenda Murray, Introduction to the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias Task Force Report: The Effects of Gender, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 739 (1994)
(documenting states' efforts to eliminate gender bias in their court systems).
497. Sheila Weller, More of America's Most Sexist Judges, REDBOOK, Dec. 1994, at 88-
90. But see notes 468-69 and accompanying text (describing case where trial court denied
woman permission to resume use of birth name, but was reversed on appeal).
498. 584 N.E.2d 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
499. See id. at 198.
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that it did not hear "evidence to warrant that it would be in the best
interest of the child ... that the name be changed.""5 ' The trial
court's decision, and the appellate court's affirmance, seemed to be
based on the fact that "99% of the children in the United States bear
the name of their father .... It is something that is done. 5 1 Dattilo
v. Groth illustrates that judicial bias for the father's surname exists
among both trial and appellate judges.
While the open-ended best interest inquiry theoretically permits
courts to consider associationalism, not all courts do so. When a
court does discuss associationalism in its decision, the concept is not
usually employed in a manner consistent with women's views of its
meaning. For example, courts, at times, use associational language
synonymously with the parent-child bond argument."2 Or courts en-
tertain the belief that the relevant association may be between the
child and the non-custodial parent's relatives.0 3 Some courts believe
"association" means any parental connection, and require that the
child use a hyphenated name to "associate" the child to both par-
ents."4 These interpretations of "association" do not mirror the
500. See id. (Greiman, J., dissenting).
501. Id. at 199 (Greiman, J., dissenting).
502. For example, one court stated:
A name, in addition to furnishing a means of identifying a person, signifies a par-
ticular relationship between and among people .... The paternal surname tends
to identify the relationship between a father and his children .... The courts
should not interfere with the usual custom of succession of the parental surname
except under circumstances warranting a change for the best interest of the mi-
nor.
Carroll v. Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ark. 1978); see also In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 387
(Okla. 1980) (noting that a surname is an important component of the parent-child bond);
Sheppard v. Wright, 895 P.2d 748,748 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (arguing that a name change
may create a barrier between child and father).
503. See, e.g., Sobel v. Sobel, 134 A.2d 598, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) ("The
surname of Sobel is a family name, and when Daniel and Leonard were born, they were
born into the family name in common with other members of the Sobel family."); In re
Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992) (remanding case where mother had testified that boy
wanted the same name as mother and brothers to "cement his feeling of being a part of the
same family unit" and father testified that child should be encouraged to continue his iden-
tification with his paternal relatives).
504. In over one third of the cases mentioned infra in note 506, where the associational
argument prevailed, the child was made to use both the custodial and non-custodial par-
ents' names. An excellent example of how some courts interpret "associationalism"
differently than most women appears in the case of Michel D.L. v. Martha P. and Charles
P., N.Y.LJ., May 11, 1990, at 28 (Sup. Ct. 1990). After using equitable estoppel to find
that the mother's first husband was the children's father (he was not the biological father),
the court ordered that the children receive a hyphenated surname. See id. at 29. The court
explained that the use of both names acts as "an indicia" of each parent's "meaningful
association" with the child. See id. (citation omitted). The court continued, "Despite the
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understanding of most women that a shared surname should be
borne by family members who presently live together.
Even courts that consider the associationalist argument from the
woman's perspective rarely let this consideration trump other con-
cerns, especially a father's desire to maintain the parent-child bond
through his child's use of the patronym. As the California Supreme
Court stated: "The symbolic role that a surname other than the
natural father's may play in easing relations with a new family should
be balanced against the importance of maintaining the biological fa-
ther-child relations."5 5 In the end, courts usually accord more weight
to the maintenance of the father-child bond than to the "symbolic
role" of associationalism.
Yet some cases do exist in which the courts consider the impor-
tance of the surname as an associational label for those family
members living together, and some courts have given significant
weight to this consideration."6 For example, the court in In re
Craig"0 7 granted the name change petition based almost entirely on
the testimony of a twelve-year-old girl:
Lisa testified that she wanted to change her last name so
that she could have the same last name as her brothers, who
will attend the same school. She stated that she is very
close to her stepbrothers and that she wants to be known as
technical and legal reasons for permitting this hyphenated name, the result is also to pre-
serve and signify the relationship of the children both to their legal father ... and to the
parents with whom they live .... Id. The court valued participation by the father that
differed from the physical proximity that most women require for a shared surname. The
psychiatrist testified that the father "did not play a greatly significant role in these chil-
dren's lives," but the court emphasized his financial contribution. See id at 28-29.
505. In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579,583 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
506. See In re Marriage of Douglass, 525 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844-45 (Ct. App. 1988); Don v.
Don, 114 A.2d 203, 204 (Conn. 1955); Delaney v. Appeal from Probate, No.
CV930521209S, 1993 WL 328611, at *1-*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 1993); Cardinal v.
Perch, 611 A.2d 515, 517 n.2 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1991) (non-marital child); Aitkin County
Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (non-marital
child); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488,493 (Neb. 1990); M.D. v. A.S.L., 646 A.2d 543,546
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (non-marital child); K.K. v. G., 530 A.2d 361, 336-37 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (non-marital child); Spence-Chapin Serv. to Families and Chil-
dren v. Tedeno, 421 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (non-marital child); In re Williams,
381 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Aylsworth v. Adams, 736 P.2d 225, 226 (Or. Ct.
App. 1987) (non-marital child); Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P.2d 965, 966 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (non-marital child); In re Grimes, 582 A.2d 1386, 1387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); In re
Richie, 564 A.2d 239,241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (non-marital child); Rothstein Petition, 28
Pa. D. & C. 2d 665,669 (C.P. Montg. 1962); G.K. v. K.A., 936 S.W.2d 70,73 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996, n.w.h.) (non-marital child); Pintor v. Martinez, 202 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (non-marital child); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 279-80 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Doe v. Dunning, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (Wash. 1976) (en bane) (non-marital child).
507. 518 N.E.2d 728 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
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their sister. She also testified that she loves her stepfather,
and desires to have his name and the name of her family.
She stated that she did not want to change her name to dis-
associate herself from her natural father."
No other reasons were advanced for the name change apart from
Lisa's long-standing desire to change her name.09 Cases where asso-
ciationalism is valued, like In re Craig, provide persuasive authority
for the many courts that never consider the associational argument,
misinterpret the argument, or diminish its importance in a best inter-
est inquiry.5"0
Overall, the best interest standard, while touted for its gender
neutrality, is problematic for women. The standard incorporates fac-
tors that reflect the male view of the importance of surnames, and
deemphasizes or omits those components that reflect the female view
of the importance of surnames.
C. Custodial Parent Presumption
In response to claims that the standards governing name change
disputes were gender-biased,"' the custodial parent presumption de-
veloped. The custodial parent presumption affords legal protection
to the surname chosen by the custodial parent; the presumption gen-
erally makes the custodial parent's decision binding unless the other
parent meets the requirements of the state's name change statute.
While some states have enacted statutes that apply the presumption
to the naming of non-marital newborns,"' or to the naming of marital
newborns whose parents are separated or divorced at the time of the
child's birth,"3 the presumption has only recently been adopted to
50& Id. at 728.
509. See id.
510. The associational argument has been the most persuasive to courts when the facts
of the case do not involve a married couple who had lived together at the time of the
child's birth. Of the cases where women made an associational argument, see supra text
accompanying notes 262-69 & 506, and then prevailed, approximately 65% of those cases
involved non-marital children or children born after the father and mother had separated.
For a possible explanation why fathers tend to lose these cases, see supra note 442.
511. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 24-27 & 385.
512. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.013(5)(b) (West 1993) ("If the mother is not
married at the time of birth, the person who will have custody of the child shall select the
given names and surname of the child."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.046(8)(a) (Michie
1995) ("The surname of the child shall be any name chosen by the mother and father. If
there is no agreement, the child's surname shall be determined by the parent with legal
custody of the child.").
513. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.046(7)(a) (Michie 1996) (stating that if
mother was married at time of either conception or birth "[t]he surname of the child shall
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resolve name change petitions. While advocates had suggested the
use of the presumption in name change disputes from the 1940s on-
ward514 it was not until Justice Mosk's 1980 concurrence in In re
Schiffinan 5 that the judiciary seriously considered the presumption
as an option in these cases. 16 Since Schiffman, commentators have
advocated the widespread adoption of the presumption.17 However,
be any name chosen by the parents; however, if the parents are separated or divorced at
the time of the child's birth, the choice of surname rests with the parent who has legal cus-
tody following birth"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126:6-a(I)(a) (1996) ("[I]f the parents are
separated or divorced at the time of the child's birth, the choice of surname rests with the
parent who has actual custody following birth."); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 8:2-1.3(a)(1)
(1993) ("Where either parent is unavailable for any reason, the choice of a child's name(s)
rests with the parent who has custody of the newborn child."); 28 PA. CODE § 1.7(b)
(1975) ("If the parents are divorced or separated at the time of the child's birth, the choice
of surname rest with the parent who has custody of the newborn child.").
514. See In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968) (applying the presumption
when the father does not object), overruled by In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579
(Cal. 1980) (adopting best interests test); Montandon v. Montandon, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43, 45
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966); In re Cohn, 50 N.Y.S.2d 278,278 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Nitzberg v. Board
of Educ., 104 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423-24 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Reed v. Reed, 338 P.2d 350, 353-54
(Okla. 1959); see also Leavitt, supra note 42, at 115, 119-20 (suggesting adoption of the
custodial parent presumption). But see MacDougall, supra note 24, at 146 (explaining that
attorneys began advocating for this standard in the mid-1970s).
515. 620 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1990).
516. See ic at 584-85. While Justice Mosk claimed that the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana upheld the application of a rebuttable presumption in an almost identical case, see id.
at 584, Justice Mosk's characterization went far beyond the holding of the Louisiana court
in Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App. 1964). The Webber court held that a
father petitioning to change the name of a child born during the parties' separation and
named by the mother must allege "a sound reason why the name given would prove detri-
mental to the present or future welfare of the child." Webber, 167 So. 2d at 521. The
father's motion failed to give "any valid reason" why the change would be beneficial to the
child; rather he rested his argument on what he said was his "absolute legal right to name
the child." Id. at 522-23. Consequently, the father never met the burden of production,
and the burden of persuasion was not before the court. In Justice Mosk's concurrence, on
the other hand, he states that in Webber, "the burden of proof was unequivocally placed by
the court on the non-custodial parent." Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 584-85 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). In addition, the Webber court merely placed the burden of production on the party
moving for the change of a child's name. The custodial parent presumption as conceived
by Justice Mosk would shift the burden of production and proof to the non-custodial parent
when a custodial parent moves to change the child's name. See Shiffman, 620 P.2d at 584-
85.
517. See, e.g., Doll, supra note 27, at 261 (arguing that the divorce court already deter-
mined by its custody award that the "custodian represents the child's best interests" and
that the custodial parent "probably understands better the child's preferences"); MacDou-
gall, supra note 24, at 157 ("[L]egislatures must also be asked to address the custodial
parent presumption as a solution to resolving disputes between parents over their chil-
dren's names"); Urbonya, supra note 44, at 819-22 (advocating for the custodial parent
presumption unless the non-custodial parent can show new facts or changed circumstances
that would bar such a name change, such as remarriage or relocation, or unless the parents
had joint custody, in which case the court should determine a name dispute according to
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with only one exception, every court that has considered the stan-
dard in the name change context has rejected it."' Courts initially
rejected the presumption because the patronym was considered es-
sentially immutable;519 more recently, courts reject the presumption
because of the strong preference for the best interest analysis. 2
When rejecting the presumption, courts have tried to differentiate,
rather unsuccessfully, the naming decision from other decisions rele-
gated to the legal custodian.21
the child's best interests); Laura Anne Foggan, Note, Parents' Selection of Children's Sur-
names, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 583, 598 (1983) (arguing that adoption of the custodial
parent presumption would "properly recognize the custodial parent's child rearing author-
ity," lend predictability to name disputes, and discourage litigation between parents).
518. See Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[M]ost recent
court decisions have both rejected the notion that there is a preference for the paternal
name and failed to adopt a preference for custodial parent choice."); see, e.g., In re Schiff-
man, 620 P.2d 597, 583-84 (Cal. 1980); Montandon v. Montandon, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43, 45
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Neb. 1982) (We refuse to
suggest or hold that a presumption exists in favor of the custodial parent."); In re Wilson,
648 A.2d 648, 650 (Vt. 1994) (rejecting argument that best interest analysis should be
guided by a rebuttable presumption in favor of the custodial parent's preference); cf Las-
siter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 306 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that because
mother alone named child at birth, dispute over child's name was not a name change dis-
pute, which would be governed by a presumption for the status quo, but rather an initial
name dispute governed by the best interest of the child test, and child would receive fa-
ther's surname); In re Cohn, 50 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (rejecting argument that
selection of children's surname was an incident of mother's general guardianship). But cf.
J.N.H. v. G.A.H., 659 N.E.2d 644, 646-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that consent of
purported father of non-marital child was not required for name change because paternity
had not yet been established); Aitkin County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d
906, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (custodial parent's preference is relevant in best interest
inquiry absent evidence that change is detrimental to non-marital children's relationship
with father).
519. See, e.g., Cohn, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (arguing that the children "remain members of
the father's family," and "[t]hat status has been in no wise [sic] altered").
520. These courts state that it is solely the child's interest, and not the custodial par-
ent's preference, that should govern a determination. See, e.g., Hamby, 769 P.2d at 277
(noting that the child's best interests are "the paramount consideration"); Wilson, 648
A.2d at 650 (same); cf MacDougall, supra note 24, at 156 ("Because of the spoken and
unspoken fear that women will, as men have, impose their surnames on children irrespec-
tive of the children's best interests, it appears highly unlikely that legislatures will adopt a
comprehensive custodial parent presumption.").
521. For example, in Montandon, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 45, the court rejected the presump-
tion and claimed that a name decision is unlike a religious, cultural, educational, or
disciplinary decision, because the latter all "unite to reach a desired result without unnec-
essary traumatic experiences for the child." Id. The court felt that it was unnecessary to
allow the child's surname to be selected solely by the custodian, and the court feared that a
presumption would give a temporary legal custodian who was unrelated to the child enor-
mous power, potentially increasing the ward's traumatic experience. See id. The first
rationale is weak considering that a naming decision can have less impact on the child than
a decision where to send the child to school, or which religion, if any, to practice. The
second rationale disappears if a court limits the use of the presumption to parents. In Wil-
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Bucking the trend, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently
and unanimously adopted the custodial parent presumption to re-
solve a name change petition brought by the child's father. Gubemat
v. Deremer? involved a non-marital child who was given the
mother's surname at birth." The father, although initially refusing
to acknowledge paternity, later sought joint custody, increased visita-
tion, and a change of the child's surname. 24 The father wanted his
son to bear his surname because
I would want my son to recognize who his father is .... It is
important for me when he deals with other children as he
gets older to see that he, yes he does have a father and he
has a father who cares and will always be there for him."
The trial court ruled in the father's favor, except that it allowed the
mother to retain primary physical custody.26 In ordering that the
child assume the father's surname, the trial court emphasized "the
father's interest in maintaining his relationship with his child for
their mutual benefit"527 and the "father's desire to have progeny and
son, 648 A.2d at 650, the court rejected the presumption and said that name changes, un-
like decisions about religion and education, are overseen in the first instance by the court.
The Wilson court's explanation is unpersuasive if one considers the ability at common law
to change a name independent of court involvement. Laks v. Laks, 540 P.2d 1277, 1279
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) ("Under the common law a person had a right to change his name
without legal formality.... Statutes ... merely affirm and are in aid of the common law
rule."); Application of Sakaris, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010 (Civ. Ct. 1993) (statute "does not
diminish an individual's common law right to select an appropriate name"); see infra note
641. In addition, these other decisions made by the legal custodian can be brought to the
court's attention. See, e.g., Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 584 (Mosk, J., concurring) (commenting
on how "the noncustodial parent can seek a corrective court order if the child's health,
education or control are deleteriously affected by the abuse of custodial care"); Von
Tersch v. Von Tersch, 455 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Neb. 1990) (holding that "a custodial parent
... may determine the nature or extent of the education for a child legally affected by the
dissolution proceeding unless there is an affirmative showing that the custodial parent's
decision has injured or harmed, or will jeopardize, the child's safety, well-being, or health,
whether physical or mental"); Rust v. Rust, 864 S.W.2d 52,56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ("The
courts should not countermand [the custodial parent's education] decisions unless they (1)
are contrary to an existing custody order, (2) impose an increased, involuntary burden on
the noncustodial parent, (3) are illegal, or (4) will affirmatively harm the child"). Even if
the distinction made by the Wilson court is legitimate, the court in a name change case
could still give significant weight to the custodial parent's naming decision in exercising its
oversight.
522. 657 A.2d 856 (N.J. 1995).
523. See id. at 857.
524. See id- at 858.
525. Id.
526. See id. at 857.
527. Id.
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also to have someone carry on his name." '528 The trial court stated,
"It's a right that the father has."'5 29 The Appellate Division remanded
for clarification of the facts and conclusions leading to a determina-
tion that the name change was in the best interest of the child, but it
later affirmed.30 The Appellate Division stated that preserving the
child's paternal identity and the "resulting bond with his father"
ineluctably meant that the child's best interest required the patro-
nym.
531
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. 32 After detailing
the history of naming, the court emphasized that the law had begun
to accord greater respect for gender neutrality, particularly in the
area of parental rights.33 The court acknowledged the widespread
dissemination of the best interest inquiry into "almost every legal
disposition involving minors," and stated that the best interest stan-
dard would govern this dispute as well.534  Yet the court
acknowledged that the best interest test had been, at times, synony-
mous with the father's best interest, and that the paternal surname
should have no preference in determining the child's best interest. 35
The court rejected the myth that the strength of the father-child
bond depends upon the surname that the child bears. 36 The court
claimed that it could apply the best interest of the child standard
"free of gender-based notions of parental rights." '537 To attain gender
neutrality, the court adopted the following formulation:
The non-custodial parent bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that despite the
presumption favoring the custodial parent's choice of name,
the chosen surname is not in the best interests of the child.
Courts should examine scrupulously all factors relevant to
the best interests of the child and should avoid giving
weight to any interests unsupported by evidence or rooted
in impermissible gender preferences. 38
Although attractive at first blush, the New Jersey court's for




532. See id. at 870.
533. See id. at 865-66.
534. Id. (citation omitted).
535. See ida at 867.
536. See id; see also supra text accompanying notes 356-57.
537. Gubernat, 567 A.2d at 867.
538. Id at 869.
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mulation of the custodial parent presumption (which was similar to
Justice Mosk's formulation in In re Schiffnan) is potentially limited
in several respects. First, it is unclear if the standard applies outside
the non-marital child context-Gubernat involved a non-marital
child, and fathers traditionally lose these cases.' While In re
Schiffman involved a marital child, Schiffnan looked like a non-
marital child case: The child was born five months after the parties
had separated (only months before the parties divorced), and the
mother had entered her own surname on the birth certificate.4
Courts may be reluctant to extend the reasoning of Gubernat to
marital child cases where both parents played (or are presumed to
have played) an active role in raising their children prior to the di-
vorce.
Second, it is unclear if the standard applies outside of the infant
context. In originally recommending the adoption of the custodial
parent presumption, Justice Mosk stated that the presumption
should be used when the name selection involves "the original name,
or a name change for a child of tender years.""54 The child in Guber-
nat was of tender years: He was three years old when the supreme
court's decision was handed down.' 2 The implicit assumption is that
a name change for an older child is presumptively disadvantageous
(perhaps due to the length of time the child has used the surname).
Third, it is unclear if the presumption applies when a custodial
mother seeks to change the child's birth name from the patronym to
her surname. While the language of Gubernat may be broad enough
to cover that situation, Gubernat involved a non-custodial father who
sought to change his child's surname from the matronym.5 3 Simi-
larly, in Schiffnan, the child already bore the mother's surname.
Society's preference for the patronym and courts' emphasis on
nominal stability may make a court reluctant to apply the presump-
tion when a custodial mother has decided to change the child's
surname from the patronym.
Fourth, the custodial parent presumption does not necessarily
539. See supra note 442; see also J.S. v. D.M., 667 A.2d 394, 394-95 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (applying Gubernat in context of four-year-old non-marital child).
540. See In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579,580 (Cal. 1980) (en bane).
541. Id. at 584 (Mosk, J., concurring); see also Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 457
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing case of name change for six-year-old child from
Schiffman, where the mother gave the child at birth her name).
542. See Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 857.
543. See id. at 858; see also J.S., 667 A.2d at 395 (applying Gubernat to reject non-
custodial father's attempt to change non-marital child's surname).
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eliminate bias for the patronym. The New Jersey Supreme Court
characterized the custodial parent presumption as "strong," but "not
irrefutable."5" Justice Mosk called the presumption "rebuttable." 54
In fact, the presumption, as described in Gubernat, is rather weak. 6
It is a dressed-up version of the best interest test and shares many of
that test's shortcomings. The New Jersey court stated,
[W]e readily envision circumstances in which the presump-
tion could be rebutted. A young child who has used the
non-custodial surname for a period of time, is known to all
by that surname, expresses comfort with the continuation of
that surname, and maintains frequent contact with the non-
custodial parent might be ill-served by the presumption that
the assumption of the custodial surname would be in his or
her best interests. 47
Justice Mosk also said that the presumption could be "contested on
the ground that it is not in the child's best interest. ' 48
As many of the best interest factors incorporate a male concep-
tion of surnames (including those specifically mentioned by the
Gubernat court in the foregoing quotation), it appears doubtful that
the custodial parent presumption can completely eliminate the pro-
patronymy bias. The failure to specify exactly what evidence permits
refutation of the presumption means that judicial preference for the
patronym can still be easily cloaked, especially as the non-custodial
parent need only prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that[,]
despite the presumption[,]" the custodial parent's choice of name is
not in the child's best interest.5 49 Thus, the current formulation of the
custodial parent presumption is feckless.
Moreover, while the New Jersey Supreme Court cautioned that
lower courts should "avoid giving weight to any interests ... rooted
in impermissible gender preferences,""55 the supreme court did not
identify what all those impermissible gender preferences might be.
The court's comments certainly did not extend as far as this Article's
observations. Consequently, lower courts applying the new standard
544. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 869.
545. Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 584 (Mosk, J., concurring).
546. One author has framed the custodial parent's decision as being impervious to
challenge by the non-custodial parent. See Seng, supra note 24, at 1346. However, this is
not the formulation that has been adopted by the courts.
547. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 869.
548. Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 584 (Mosk, J., concurring).
549. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 869.
550. Id.
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lack guidance on how to comply with the supreme court's edict.
In addition, language at certain points in the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's opinion and in Justice Mosk's concurrence may
undermine the attempt to neutralize the sex bias attending the best
interest inquiry. For example, when the New Jersey court criticized
the widely held assumption that the parent-child bond can be af-
fected by a child's surname, the court also implied that if empirical or
circumstantial evidence had been produced, the inference might have
been permissible."' The court did not indicate what sort of evidence
would suffice. Similarly, Justice Mosk, imagining that most litigants'
children would already be using the custodian's surname, suggested
that a court's orientation be in favor maintaining the status quo. He
cited Donald J. v. Evna M. for authority:
[W]here a child has used a particular surname for a substan-
tial period of time without objection by either natural
parent, the court, upon petition, of one of the natural par-
ents to change the child's surname over objection of the
other natural parent, should exercise its power to change
the child's surname reluctantly, and only where the substan-
tial welfare of the child requires the change.".
This conservatism favors nominal stability-a value not held by most
women-and may work against the outcome women seek. In fact, it
is probably more common that women have acquiesced in their chil-
dren's use of paternal surnames than vice versa.
Finally, the new presumption does not require that a court con-
sider the merit of associationalism when the non-custodial parent
tries to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the presumption is
fundamentally inadequate: there is no guarantee that associational-
ism will be valued, or even considered, at all.
Since this new standard is touted as a plausible alternative to the
best interest test, it is worth exposing another major problem with
the standard, as formulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.5 3
Simply, the presumption blurs the line between physical and legal
custody, and does so with no coherent theoretical justification. Gu-
bernat allocates the presumption to "the parent who exercises
physical custody or sole legal custody." '54 A joint legal custodian,
like Mr. Gubernat, is put in the same position as a father with no le-
551. See id at 870.
552. Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 585 (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting Donald J. v. Evna M.,
147 Cal. Rptr. 15,20 (Ct. App. 1978) (non-marital child)).
553. For additional criticism, see Seng, supra note 24, at 1347.
554. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
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gal custody.55 The court justifies giving the physical custodian so
much power because it "is rooted in a basic principle of family law-
that the parent having physical custody of the child is generally ac-
corded broad responsibility in making daily child-rearing
decisions." '  Yet normally the physical custodian can only make mi-
nor day-to-day decisions. 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court itself
has stated that legal custody involves the "authority and responsibil-
ity for making 'major' decisions regarding the child's welfare" and "is
often shared post-divorce by both parents," '558 while physical custody
involves "responsibility for 'minor' day-to-day decisions." '59  The
court is disingenuous when it equates a child's surname change with
a minor day-to-day child-rearing decision; even women who see a
surname as fungible and labile do not change their surnames daily,
or see their name changes as "minor." Other courts have character-
ized the choice of a child's surname as "a major decision that must be
shared under a joint custody agreement. '' 6
The Gubernat decision would not be so aberrational if it allo-
cated the presumption to the parent with physical custody and joint
legal custody. Gubernat would then be similar to other New Jersey
cases in various respects. For example, the New Jersey courts treat
physical custody subject to visitation in a joint custody decree the
same as sole custody for removal purposes56' and for child support
spending decisions. 62 Nor would the Gubernat decision be so ex-
traordinary if it allocated the presumption to the parent or parents
with legal custody, regardless of who had physical custody. A Penn-
555. See id. at 857. Joint legal custody is now a fairly common practice. See MACCOBY
& MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 107 (citing "overwhelming tendency" for California di-
vorce decrees to provide for joint legal custody); Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint
Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 167, 167 (1990) (claiming that approxi-
mately 80% of divorced parents have joint legal custody in California); Scott, supra note
12, at 635 ("Joint legal custody.., is now the prevailing norm in some jurisdictions.").
556. Gubernat, 657 A.2d at 868.
557. See Linda Hallmark & Laura Cheger Barnard, Recent Trends in Family Law: Joint
Custody and Third-Party Standing, 73 MICH. B.J. 642, 642 (1994) ("The primary physical
custodian may make routine decisions regarding the child, however a trial court may not
relinquish its authority to determine the best interests of the child to the primary physical
custodian.").
558. Pascale v. Pascale, 660 A.2d 485, 491 (N.J. 1995) (citing Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d
63, 66 (N.J. 1981)).
559. Id. at 491-92.
560. Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742,744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
561. See Christopher-Frederickson v. Christopher, 538 A.2d 830, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988).
562. See Pascale, 660 A.2d at 491-92 (citing Beck, 432 A.2d at 63).
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sylvania statute that allocates the choice of surname at birth to the
parent with' custody of the newborn (when the parents are separated
or divorced) has been held to refer "clearly" to "legal custody.
'563
Perhaps the most principled approach would have been for the New
Jersey court to emphasize that Ms. Deremer had physical custody
and sole legal custody when she named her son, since Mr. Gubernat
denied paternity. But the court's apparent desire to give the physical
custodian decision-making power in this area, even when the parents
share legal custody, meant that the case could not be decided in this
way.56 Of course, the court could have explicitly engaged in law re-
form and held that the physical custodian's authority should be
expanded in the context of children's name changes because of the
unique associational significance of a surname. That was not the
New Jersey Supreme Court's approach, but it is the solution advo-
cated below.
The Gub~rnat court's use of the disjunctive leaves ambiguous
the allocation of the burdens of production and proof when one par-
ent has sole physical custody and the other parent has sole legal
custody, 65 or when the parents have joint physical custody.56 6 If fu-
ture decisions limit Gubernat's odd formulation by confining its
holding to its facts (for Ms. Deremer did have physical custody and
sole legal custody when she named her son), the case has no utility
for the sole physical-joint legal custodian, or the sole physical-no le-
gal custodian, or even the joint physical custodian, who seeks to
563. See In re Schidlmeier by Koslof, 496 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). See
supra note 513 (setting out Pennsylvania statutory provision).
564. The court may have wanted to shield the name selection from a future challenge
by Mr. Gubernat. The trial court had awarded Mr. Gubernat joint legal custody simulta-
neously with its resolution of the naming issue. See Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856,
857 (NJ. 1995). By allocating the presumption to the parent with physical custody or sole
legal custody, Ms. Deremer's decision would remain insulated by the presumption.
565. This is a possible, although rare, situation. As the court in Schidlmeier, 496 A.2d
at 1253, explained, "[a]lthough the child may be in mother's physical custody, legal custody
may well rest with the natural father in cases of death or disability of the mother, agree-
ment between the parents, or perhaps by court order." Id. (clarifying that "custody" in 28
PA. CODE. § 1.7 (1986) refers to legal custody); see, e.g., Pyfrom v. Commissioner of the
Dep't of Public Welfare, 659 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (awarding tempo-
rary physical custody to father after mother's attempted suicide, but mother retained legal
custody, thereby entitling her to AFDC benefits); cf. Powell v. Powell, 249 P.2d 630, 632
(Kan. 1952) (upholding trial court's transfer of legal custody of child from mother to fa-
ther, but leaving physical custody with a third party who had been taking care of child for
years).
566. Cf Lombard, supra note 15, at 131 (raising issue in the context of a rule which
would permit the custodial parent to name the child at birth).
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change her child's surname. 67
For all of the reasons discussed, the existing version of the cus-
todial parent presumption appears inadequate to eliminate gender
bias. The standard may not apply to disputes involving marital chil-
dren, older children, or a custodial parent who wants to change the
child's surname from the patronym. A more serious problem is that
the presumption does not eliminate the bias that exists for the patro-
nym; the presumption allows the existing best interest factors to
rebut the presumption by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
There is no requirement that associationalism even be considered, or
that the custodial parent be encouraged to give the child a name
matching the name of the child's custodial family. Finally, the stan-
dard, as formulated, complicates the law of custody by blurring the
traditional line between legal and physical custody without a coher-
ent justification for doing so.
567. If the presumption applies when a sole physical-joint legal custodian seeks to
change the child's birth name, then the naming decision would receive less deference from
the New Jersey courts than decisions by the sole physical-joint legal custodian on issues of
child discipline, medical care, and child support. See Pascale v. Pascale, 660 A.2d 485, 493
(NJ. 1995) ("[W]hen joint custody is merely legal in nature, the primary caretaker should
be accorded autonomy over the day-to-day structure of the new family in which he or she
is the primary caretaker.") (how to spend child support); Brzozowski v. Brzozowski, 625
A.2d 597,600 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) ("[T]he residential custodial parent has been
afforded somewhat more authority to decide issues in the event of a disagreement....
[A]ny court should be reluctant to substitute whatever limited expertise it may have for
the empirical knowledge and day-to-day experience of the parent with whom the child
lives, except where there is a clear showing that an act or omission will contravene the best
interests of the child.") (deciding to uphold physical custodian's decision regarding surgery
for minor child over joint legal custodian's disagreement); Pogue v. Pogue, 370 A.2d 539,
540-41 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) ("Only when moral, mental and physical conditions
are so bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should the courts be called
upon to act." (citing Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936))) (refusing to honor
father's request to pull the boy out of basketball until his grades improved).
On the other hand, the naming decision might be treated more favorably than a deci-
sion by a sole physical-joint legal custodian to remove a child from the jurisdiction. In
New Jersey, the custodial parent must "establish (1) that there is a real advantage to that
parent in the move, and (2) the move is not inimical to the best interest of the children."
Christopher-Frederickson v. Christopher, 538 A.2d 830, 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988). After these threshold requirements are established, the court decides whether the
"parent has sufficient cause to permit removal," considering:
(1) the prospective advantage of the move as either maintaining or improving the
general quality of life of both the custodial parent and children, (2) the integrity
of both the custodial parent's motives in seeking to remove the children and the
non-custodial parent's motives in seeking to restrain such move, and (3) whether
a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the move is al-
lowed.
Md It is difficult to predict exactly how the New Jersey courts would view the name change
decision.
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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORM
I will now survey possible solutions to the problem, including
equal protection litigation, the education of judges, and a legislative
proposal. A review of equal protection challenges in name change
cases reveals that such challenges are successful against facially dis-
criminatory classifications, but are unsuccessful against gender-
neutral classifications (unless these classifications are applied in such
a way as to evidence an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex).
Because of the substantial impediments to an equal protection chal-
lenge, I will argue that education and/or legislative reform present
more attractive options for the future.
A. Equal Protection Litigation.8
Equal protection arguments have proven successful in chal-
lenging explicit gender-based classifications such as statutes requiring
that a child bear the patronym,"9 or case law to that effect.5Y0 Facing
the widespread infiltration of equal protection doctrine into family
law,"' the emphasis on "equal rights" by the women's movement,572
568. I appreciate Jean Love's very helpful comments on this section.
569. See, e.g., Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976)
(challenging ALA. CODE, §§ 26-12-1 to 9 (1975) (repealed 1984)); Sydney v. Pingree, 564
F. Supp. 412, 413 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (challenging FLA. STAT. ch. 382.16(5)(a) (renumbered
as ch. 382.013 and amended 1987)); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C.
1981) (challenging N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-50(e) (repealed 1983)); Jones v. McDowell, 281
S.E.2d 192, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (declaring unconstitutional N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-13
(1996)).
570. See, e.g., Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (non-marital
child); Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 964 (Sup. Ct. 1986); cf. In re Marriage of Schiffman,
620 P.2d 579, 582-83 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (finding that legislative reform to eliminate
gender bias in family law generally indicated a legislative intent to treat the sexes equally
in resolving petitions to change a child's surname and trial court should not honor custom
of the father's "primary right" to have his child bear his surname).
"The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacity have long
been held to be state action governed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339,346-47 (1880)). A judge may violate the equal protection clause either
by announcing a "judicial rule" that contains a facial sex-based classification or by decid-
ing the particular case in such a way as to make gender the "sole" or "primary" factor
when there is no "important governmental objective" for doing so.
571. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,461 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
278-79 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 204-17 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975); Stanton v. Stan-
ton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
572. Cf KUPPER, supra note 54, at 133 (attributing women's views about the need to
keep using their birth name upon marriage to the women's movement of the past twenty
years).
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the emergent concept of the family as an institution composed of in-
dividuals with individual rights,573 and scholars' criticism,511 courts
have recognized the mother's right to have a facially gender-neutral
test applied in adjudicating whether her children will bear her sur-
name. 7 Successful equal protection challenges have been raised in
both federal court (e.g., the federal court strikes down a state's stat-
ute or a state court's judicial rule)576 and state court (e.g., a state
appellate court reverses a lower court). 77
Several examples of these victories are informative. In Jones v.
McDowell, 8 for instance, the North Carolina Court of Appeals up-
held an equal protection challenge by the mother and invalidated a
North Carolina statute that required the State Registrar of Vital Sta-
tistics to change a non-marital child's surname on his or her birth
certificate to that of the father upon an order legitimating the child.5 9
The court found that the statute did not "bear a close and substantial
relationship to the important governmental objective underlying the
statutes.""58 The valid purpose of establishing a filial relationship be-
tween non-marital children and their fathers was in no way furthered
by the surname requirement.
Less than two months later, a federal court in O'Brien v. Til-
son581 struck down a North Carolina statute that required marital
children to be given their fathers' surnames. The statute prohibited
one couple from following Swedish custom and giving their child a
surname which combined the father's first name with the suffix
"son." The statute also prohibited another couple from following
Spanish custom and giving their child a hyphenated combination of
573. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
574. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27 & 385.
575. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496-97 (E.D.N.C. 1981); In re Mar-
riage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980) (en banc); In re Marriage of Douglass,
252 Cal. Rptr. 839,843 (Ct. App. 1988); Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742,744 (Ky. Ct. App.
1996); In re Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488,491 (Neb. 1990); Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381,
384 (Neb. 1982); K.K. v. G., 530 A.2d 361,363 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); Rio v. Rio,
504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 457
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Hambry v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Lufft
v. Lufft, 424 S.E.2d 266,269 (W. Va. 1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 386-89.
576. See, e.g., Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412,413 (S.D. Fla. 1982); O'Brien, 523 F.
Supp. at 497; Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769,782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
577. See, e.g., Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).(non-marital child).
578. 281 S.E.2d 192 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
579. See id at 195-97.
580. Id. at 197.
581. 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
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both parents' surnames, and it prohibited a third couple from giving
their child a hyphenated surname. 2 Without designating the appli-
cable level of scrutiny, the court held that North Carolina's
purported justifications for the statute did not meet even a rational
basis test."3 The court found unpersuasive the state's claim that the
statute was needed for the accurate and timely recording of births or
for the screening of newborns for health problems.5"
Some litigants also have successfully challenged a judge's ex-
plicit preference for the patronym. In Hazel v. Wells.'8 for example,
a non-marital child was given the mother's surname. The father peti-
tioned to establish paternity and change the child's surname to his
own surname. After the parties agreed, among other things, to pa-
ternity and joint custody, the trial court ordered that the child's
surname be changed to the father's surname. The trial court said,
The parties have joint custody of their only child ... And
the law is unclear as to which parent should be allowed to
determine [her] surname. While it may appear gender bi-
ased, our society has traditionally had children carry the
surnames of their fathers. Because the Court has no clear-
cut answer to this question, it will require [the mother] to
follow societal norms and change [the child's] surname to
[the father's surname].586
The appellate court reversed. The appellate court read the relevant
statute as not requiring that a child bear the declared father's sur-
name.87 To interpret the statute otherwise "would result in a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause." ' The court continued,
"In these times of parental equality, arguing that the child of unmar-
ried parents should bear the parental surname based on custom is
another way of arguing that it is permissible to discriminate because
the discrimination has endured for many years." '589 The court held
that the child's best interest must determine the outcome and re-
582. See id. at 495.
583. See idU at 496.
584. See id at 496-97.
585. 918 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (non-marital child).
586. Idt at 744 (emphasis omitted).
587. The statute read: "In any case in which paternity of a child is determined by a
court order, the name of the father and surname of the child shall be entered on the cer-
tificate of birth in accordance with the finding and order of the court." Id at 743-44
(quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.046(8)(c)).
588. Id. at 745.
589. Id. (citing Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E.2d 180,185 (Ohio 1988)).
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manded the case for such a determination.59
While an explicit preference for the patronym is vulnerable to
an equal protection challenge, not all such facially discriminatory
laws have disappeared. For example, North Carolina still has a stat-
ute that states: "The surname of the [marital] child shall be the same
as that of the husband, except that upon agreement of the husband
and mother, or upon agreement of the mother and father if paternity
has been otherwise determined, any surname may be chosen."591 The
only difference between this statute and the statute struck down in
O'Brien is the caveat permitting the choice of "any surname" ap-
proved by both the mother and the father.9 The parties in O'Brien
had raised both an equal protection and a substantive due process
objection to the North Carolina statute as it then existed.9 3 The
O'Brien court said that the statute failed to satisfy even the minimum
level of scrutiny, without clearly basing its decision on either argu-
ment. While the subsequent statutory amendment may have
satisfied the O'Brien plaintiffs (as each set of parents were united on
the name they wanted to give their child), the present statute proba-
bly would not survive an equal protection challenge by a woman who
590. See id. at 754.
591. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-101(e) (1995); accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:34(B)(1)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 1997) ("Except as otherwise provided ... the surname of
the child shall be the surname of the husband of the mother if he was married to the
mother of the child at the time of conception and birth of the child or had not been legally
divorced from the mother of the child for more than three hundred days prior to the birth
of the child, or, if both the husband and the mother agree, the surname of the child may be
the maiden name of the mother or a combination of the surname of the husband and the
maiden name of the mother."). Hawaii requires an adopted child receive the adoptive
father's surname where the adoptive parents have different names. See HAW. FAM. Cr.
RULE 111 (Michie 1995). Several states statutorily mandate that the child's name be
changed to the father's automatically upon an establishment of legitimization or paternity.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-15 (Michie 1993) ("If the parents of a child born out
of wedlock in Indiana later marry, the child shall legally take the last name of the fa-
ther."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 46(A) (West 1992) ("If any child born in this state is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents, the state registrar, upon receipt of a
copy of the marriage certificate of the parents together with a notarized statement of the
husband acknowledging the child's paternity, shall prepare a new certificate of birth in the
new name of the child wherein the child's surname shall be that of his father or if both the
father and mother agree, the surname may be the maiden name of the mother or a combi-
nation of the surname of the husband and the maiden name of the mother.").
592- Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-101(e) (1995) (stating that if the mother was
married at the time of conception or birth, the name of the husband-or father if paternity
has been otherwise determined-will be given to the child, unless mother and hus-
band/father agree to a different name) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-50(e) (1981) (repealed
1983) (stating that if the mother was married at conception or birth, the name of the hus-
band-or father if paternity was otherwise determined-shall be given to the child).
593. See O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494,496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
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disagreed with her husband over their child's surname.
To resolve an equal protection challenge to the existing statute
in North Carolina, a court would apply an "intermediate" level of
scrutiny, the standard traditionally applied to distinctions drawn
along gender lines."4 Authors and jurists already have argued that
various state justifications for a patronym preference cannot with-
stand intermediate scrutiny, and their reasoning is persuasive.595 For
example, a patronym preference cannot be justified by the argument
that such a preference helps maintain the parent-child bond, and
therefore furthers the child's best interest. While the child's best in-
terest has been termed a substantial governmental interest in other
contexts, 59 a state would have to concede that a gender-neutral pref-
594. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). A state might apply a higher level of scrutiny under its
state constitution. North Carolina, however, applies intermediate scrutiny even for equal
protection challenges arising under the North Carolina Constitution. See Dunn v. Pate,
431 S.E.2d 178, 182 (N.C. 1993).
595. See, e.g., O'Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 496-97 (holding that it was an "irrational as-
sumption" to believe paternal surname requirement for child was necessary to prevent
undue delays in filing of birth certificate); Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-65 (Sup. Ct.
1986) (showing how the paternal surname does not serve ease of inheritance, governmen-
tal convenience, genealogical and historical convenience, or promotion of marriage and
family life); see also In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 582 (Cal. 1980) (en banc)
(listing other justifications, which have been refuted, such as that the paternal surname
system formalizes long-standing custom, provides a convenient and certain surname sys-
tem, makes official record-keeping easier, minimizes confusion and difficulty with public
and private bureaucracies, gives one a healthy sense of family, ethnic, and religious iden-
tity, and maintains a link to an absent or non-custodial father); Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 724 (Mass. 1977) (stating that justification
of tracing ancestral claims is "a chimera"). Some of the cases where the state's interests
are criticized are substantive due process cases. See, e.g., Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714,
720 (D. Haw. 1979). See also Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 22 (commenting on the
government's interest in "keeping track of its citizens, recording their identities[,] docu-
menting them for purposes of assessing rights," and ensuring that name changes aren't
undertaken for fraudulent purposes); Seng, supra note 24, at 1318-40 (debunking the legal
and sociological arguments for the paternal surname presumption); Thornton, supra note
42, at 311 (arguing state justifications for automatic paternal surname preference are not
sufficient under an equal protection analysis). But see Robertson v. Pfister, 523 So. 2d 678,
679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 382.16 (West
1985) (repealed 1987), that required marital child to receive father's surname based upon
state's interest in insuring accuracy and reliability of vital statistics).
596. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The goal of granting cus-
tody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental
interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause."). In Palmore, the Supreme Court
held it was unconstitutional to divest a natural mother of child custody because of her in-
ter-racial remarriage. Id. at 432. The trial court had found that the best interest of the
child standard dictated an award to the father because the child would be subjected to
"social stigmatization." Id The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court said that
the trial court "made no effort to place its holding on any ground other than race": Racial
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erence for the noncustodial parent's surname would work just as
well. 7 Thus it appears that an equal protection argument provides a
viable means of challenging statutes, such as North Carolina's, that
explicitly prefer the patronym.
Most states, however, do not have gender-specific laws. In these
states, the standards governing marital children's name changes are
gender neutral, although courts often interpret and apply the stan-
dards so that they favor how most men, and not most women, view
surnames. Such sub rosa gender bias is rarely susceptible to an equal
protection challenge.
The case of Halloran v. Kostka595 illustrates the primary diffi-
culty involved in mounting a successful equal protection challenge to
a facially neutral standard. In that case, a marital child had been
given the father's surname at birth. The mother was granted custody
of the child upon divorce. The mother subsequently remarried and
began using her second husband's surname as her own surname.
When her ex-husband refused to allow her second husband to adopt
the child, the child started using the mother's and stepfather's sur-
name. 9 The father filed a petition for a permanent injunction
barring the mother and stepfather from using their surnames to iden-
tify the child. The mother counter-petitioned and sought to change
the child's name to the surname that she and her husband used, a
name that the child had been using for the last four and one-half
years.Y0 Using the best interest standard, with the gloss that the
mother had to prove "some compelling reason" why the father's sur-
name should not be used, the trial court granted the injunction and
denied the mother's petition.'
On appeal, the mother claimed that the trial court violated her
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by per-
petuating the outdated custom of using the paternal surname.0 2 The
Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's decision and
prejudice was used to justify a racial classification. Id. Although the Supreme Court in
Palmore found the child's best interest there was insufficient to justify the state's discrimi-
nation, the "child's best interest" may still be an adequate justification in the name change
context. As the Court in Palmore said, race discrimination is subject "to the most exacting
scrutiny." Id. at 432. Gender discrimination is more easily justified under intermediate
scrutiny.
597. See Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959,965 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
598. 778 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
599. See id. at 455 (noting that although child was registered with school officials by
father's surname, mother requested child be called by stepfather's surname).
600. See ia.
601. See id.
602. See id. at 456-57.
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rejected the mother's equal protection challenge. The appellate
court reasoned that Tennessee's statute recognized equal parental
rights by providing parents with the option of giving their child at
birth a surname other than the father's surname." As the mother
and father were married and living together when they named the
child, the mother "already exercised her equal parental rights by her
participation in choosing this name. Refusing now to allow her to
change [the child's surname].., does not deprive her of any parental
right that is constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed her.",0
4
Halloran highlights a conceptual (and actual) problem with an
equal protection challenge. Litigants must be able to identify "state
action" in order to prevail. In Halloran, both the naming statute and
the trial court's injunction were state action. But the former was
gender-neutral and the latter only enforced the gender-neutral rights
of parents under the statute. While all of this transpired against the
backdrop of a sex-biased custom, the sex-neutral statute overrode
the custom. Even when a state lacks a statute that affirmatively
guarantees parents equal rights to name their child initially, there is
usually no statute or case law that precludes either parent from exer-
cising their equal rights in the initial naming decision. Therefore, an
equal protection challenge to a facially neutral name change stan-
dard would almost always fail under Halloran's reasoning."
Women also face other problems if they choose to raise an equal
protection challenge. For example, a facially neutral standard is not
vulnerable to an equal protection challenge unless one can prove in-
tent to discriminate.S In the context of name change disputes,
where a facially gender-neutral standard usually exists, proving such
intent will be difficult: Women at times do prevail when trying to
change the child's name from the patronym,- and non-discriminatory
603. See id. at 457.
604. Id. at 457.
605. Cf. In re Wilson, 648 A.2d 648, 650 (Vt. 1994) ("If, as here, the court declines to
change a child's name from the father's surname to the mother's surname because such a
change is not in the children's best interest, the decision does not inherently reflect gender
bias merely because the parents' original naming choice followed traditional custom.").
One might have a successful equal protection argument if there were a common law right
of the father to have his marital child bear his surname, which a court in a name-change
dispute then upheld with its facially neutral standard. Some courts have held that the
common law rule was just this, absent a statute to the contrary. See Donald J. v. Evna M.,
147 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 (Ct. App. 1978) (arguing that the Uniform Parentage Act abrogated
common law rule).
606. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-42 (1976).
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justifications exist for the standard.67
Pressing an equal protection challenge to facially gender neutral
standards also may entail some long-term disadvantages for women.
Such a challenge might jeopardize other facially neutral standards
that tend to benefit women-for example, the presumption in favor
of the primary caretaker in custody disputes. 8 The presumption for
the primary caretaker favors women both in its underlying assump-
tions (e.g., that a child needs continuity with his or her day-to-day
caretaker) and in its outcomes. Although the constitutional validity
of the primary caretaker presumption does not turn on whether
women prevail on equal protection challenges in the name change
context, such success would provide a potentially useful analogy by
which courts might more readily invalidate the primary caretaker
presumption. Moreover, if the facially gender-neutral name change
standards that now exist would fail under an equal protection chal-
lenge, then this Article's proposed standard would probably also
succumb to an equal protection challenge.
The injection of equal protection doctrine into the name change
context has helped women achieve some gains, and it should con-
tinue to help eliminate explicit preferences for the patronym. Yet an
equal protection argument probably can do little to eradicate the
subtle bias favoring the paternal surname. The limited usefulness of
an equal protection challenge, and the tactical disadvantages associ-
ated with this approach, suggest an alternative solution is needed.
B. Education of Judges
A possible solution short of law reform would be to educate
607. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270-71, 275 (1979) (upholding state
law that created an absolute hiring preference for military veterans applying for state jobs
although, at the time that the litigation commenced, over 98% of the veterans in Massa-
chusetts were male, over one fourth of the Massachusetts' population were veterans, and
the impact of the Massachusetts' plan on women was "severe"). In addition, the variety of
decision makers and the fact-specific inquiry called for by the various name change stan-
dards would impede the usefulness of statistics in establishing discriminatory purpose. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-98 (1987) (upholding Georgia death sentencing
process because inference from general statistics to a specific decision in trial and sen-
tencing did not warrant inference of unconstitutional discrimination given numerous
entities and variables relevant to statistics).
60& See CLARK, supra note 142, at 800-02 (defining the presumption as one where a
court awards custody to the parent who, before the divorce proceeding, has had primary
responsibility for the day-to-day care of the child, "who has fed him, clothed him, arranged
for his medical care, taken him to and from school, taught him in the home and been re-
sponsible for his discipline"). For an example of the presumption, see Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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courts so that they apply the existing standards without gender bias.
This remedy requires, however, a fortitude that may prove difficult
for some judges given society's deep and entrenched preference for
patronymy. 9 Yet if my analysis helps some courts move in that di-
rection, one of my goals will have been accomplished. Education
would be valuable if it led judges to value more highly the symbolic
function of a surname as an announcement of physical propinquity.
Education should also strive to discredit the argument that a shared
surname is crucial to the noncustodial parent-child bond and the idea
that a stable identity requires a stable name. In general, education
should attempt to make judges more comfortable with name alterity.
C. A New Legal Standard: The Family Association Rule
A more thought-provoking alternative, however, is the possible
adoption of a "family association rule" to govern disputes over chil-
dren's name changes."' The family association rule is similar to, yet
crucially different from, the New Jersey Supreme Court's custodial
parent presumption. Unlike New Jersey's weak version of the cus-
todial parent presumption, the family association rule would require
the court to resolve a name change dispute by allowing the surname
selected by the parent who is the physical custodian to become the
child's surname, so long as an associational justification for the sur-
name existed, unless the non-custodial parent proved by clear and
convincing evidence that serious harm to the child would result. The
most likely associational justifications would be that the name chosen
for the child is the physical custodian's surname or the surname of
another family member who lives in the household (e.g., a step- or
half-sibling). If no associational justification existed, the case would
be decided under the state's existing name change standard. 1 If the
609. Some of these reforms were suggested in the 1970s and have yet to take effect.
See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 42, at 329-30 (suggesting, inter alia, that courts "attach
greater weight to the function of a surname in identifying the child as part of a current
family unit").
610. The proposal is one possible way to help guarantee that associationalism is consid-
ered and valued. I welcome other suggestions for doing the same.
611. To the extent that legal argument adjusts to adaptations in the law, I suspect that
few cases would fall into this residual category. This proposal is not meant to discourage a
state from adopting a new standard for resolving the cases which fall into this residual
category. I do not mean to imply by my proposal that all three existing standards are
equally appealing absent change. My focus has been to indicate that all the current stan-
dards are problematic, and not to choose among them. To the extent that "association"
should always be the paramount consideration, the best interest standard, out of all the
existing standards, probably gives courts the greatest opportunity to consider and value
associational concerns. Other authors have looked at the existing standards and have cho-
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parents have joint physical custody and either parent desires to
change the child's surname, each parent could select a surname for
the child so long as that name had an associational justification.6"
The child would then bear a hyphenated combination of the parents'
chosen surnames, in alphabetical order, unless an objecting parent
could prove by clear and convincing evidence that serious harm to
the child would result.613 In all cases, the court must explicitly con-
sider associationalism in determining whether an objecting party
proved by clear and convincing evidence that serious harm to the
child would result from the change.
This proposal offers several advantages. First, the proposal
would-somewhat ironically-bring the law of name change disputes
closer in line with traditional Anglo-American naming practices.
Generally, nuclear family members who live together and follow
Anglo-American tradition tend to bear the same surname. Not only
do members of a marital couple usually use the same surname, but a
child in an intact family typically bears the surname of his or her cus-
todial parents. A non-marital child also commonly bears the name
of his or her custodial mother."4 If the law of name change disputes
is to be consonant with this tradition, then a child in a dissolved fam-
ily should also have the same surname as his or her custodial parent
or other members of the custodial family. Society (and the parties)
would receive those benefits that attend the following of tradition.'
Second, a number of practical benefits will result from the pro-
posal. For example, the child's and society's safety are increased
when a child is readily identifiable with his or her custodial parent.
The shared surname also helps minimize the inconvenience, embar-
sen between them; their analyses appear helpful for selecting a standard to govern the
residual cases. See supra notes 44; infra note 637.
612. This situation would probably arise infrequently, as the number of people with
joint physical custody is small. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 112 (finding
that of the 933 families in California studied in 1989, approximately 80% had joint legal
custody and 20% had joint physical custody); W.P.C. Phear et al., An Empirical Study of
Custody Arrangements: Joint Versus Sole Legal Custody, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING 142,147 tbl. 6 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984) (determining that of the 500 families in
Massachusetts, only 10% had joint legal and physical custody).
613. While I am not wedded to any one definition of serious harm, I imagine an ob-
jecting party would have to prove something like probable negative changes in the child's
health resulting from the infliction of physical or mental injury.
614. See supra note 436 and accompanying text; but see supra note 437 and accompa-
nying text.
615. There is an economic benefit to following tradition. Cf. Robert C. Clark, Con-
tracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703,
1730-36 (1989); id. at 1731 ("Traditions greatly reduce the very high costs of repeated
discovery, learning, and rational decisionmaking by individuals.").
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rassment and discomfort often mentioned by custodial parents and
children whose surnames differ.616 In addition, a common surname
allows the family members to reveal the family's history to others on
the family members' own terms, thereby minimizing the chance that
the family will encounter hostile attitudes or pejorative labels, such
as "dysfunctional." 617 In fact, the proposal recognizes the importance
of a common surname to a functional family. The practical necessity
for the family association rule is best proven through an examination
of demographic data. One-parent households and blended families
are so common that these family forms alone warrant adoption of the
proposal. Given current rates of divorce and remarriage, half of all
children are expected to live in blended families by the year 2000.618
When a couple divorces and the mother obtains custody, she and her
child (and the stepfather or the mother's partner, if one exists) are a
functional family. They "share affection and resources, think of one
another as family members, and present themselves as such to neigh-
bors and others."'619 Giving members of this group the same surname
helps society recognize them for what they are-a family. °
Third, the family association rule is preferable to current stan-
dards because it brings the most important values to the forefront in
disputes over children's name changes occurring in the aftermath of
family breakup. The family association rule reflects a preference for
symbolic unity among physically proximate family members, rather
than notions of a surname's importance to a person's sense of a sta-
ble identity, immortality, dominion, or the parent-child bond.
Symbolic unity is a preferred value in this context.
The male paradigm has little meaning for a child, with the possi-
ble exception of a name's relation to the parent-child bond or to a
child's sense of a stable identity.62' Rather, the concerns raised by
616. See, e.g., supra notes 462, 466, 468, 471, 487 and accompanying text. For other
possible benefits see text accompanying supra notes 344-45.
617. Of course, it is possible that a name change will also elicit questions.
618. See Paul L. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief
Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24,26 (1989). Glick's estimate includes as children of
blended families "all persons (adults as well as young children) who were born before one
or the other of their parents entered into a second or subsequent marriage...." Ia&
"There are an estimated 25 million stepparents ... and 6.5 million children live in stepfa-
milies." Patsy Skeen et al., supra note 479, at 64 (citations omitted).
619. Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Ou4 62 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 269,270 (1991).
620. See id. at 271 ("[U]nless we start to make family law connect with how people
really live, the law is either largely irrelevant or merely ideology: merely statements of
the kinds of human arrangements the lawmakers do and do not endorse.").
621. See supra Sections IV.A. & IV.B.2.
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the male paradigm relate more to the life of an adult male. Most
young children, even young boys, do not have a "public identity"
akin to an adult's public identity that necessitates a stable surname.
Nor does a father's interest in surnominal immortality have rele-
vance for a child who will carry a family name forward, even if it is
the mother's surname. In contrast, the female view of associational-
ism can be as pertinent, if not more pertinent, to the child as to the
adult. Associationalism reflects the day-to-day lived reality of both
parent and child. In fact, "kids themselves seem to identify who is a
family based on who lives together and has daily contact."6"'
Even if both paradigms are equally valid for a child experiencing
family breakup (assume, for example, that the child's surname is im-
portant to the child's sense of identity), associationalism seems a
superior value to promote in cases where the child will not suffer se-
rious harm from the name change. Certainly a child may find it
unsettling to face either the loss of his or her surname or nominal
disconnection from the custodial parent. When the law is forced to
choose between these two outcomes, the law should prefer linking
the custodial parent and child together through a common surname,
rather than differentiating them. Otherwise a child appears particu-
larly isolated in the context of family breakup-disconnected
nominally from the custodial parent and disconnected physically
from the non-custodial parent. Reinforcing with symbolism the ac-
tual connection that now exists among household members can give
a child comfort, whether or not it can strengthen the actual connec-
tions among those physically proximate. In addition, allowing the
custodian to change the child's name can aid the custodian's own
transition after divorce, and some evidence suggests that easing the
custodial parent's transition from the marriage helps the child as
well.'2' Moreover, the proposal signals to children that one's identity
is not independent of one's custodial family, and that family relation-
ships are just as important as individual notions of identity.2 4 During
divorce, when parents may be emphasizing their independent identi-
622. Minow, supra note 619, at 275 (citing Rhonda L. Gilby and David R. Pederson,
The Development of the Child's Conception of the Family, 14 CANAD. J. BEHAV. Scl. 110,
117-18 (1982)); see also supra note 345.
623. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 335, at 311-12 ("While the psychological
adjustment of the custodial parent has consistently been found to be related to the child's
adjustment, that of the non-custodial parent has not.").
624. It is standard feminist theory to regard relational selves as morally superior to
individualistic selves. See Marilyn Friedman, Feminism & Modem Friendship: Dislocating
the Community in Communitarianism of Individualism, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND
INDIVIDUALISM 101, 101-02 (Schlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992).
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ties at the expense of the family unit, it is critical that the value of
family connection be emphasized.
Even leaving aside the child's interest, the male perspective is
intrinsically flawed when viewed within the context of family
breakup and children's name changes. The male rationale for sur-
nominal stasis does not provide a compelling argument for rejecting
a petition to change the surname of a non-custodial father's child. A
man does not alter his own identity by allowing his child's surname
to change. Nor should notions of "public identity" have any bearing
on this issue: To the extent that a non-custodial father's public iden-
tity is "sullied," this stigma attaches because of the man's failed
marriage and loss of custody, not from the secondary effect of his
child's name change. The father's interest in immortality is not more
weighty than the mother's comparable interest. That interest is also
highly contingent, given that the continuation of a surname beyond
the current generation is always a speculative venture. Moreover, to
the extent that a parent has any valid interest in "demarcating do-
minion" through imposing his or her surname on the children, it
makes more sense to allocate this power to the custodial parent when
the family is in transition. Otherwise, questions may arise about who
has day-to-day authority over the child. There is little merit to the
concern that patronymy is necessary to preserve the bond between a
non-custodial parent and his child, and in any event, a shared sur-
name serves as a weak proxy for actual parent-child contact and
support. Although the male perspective on surnames is hardly vin-
dicated through a court's denial of a name change for his child after
marital dissolution, the woman's perspective is strongly and uniquely
vindicated by a court's permitting the change for associational rea-
sons.
Fourth, the proposal provides a coherent theoretical justification
for restraining judicial discretion. While not eliminating judicial dis-
cretion, the proposal provides a fairly administerable solution for
narrowing the parameters in which that discretion can operate,
thereby helping to constrain any judicial bias that may exist. The
proposal exposes the gender implications of ad hoc decision-making
and the fallacy that "the best interest of the child" standard, or any
standard, is gender neutral.6" The family association rule achieves
this result without obfuscating custody law by calling a surname
change a "daily" child-rearing decision; the proposal instead explic-
625. Cf Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 L. & INO. J. 1, 17 (1984)
(describing the ideological defeat involved in the fall of the tender years doctrine).
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itly allocates the naming decision to the physical custodian because
of a surname's unique purpose.
Although (or, perhaps, because) the proposal does not advocate
radical change, a number of objections to the proposal are foresee-
able. Many of the common justifications for patronymy-including
ease of inheritance, governmental convenience, and genealogical and
historical convenience-have already been debunked by various
courts and commentators,626 and they do not require further attention
here. Rather, I will confront those objections that are unique to the
present proposal.
One conceivable objection to the proposal is that it insufficiently
combats patriarchy and patronymy because it leaves unaltered initial
naming decisions. For practical reasons, I tailored the proposal to
achieve only incremental reform. While sweeping measures that ad-
dress all aspects of patronymy might best rectify the problem, far-
reaching change is also more likely to meet with resistance. To at-
tack effectively the custom that marital children receive their fathers'
surnames at birth, a state would have to legislate parents' ability to
give their children solely the patronym at birth, and a state might
also have to restrict women's ability to take their husbands' sur-
names upon marriage: Such reform would be revolutionary and
would meet with considerable opposition. Adoption of the family
association rule is a much more modest approach, which may in turn
help people think differently about adult surnames upon marriage,
children's surnames upon birth, and children's surnames upon di-
vorce.
Even assuming the state could, through legislation, eliminate the
patronymic preference for children's initial surnames without regu-
lating women's surnames upon marriage, such a reform would raise
substantive due process concerns. The Fourteenth Amendment has
been held to extend constitutional protection to various incidents of
family life, including the parents' right to the care, custody, manage-
ment, and companionship of their minor children.627 Choosing a
surname for one's child falls within the purview of substantive due
process.62 The parents' liberty interest in naming their children what
626. See Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962-63 (Sup. Ct. 1986); supra notes 580, 584,595
and accompanying text.
627. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510,535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923).
628. See, e.g., Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412,413 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (ruling that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects married parents' right to
choose the surname of their children); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C.
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they choose is particularly strong when the parents are united against
the state,'29 even though only rational basis scrutiny is applied to
evaluate the constitutionality of a state's statute.3 ' By prohibiting
1981) ("The Court has no difficulty in concluding that the statute [requiring married par-
ents to give their children the father's surname] does implicate important constitutional
interests. It impinges upon decisions affecting family life, procreation, and child rearing;
areas of human experience which the Supreme Court has long held must be accorded spe-
cial protection."); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979) (holding that
"parents have a common law right to give their child any name they wish, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from arbitrary state action"); Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (Mass. 1977) ("We think the common
law principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names extends to the name chosen by a
married couple for their child."); Jones v. McDowell, 281 S.E.2d 192, 197 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981) (stating requirement that non-marital child's name be changed to the father's sur-
name upon establishment of paternity is "arbitrary" and "denies such mothers a protected
liberty interest").
629. See MacDougall, supra note 24, at 117 ("Wherever married parents are in agree-
ment or there is a statute requiring that a marital child be given its father's surname or
choice of surname on its birth certificate, parents suing jointly have prevailed in all chal-
lenges to mandatory state requirements."). Compare this with Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d
1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990), where the Eighth Circuit upheld the state's restrictions on par-
ents' options when changing their children's surnames. Here the two families challenging
the law were not "traditional." One mother (Henne), although married at the time she
tried to give her child a surname the state disallowed, was going through a divorce and the
child was not her husband's child. See id. at 1210. The other mother was apparently not
married and wanted her child to bear the same surname as the mother's other children,
which differed from the mother's and the father's surnames. See id.
630. In the first reported case to raise the issue, the federal district court of Hawaii
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did protect the parents' right to give their child a
blended surname. See Jech, 466 F. Supp. at 719. While a liberty interest was at stake, it
was not a "fundamental interest," and the court only applied the lowest level of scrutiny to
the state's action. See id. at 719-29. The rational basis test was also used in the other four
cases decided by federal courts: Henne, 904 F.2d at 1214; Brill v. Hedges, 783 F. Supp. 333,
339 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Sydney, 564 F. Supp. at 413; and, O'Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 496. Some
courts have avoided the application of a higher level of scrutiny by differentiating the
naming of children from "other incidents of parenthood." See, e.g., Henne, 904 F.2d at
1214 ("[The choice of a child's surname] possesses little, if any inherent resemblance to
the parental rights of training and education recognized by Meyer and Pierce .... ); Brill,
783 F. Supp. at 339 (naming does "not involve important issues of education or training").
At least one court has focused on the absence of a strong historical practice supporting
unconventional surnames for children. See, e.g., Henne, 904 F.2d at 1213 (framing the
question as whether "a parent has a fundamental right to give a child a surname at birth
with which the child has no legally established parental connection"). Cases which have
made the right seem akin to other "fundamental" rights have not needed to classify the
right and/or have been based on dubious logic. For example, Carroll v. Johnson, 565
S.W.2d 10 (Ark. 1978), a procedural due process case, rested heavily on the proposition
that changing the paternal surname of a child can contribute to the "complete severance of
the father-child relationship," id. at 15, analogizing a father's right to notice when an adop-
tion petition is pending to a father's right to notice when a name change petition is
pending. Id. While courts that have considered the issue apply rational basis scrutiny, this
rational basis scrutiny has more bite than in some other contexts. See, e.g., Sydney, 564 F.
Supp. at 413; O'Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 496; Jech, 466 F. Supp. at 720. But see Robertson v.
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parents from following the historic practice of patronymics, a state
would be repudiating a practice "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition." '631  Such a prohibition might trigger the
application of a higher level of scrutiny by the courts than at present.
In contrast, a state should encounter few, if any, substantive due
process objections when it imposes a family association rule on di-
vorcing, divorced or unmarried parents who disagree over their
children's surnames. The state wields tremendous power to promote
the child's best interest when the family is not intact,632 and this pro-
posal-as explained above and below-furthers the child's interest
better than the status quo. The rationale for the family association
rule should assure that the proposal withstands the level of judicial
scrutiny currently applied in this area.633
A second, but related, criticism is that the proposal perpetuates
patriarchy and patronymics because many children will acquire their
stepfathers' surnames. It is true that many children will in fact ac-
quire their stepfathers' surnames under this proposal because women
customarily take their husbands' names upon marriage and remar-
riage.634 Yet sometimes the stepfather's surname is also a step- or
half-sibling's name, and often it is the mother's surname too. Re-
gardless of who else shares the stepfather's surname, it is the name
the custodial parent wants to share with her child, and this choice
should be honored by the courts. The benefits of associationalism
identified above do not evaporate because the child will use the step-
father's surname.
A similar criticism is that the proposal may reinforce patronym-
ics to some degree because the law "rescues" women who
accommodate their husbands' wishes at the initial naming stage,
making these women's acquiescence possible. Such an objection
Pfister, 523 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding state statute requiring
child conceived before parents' divorce to bear father's surname as reasonably designed to
insure accuracy of vital statistics).
631. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (discussing the test generally);
accord Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (same).
632 See FINEMAN, supra note 454, at 189; see, e.g., Robertson, 523 So. 2d at 679
(rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute that required child receive surname
of woman's husband where parties had conceived while married, although child was born
after the marriage was dissolved).
633. For an example of an application of rational basis scrutiny in this area, see Brill,
783 F. Supp. at 339 (remanding to determine whether the defendant's statute could be
reasonably related to the legitimate goal of preservation of family life).
634. See M.D. v. A.J.L., 646 A.2d 543, 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) ("The ma-
jority of cases dealing with a requested change of an infant's surname" concern the
stepfather's name.).
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only applies to those women who consider the name change stan-
dards and who anticipate, at the time of giving birth, a subsequent
divorce and a future desire to change the child's surname. While the
critique might be true for these women, it seems only remotely pos-
sible that enough women will conform to this fact pattern to further
entrench patronymics on a systematic level.
Another criticism of the standard relates to its potential ineffec-
tiveness. Under the proposal, a court can still look at the best
interest factors (e.g., the link between a surname and the child's
identity) in determining whether clear and convincing evidence es:
tablishes that a child will suffer serious harm from the name change.
However, the elevation of the burden of proof, the imposition of the
burden of proof and production on the non-custodial parent, the re-
quirement of an associational justification for the name change, the
requirement of "serious" harm to thwart the proposed name change,
and the explicit consideration of associationalism in the determina-
tion of whether serious harm will result all guarantee a change in
process, and presumably outcome, from the status quo. For exam-
ple, courts applying the proposal should more frequently than at
present reject arguments that rest on unsupported assumptions.
Notwithstanding my intent, some courts may manipulate even the
proposed standard to accommodate a paternal surname preference.
In the end, however, I believe that some risk of ineffectiveness must
be tolerated in order to allow consideration in a particular case of all
the evidence-regardless of its gendered assumptions-that may se-
verely impact a child's welfare.
A further criticism is that the Article is parent-centered and not
child-centered. For children's rights advocates,635 there are two re-
lated critiques: (1) the empiricism focuses on the importance of
surnames to adults and extrapolates the research conclusions to chil-
dren and, (2) the proposal is a worse solution for children than the
best interest standard or other standards that could be adopted. The
first critique rests, in part, on the truism that name changes at di-
vorce for children differ from name changes at marriage for women.
Among other points of departure, a woman has a choice at marriage
and her decision occurs within the context of a happy event. In con-
trast, a child may have no choice about his or her surname, or his or
her parents' marital situation, or whether he or she experiences the
635. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, The Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: De-
bunking the Doctrine of Parent's Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994); F. Paul Kurmay, Do
Children Need a Bill of Rights? Children as More Than Objects of the Law, 10 CONN.
PROB. L.J. 237 (1996); Woodhouse, supra note 431.
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divorce as a tragedy. Therefore, it may be wrong to assume sur-
names are as labile and alterable for children as they are for their
mothers. The answer to this critique lies in the thesis of this Article.
I argue that the law reflects most men's views of surnames and not
most women's views.* This analysis is justified because the law cur-
rently equates the child's best interest with the predominantly adult
male view.636 Until the child's true interests are explored in a more
empirical fashion,637 there is just as much reason (if not more) to em-
phasize the women's perspective as that which is best for the child.63
Certainly another article could explore generational bias, as opposed
to adult gender bias, in the law.639
The second part of the children's rights critique is that the pro-
posal is worse for children than other potential standards (e.g., a
standard that would allow a child to choose his or her surname)."4°
636. See supra Section IV.
637. Kelly, supra note 178 ("Not much has been written about the role of naming and
name changing in child development literature generally ...." and "very little has been
said among experimental psychologists or child development psychologists about the role
of a last name in childhood identity formation."). Professor Kelly uses literature "from a
variety of sources which attempts to divine the deep and inscrutable value of names for
children." As the quotation and the title of her article indicate, the value of names to chil-
dren is currently inscrutable, although Professor Kelly suggests that "learning one's name
is an important part of the identity formation process." Ld. Professor Kelly admits, how-
ever, that whether a name change is "helpful or harmful to children certainly varies from
situation to situation," id. at 64, as the child's identity is also "shaped by family structure
and relations to others." Id. In advocating that the law stay focused on the child's interest,
Kelly advocates the standard in Gubernat for children under 6, the best interest standard
for children between the ages of 6 and 14, and that the child's own preference governs if
the child is over 14. See id. To the extent that one could eliminate the gender bias implicit
in the standards advocated by Kelly for children under 14, her proposed reform has merit.
But see supra Sections IV.B & IV.C.
638. For example, consider the fictional vignettes discussed supra in the text accompa-
nying notes 79-87, 163, 245, 247,344-45. 479-87 and supra notes 618-20, 622.
639. In fact, this is the approach of Lisa Kelly. See Kelly, supra note 180; supra note
637.
640. Several international instruments enshrine children's rights relating to names. For
example, the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, states, "The child shall be enti-
tled from his birth to a name and a nationality." DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD, G.A. Res., U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, 20, U.N. Doe. A/4354
(1954) (principal 3). Article 24(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states, "Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name." G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 55, U.N. Doc
A/16316 (1966) (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III, Article
24(2)). The American Convention on Human Rights states that "Every person has the
right to ... the surnames of his parents or that of one of them." American Convention on
Human Rights, 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Series KIXVI/1.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970)
(signed Nov. 22, 1969). Article 7 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child states,
"The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to
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Under my proposal, as under the status quo, a court would have dis-
cretion whether or not to accord weight to the child's opinion."
a name .... " 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1448, 1460 (1989) (reproduced from G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989)). As one author commented, "although children have a
right to a name, they do not have a right under international law to a name of their
choice." GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHT OF THE
CHILD 117 (1995).
It is worth noting that the Convention on the Rights of the Child also states that
"States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including ... name ... as recognized by law without unlawful interference." 28 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1446, 1460 (1989) (ARTICLE 8(1)). Resolving naming disputes with
my proposal would not constitute "unlawful interference" under this convention. The
United States, while signing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, has not yet ratified
it. Some Senators have opposed ratification of this convention because of its perceived
encroachment upon "the laws and traditions of the U.S. [that] affirm the right of parents to
raise their children and to transmit to them their values...." See S. Res. 133, 104th Cong.
(1995).
641. State law is currently split over whether a minor has the same common law right as
an adult to change his or her surname, assuming the child is of sufficient age and maturity
to make an intelligent choice. Some states recognize such a right. See, e.g., Laks v. Laks,
540 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Carroll v. Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Ark.
1978); Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hall v. Hall, 351
A.2d 917, 923, 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Bruguier v. Bruguier, 79 A.2d 497, 499 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951); In re Shipley, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1960); cf. Rap-
pleye v. Rappleye, 454 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Other states require that
the surname change be in the child's best interest. See, e.g., Clinton v. Morrow, 247 S.W.2d
1015, 1018 (Ark. 1952); In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980); In re
Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873,874 (Ct. App. 1968), overruled by Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 579; In
re Marriage of Presson, 465 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Ill. 1984) (citing Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d
381, 384 (Neb. 1982)); In re Morehead, 706 P.2d 480, 483 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Hardy v.
Hardy, 306 A.2d 244,246 (Md. 1973); West v. Wright, 283 A.2d 401,402 (Md. 1971); Mark
v. Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Mass. 1956). Where the court looks at the minor's best
interest, the child's age and maturity influences the weight a court assigns to the child's
preference. See supra note 489. Whether a state recognizes the child's common law right
often turns on whether a statute exists which can be construed as altering the common law
right, see, e.g., Morehead, 706 P.2d at 482, and/or whether the child himself or herself
adopted the new surname or whether the parent adopted it for the child. See, e.g., Shipley,
205 N.Y.S.2d at 587 ("Where the parents are separated or divorced, policy considerations
suggest that any change brought to a court's attention be closely scrutinized to determine
that it is actually the infant's own decision rather than that of the parent with whom he
lives...."); Kay v. Bell, 121 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) ("While it is true ....
that one 'may adopt any name he may choose so long as such change is not made for
fraudulent purposes,' that does not mean that some other person may select, for a person,
a name different from the name by which such person is known." (quoting Pierce v.
Brushart, 92 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ohio 1950))); cf In re Staros, 280 N.W.2d 409, 410-11 (Iowa
1979) (holding that Iowa statute does not allow a minor to obtain a name change even if
brought by next friend except in narrow circumstances, and court refused to address
whether statute preempted common law right to change name without legal formality).
See generally, Bugliari, supra note 274, at 149 (arguing that common law right to change a
name applies to minors absent modifying statute although right may be subject to court
scrutiny). Even if such a common law right exists, its utility is limited as "schools often
request to see the child's birth certificate before registration," causing a "practical prob-
1771
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Also, under the family association rule, as exists at present, the name
that the law deemed best for the child might conflict with the child's
desire for an already established identity. Yet I believe the proposal
is a reasonable attempt at reform, although it continues to restrict
children's autonomy in selecting their surnames.
The suggested legal reform is consistent with the present status
of children's rights generally. For most childrearing decisions, con-
stitutional jurisprudence still subordinates children's rights to their
parents' desires,"2 except when a parent jeopardizes a child's physical
or mental health."3 The United States Supreme Court has never de-
cided whether a child has a liberty interest in his or her surname,
independent of the parents' desires.6" Even if one assumes that the
child has a liberty interest in his or her name that grows as the child
ages," this interest would not necessarily be determinative. 646 At
lem." Seng, supra note 24, at 1309. In addition, the child's common law right may be lim-
ited by the rights of others. At least one court has said that the father's right would be
burdened by his children's use of their stepfather's surname. See In re Marriage of Omel-
son, 445 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also MacDougall, supra note 24, at 108
n.40 (explaining that a child's common law right is subject to his or her parents' authority
and that minors never have had a common law right to name themselves independent of
their parents, even if they can do so without judicial proceedings).
642. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2406 (1995) ("IT]he tradition of legal protection of parental rights has deep histori-
cal roots."). Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L REV.
955, 989 (1993), explains how all of the Justices in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990), "recognize[d] that a minor's right of individual privacy is limited by the competing
right of parental authority." Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972)
(recognizing parent's traditional interests in children's upbringing); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629,639 (1968) (stating that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recog-
nized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society").
643. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) ("We have recognized that a
state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children
when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.").
644. See MacDougall, supra note 24, at 157 ("[Courts have not been receptive to rec-
ognizing... children's constitutional rights in this area."). Neither has the Supreme Court
decided whether a child has a liberty interest symmetrical with that of a natural parent in
maintaining their relationship, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989), but
such arguments have not always met with success. See, e.g., Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 339
(refusing to recognize Baby Richard's liberty interest in relationship with adoptive parents
because to do so would "overturn the entire jurisprudential history of parental rights in
Illinois").
645. See Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("[IThe name
change touches upon this right to maintain the integrity of established family relations.")
(stating in obiter dictum that the child has a "liberty" interest at stake when his or her
name is altered).
646. Cf In re Wing, 157 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (City Ct. 1956) (denying application on be-
half of 11-year-old child because it was not in her best interest to change her name, even
assuming that name change was an essential part of the child's Muslim religion).
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best, the child's right would have to be balanced against the parents'
liberty interests 47 My proposal is one way to strike the balance. A
child can still inform the court if he or she disagrees with the custo-
dial parent's choice. The court can protect the child from a harmful
choice by the parent. In those cases where an unavoidable conflict
exists between the child's wishes and the custodial parent's wishes
(because the child will not suffer serious harm), society has to make
a difficult choice, and for the reasons already suggested, association-
alism should prevail.
Additionally, one may worry that the proposal will have a nega-
tive effect on certain subgroups of our population. For example, a
Latino child often bears a hyphenated version of the parents' sur-
names. That child may face a loss of cultural identification if the
custodial parent has only one surname and wants the child to bear
only that surname. This erosion of cultural identification may, in
turn, weaken the Latino community in some respect. When ad-
dressing petitions to change the names of Latino children, judges will
have to determine if clear and convincing evidence establishes that
serious harm would result to the child (not the community) from the
lack of cultural identification that would otherwise attend the use of
a hyphenated surname. A similar child-centered approach, as op-
posed to a community orientation, exists under the status quo's
standards. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which a Latino
or other community would be uniquely harmed by the adoption of
the proposal, although it is possible that the proposal would actually
benefit at least some Latino communities. To the extent that the
proposal encourages or results in the proliferation of hyphenated
names generally, society may become more tolerant and accommo-
dating to the predominant Latino practice."8
The proposal may also adversely impact upon some women.
These are not the women who think a stable surname is integral to a
647. It is conceivable that a court would find that the child's liberty interest is subordi-
nate to her parents' liberty interest in childrearing absent a finding of the parents'
unfitness. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("[T]hree reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:
the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner, and the importance of the parental role in childrearing."); cf.
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 328 (stating that child's interest in family life is not independent of
the child's parents' interest absent a finding of unfitness). This is especially true when
there is no reason to believe that "the natural bonds of affection" will not "lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children." Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
648. See generally Cherena Pacheco, supra note 42, at 33-35 (explaining problems Lati-
nos face in dominant culture because of diverse naming practices).
1773
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stable sense of identity and who obtain custody; no woman is forced
to change her child's surname. Rather, there probably are some
women who will lose physical custody of their children to their
spouses. These women may believe that one's name is an important
aspect of one's identity and vigorously oppose attempts to change
their children's surnames. Yet the male custodial parent may want
the children to bear only the patronym, even if the children currently
bear their mothers' surnames, either alone or in hyphenated form.
While women in this category will have less chance of prevailing un-
der the proposed standard than under the status quo, the number of
these women must be minuscule. More importantly, however, the
merits of an associational approach are not diminished by these
women's circumstances.
One might agree that associationalism is an important concept,
but also believe that the proposed standard is too weak. After all,
why not require that associationalism always be the guiding princi-
ple, and ensure that children who live with a parent always bear that
parent's surname? The formulation proposed in this Article avoids
or minimizes many of the concerns about a stricter rule. For exam-
ple, a standard that required the physical custodian and the child
always to bear the same surname would repress diversity, and some-
times undermine the desired associationalism. A strict requirement
that the child bear the physical custodian's name would preclude a
physical custodian who used her birth name from giving the child the
surname of the child's step- or half- siblings. The current formula-
tion assumes that the physical custodian is in the best position to
evaluate the various aspects of associationalism, subject to the non-
custodial parent's right to contest the physical custodian's selection.
One might be concerned that a child's father will reduce child
support in response to his child's relinquishment of the patronym.
While failure to pay support can cost a father his right to object to a
surname change,"9 courts generally reject the argument that child
support obligations are contingent upon the child's retention of the
patronym,60 although fathers certainly make the argument.6' Nor do
649. See supra note 293.
650. See, e.g., In re Grimes, 582 A.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("In no case
has a court decided that a name may not be changed because the father pays sup-
port .... "), rev'd on other grounds, 609 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1992). But see In re Marriage of
Presson, 465 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. 1984) ("It would be ironic if the courts were to require [the
natural father] to meet these obligations [of support] and yet not honor his wish to help
maintain the parental bond under difficult circumstances by allowing the child to utilize his
mother's new surname just five short weeks after her remarriage!"). Historically, courts
were more receptive to this argument. See Montandon v. Montandon, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43, 46
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most courts look favorably upon fathers' attempts to terminate child
support when their children's names are changed."2 Child support
enforcement statutes will help minimize the risk that such an argu-
ment would succeed.
One might fear that the family association rule will disadvantage
women by raising the stakes in custody battles. It is conceivable that
fathers may vie for physical custody -more often if an award of physi-
cal custody to the father essentially ensures that his children will
continue to bear the patronym. Also, if physical custody is an impor-
tant factor in determining a child's surname when a dispute over the
surname exists, then the judicial preference for the patronym may
cause women to lose more custody disputes. Neither of these possi-
bilities appear particularly likely at present. Undertaking sole or
joint physical custody is a high price for fathers to pay simply to help
ensure that their children continue to bear their surnames. A fa-
ther's concern would more likely be negotiated and resolved through
an agreement that gave the custodial parent money or custody in ex-
change for her preservation of the paternal surname. Whether
judges' preferences for the patronym would overcome their strong
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (" 'And tho' it be ordinary to make the eldest son only to bear the
name, yet it seems very reasonable that even all the younger children should bear the
name if they get any Patrimony out of the family, unless they can prove they were pro-
vided Aliunde.'" (quoting Works, ii, 490 (1722)).
651. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Ginsburg, 53 Cal. Rptr. 911, 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Bell
v. Bell, 500 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 1986); Dolgin v. Dolgin, 205 N.E.2d 106, 108
(Ohio Ct. App. 1965); Aylsworth v. Adams, 736 P.2d 225,226 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Grimes,
582 A.2d at 1388-89.
652. See Ryan v. Schmidt, 633 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that trial
court erred in relieving father of child support obligation based solely upon the change of
children's surname); Bell, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 389 ("[Tjhere is no basis in law or reason to
condition the duty of support upon a child's bearing the surname of the payor parent.");
Dolgin, 205 N.E.2d at 110 (changing of child's surname does not relieve father's child sup-
port duties); Aylsworth, 736 P.2d at 227 (holding that father must continue to support child
despite child bearing mother's surname). But see Warshaw, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (changing
name to stepfather's name indicated eighteen-year-old no longer needed defendant's mea-
ger support); cf. Cohen v. Schnepf, 463 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (App. Div. 1983) (changing name
coupled with denying father visitation for the last five years constituted abandonment of
the father so eighteen-year-old son forfeited claim for support); Good v. Stevenson, 448
N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (noting that mother severed father-son relationship by
unilaterally changing children's names and denying visitation); Jones v. McDowell, 281
S.E.2d 192, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding unconstitutional statute that child bear fa-
ther's surname upon establishing a filial relationship with non-marital child, regardless of
mother's and child's desires, but also reversing finding of filiation, initiated by putative
father, so that he could decide if he wanted to continue the action knowing that the child
would bear her mother's surname and that the child would have certain rights, including
the rights of inheritance).
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preferences for maternal custody is hard to predict."' However,
judges probably will recognize that few women seek to change their
children's surnames upon divorce, and that the proposal would not
result in an automatic name change for children. In the future, if
more women petition to change their children's surnames, the situa-
tion may change. Only empirical research at that time will reveal if
judges' preferences for the patronym have yielded sufficiently to rec-
ognize the merit of the family association rule.
One also may be concerned that custodial parents with base mo-
tives-for example, a desire to hurt an ex-spouse-may be able to
exploit a standard based on associationalism. Because the proposed
standard finds a parent's motive for changing the child's name irrele-
vant, unless the motive constitutes an associational justification or
helps to establish that the name change will cause serious harm to
the child, a small risk exists that adults with malicious motives will try
to take advantage of the rule. However, under existing standards a
litigant can easily evade a court's scrutiny of his or her motive by of-
fering a socially acceptable motive in lieu of a more accurate base
motive. In addition, the selfish or sullied motives of some parents do
not diminish the importance of the associationalism critique or asso-
ciationalism itself, and the benefits of associationalism are bestowed
in spite of the parent's motives.
Finally, one may be troubled by the potential that a child's name
may change if and when physical custody is modified. Such a change
only is objectionable, however, if one accepts the predominantly
male view that a surname should be stable. If one embraces associa-
tionalism, then the objection disappears. In any event, the family
association rule would permit a judge to refuse to change a child's
surname in the exceptional case, where clear and convincing evi-
dence showed that the child would be seriously harmed by the name
change.
653. Mothers still receive custody in the overwhelming number of cases. See
MACCOY & MNOOKIN, supra note 49, at 98-114. In a study of 933 California couples,
500 of 705 uncontested cases involved a request for mother physical custody and, in 90%
of the cases, the mother received sole physical custody. See id. at 103. Only 75% of the
uncontested cases for sole father custody led to the father gaining sole custody, with 12%
resulting in mother physical custody. See iU. Only 50% of the uncontested cases for joint
physical custody resulted in that outcome. The proportion resulting in mother custody was
four times higher than the resulting father custody. In cases with conflicting requests,
mothers' requests were granted approximately twice as often as fathers' requests. The
mother was denied sole physical custody in only one third of the cases where she wanted
sole physical custody and the father wanted joint physical custody. Mothers were awarded
sole physical custody four times as often as fathers when both requested sole physical cus-
tody. See id. at 103-04.
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Although it is not free of problems, the family association rule
provides a better mechanism for adjudicating name change disputes
than any of the existing standards. The rule would redress the status
quo's long neglect of associationalism as an important criterion in
resolving name change disputes. While additional reforms may also
be appropriate, the family association rule offers a useful starting
point for overhauling the law governing disputes over children's
names.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal disputes over marital children's surnames present a win-
dow through which one can examine society's gender relations and
courts' treatment of women. Society and the courts are slowly, but
generally, progressing past overt gender inequality. While most of
the existing standards governing name change disputes are facially
neutral, they are interpreted and applied in a manner that privileges
the typical male conception of surnames, and undervalues (or ig-
nores) the viewpoint commonly held by women. Such sub rosa
gender bias casts doubt on courts' assertions that current legal doc-
trine has overcome the vestiges of sexism. In the context of family
dissolution, where the predominantly male and female paradigms
often clash, exposing the bias opens up a discussion about the values
society may want to promote with its naming practices.
In the first half of this Article, I employed an interdisciplinary
methodology to discern general differences between most men's and
most women's views of surnames. Drawing from social science
studies, fiction, personal narratives, and more traditional legal mate-
rials, I demonstrated that the typical male view of surnames is
different from the typical female view. Because a man generally
bears the same surname from birth until death, he comes to believe
that his identity is inextricably bound up with his surname, and he
equates changing his surname with altering his identity. Men are so-
cialized to believe that a stable surname is vital to their public
personae, because a man's surname links together his all-important
accomplishments in the public sphere. Some men believe that when
their children's names are changed from the patronym, the fathers'
public reputations are tarnished. Many men also feel that they can
achieve immortality by preserving their surnames intact and be-
stowing them on future generations. Some men regard surnames as
markers of their apparent or actual authority over their wives and
children. Many men also feel that their relationships with their chil-
dren will suffer if father and child bear different surnames. Given
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these deeply held beliefs, it is not surprising that many men feel a
visceral opposition to name changes, either for themselves or their
children.
Women usually have a wholly different conception of surnames.
Many women, faced with the prevalent societal custom that women
generally change their surnames upon marriage, view surnames as
labile and fungible. To these women, the primary purpose of a sur-
name is to designate present propinquity-a notion that I have
termed "associationalism." Most women do not believe that one's
identity would be undermined by a surname change to reflect one's
present association with family members in the same household; in
fact, women generally believe such a name change would affirm
one's identity as a member of that household.
In the second half of this Article, I argued that the law govern-
ing disputes over children's surname changes tends to reflect (and
thereby fortify) the "male" conception of surnames. The specific le-
gal standards used by the courts for resolving children's name change
disputes-the presumption for the status quo, the best interest of the
child standard, and the custodial parent presumption-all are inter-
preted and applied in a manner that favors the typically male view of
the importance of surnames, despite courts' rhetoric to the contrary.
For example, the courts have shown their prejudice against surnomi-
nal change by emphasizing the length of time a child has borne his or
her present surname, by presuming that a name change disrupts a
child's sense of identity, by speculating that a child with the maternal
surname will be viewed as a bastard, and by questioning the motives
of women who submit name change petitions. To the extent that
those standards address associationalism, they often focus on the
child's need to associate with the absent father.
While the custodial parent presumption is somewhat more pro-
gressive than the other two standards, it offers little hope of valuing
associationalism in name change disputes. The custodial parent pre-
sumption has been rejected by every court that has considered it in
the context of a dispute over a child's name change, except for the
maverick New Jersey Supreme Court. No court has ever applied the
custodial parent presumption to adjudicate name change disputes
involving marital children or older children, or even a name change
petition initiated by a custodial parent. Moreover, even the New
Jersey court recognized a "best interest" exception that all but swal-
lows the rule. Beset by these limitations and others, the existing
custodial parent presumption is unlikely to vindicate the association-
alist values held by most women.
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Nor does it appear that the current legal framework is suscepti-
ble to reform through an equal protection challenge or education of
the judiciary. The facial neutrality of the existing standards, coupled
with the absence of state action, pose high hurdles to any equal pro-
tection challenge. An equal protection challenge also raises a tactical
problem for women's rights activists. The educational solution re-
quires an extraordinary faith in the judiciary's commitment to
recognize and eliminate gender bias. The effectiveness of education
is dubious given society's entrenched preference for patronymics, the
subtlety of the patronym preference, and the vast number of judicial
actors.
Instead of trying to work within the existing framework, I pro-
posed legal reform-the family association rule-which would
mandate that courts take account of associationalism in disputes over
children's surnames. The family association rule requires a court to
resolve a dispute by allowing the surname selected by the parent who
is the physical custodian to govern, so long as an associational justifi-
cation exists, unless the noncustodial parent can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that serious harm to the child would result. In
determining whether the child would suffer serious harm, the court
must explicitly consider and value associationalism.
The family association rule is no more gender neutral than the
status quo. The principal contribution of the family association rule
is that it represents an overt decision that associationalism should be
valued highly in adjudicating disputes over children's name changes.
Children and adults benefit when society recognizes that a child's
present relationship to his or her custodial family is one of the most
important factors in resolving a name change dispute. Surnames
should unify, not distinguish, family members in the same household.
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